



## Global Policy Brief No.1

### *A National Security Planning Framework for Post-conflict Countries*

The International Working Group on National Security (IWGNS) was formed in 2009 to promote the intellectual development and systematic study of national security policy formulation and the broader implications for a range of related policy instruments. Members of the Working Group bring with them a background in both strategic planning and the facilitation of national security and development processes. The Group responds to requests to facilitate national security planning processes for both bilateral and multilateral partners, and contributes to the national security training and education programmes of all member institutions.


The *Global Policy Brief* Series is meant to provide analyses and useful methodologies on challenges related to national security planning in order to support policy development and education.

## A NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING FRAMEWORK FOR POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

### “The Cranfield (IWGNS) Model”

1. The development of the Cranfield (IWGNS) Model for National Security Planning in post-conflict countries is intended to respond to a gap in the academic, policy and practitioner literature on strategic planning for national security. The Model is meant to support the evolution of a more comprehensive, cohesive, evidence-based and inclusive approach to national security development/management. It outlines the core elements for consideration and allows adaptation of the process by policymakers and security professionals of all types in formulating and executing interventions in post-conflict countries. It is dynamic, simple in presentation (yet capable of being used in a wide variety of situations), and based on a number of simple and widely accepted principles.

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Source: The Cranfield (IWGNS) Model, 2009 (illustrated in full at Annex 1)

2. This model is based on the International Working Group for National Security's (IWGNS) definition of national security. This reads:

*“National Security is the first and most important obligation of government. It involves not just the safety and security of the country and its citizens. It is a matter of guarding national values and interests against both internal and external dangers - threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state, society and citizens. It must include not just freedom from undue fear of attack against their person, communities or sources of their prosperity and sovereignty, but also the preservation of the political, economic and social values - respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, a market economy and the environment - which are central to the quality of life in a modern state.”*

3. This Model is principle-based and builds on lessons learned across various transitional post-conflict contexts. Core principles include: i) planning for eventual full sovereignty ii) adopting a holistic and structured process iii) progressive transparency and accountability iv) evidence-based policy formulation v) continuous and simultaneous activity planning vi) fiscal sustainability vii) partnerships (between national actors and also between national and international actors) viii) ‘do no harm’ ix) benchmarked service delivery.
4. The Model is illustrated as an interconnected analytical process which considers i) the political economy, security and conflict history of a particular state, at a given moment in time and ii) options and entry points for strategic reform and restructuring of national security policy, planning, budgeting and execution processes. It emphasises the need for both effective strategic leadership and strategic management.
5. The top circle represents the high-level considerations or drivers that are critical for informing the internal strategic planning process shown in the bottom circle. In a post-conflict situation, the logical ‘entry point’ will differ depending on context. Whilst this Model does not prescribe any particular starting point, it recognises that any number of the 4 elements in the top circle – *Values, Goals, Factors Affecting Pursuit of Goals/Aims and Strategic Leadership* - will already be present in varying capacities, shapes and forms.
- a. **Values:** A country emerging from conflict may already have a Constitution and/or a set of strategic policy papers which refer to the country's national values. It will be important, however, to have an agreed knowledge and understanding of the country's security and conflict history, culture(s), political-economy drivers, societal structure and institutions as a lack of common understanding even among the local population often leads to external actors being influenced by one interpretation. In some cases, it may be necessary to

work with other documents or 'creeds' that have shaped clan, tribal or various other ethnically-based groups which make up the society.

- b. **Goals/Aims:** In developing a mechanism to determine or articulate a country's short-term stabilisation objectives in parallel to its medium-longer term "*Goals*", there may be a range of options, including an existing National Security Secretariat, a Special or Technical Committee, an ad hoc group appointed by the Head of State, parliamentary or civil society groupings, or a group of well-informed 'change agents' (or advisers/facilitators/experts) which meets regularly and often informally. However, none of these mechanisms will work unless there is already a consensus amongst important actors on the future of the country. Typically, a number of these actors will be "spoilers" with agendas favouring instability and conflict. As a strategic approach, careful consideration should be given to isolating the spoilers and supporting the visionary leaders who seek progressive transformation at the political, economic and social levels.
  - c. **Factors affecting pursuit of values/aims:** The third element in the top circle involves identifying and assessing the existing environment in terms of factors that may affect the achievement of the stated goals. Such factors include public security and infrastructural issues, educated/ trained/ competent human resource constraints and demographics in terms of age, education, culture and geography. This analysis should also consider regional and international dynamics which impact on the pursuit of stated goals. The arrows in both directions in this part of the cycle reflect an intentional feedback/re-assessment as conditions may change as the activity/process develops leading to additional factors to be addressed.
  - d. **Strategic Leadership:** Strategic leadership appears as the fourth element in the top circle. In a weak or fragile state, this leadership could exist in many ways, shapes and forms. For example, and as was the case in Haiti and Liberia, the Head of State may be in exile; there may be an external actor serving as an interim transitional authority; a member of the Diaspora community, an existing indigenous leader who represents the former regime, or an indigenous 'change agent' who commands the broad support of the international community. The issue of 'agency' and associated militia movements and political parties is also relevant. The strategic leadership must have a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of all of the components of the top circle.
6. The top circle highlights the importance of 'knowing where you are' with each of these critical elements and keeping the elements in 'balance' in a way that allows for actual progress to be made on the

ground. For example, the values need to be clear and supported whole-heartedly by strategic leadership; the goals need to reflect these values; and the analysis of the factors affecting the pursuit of goals needs to be equal to the capacity of strategic leadership to work on them in a practical way.

7. In some cases, approaching the problem in this way will not be a comfortable experience for external advisers as there may have to be compromises recognising local conditions, local capacities and even some widely-held concepts in human rights which, in an ideal world, would be fully acceptable in the host country. The top circle also reminds the user that these elements can usually be drawn from internal sources right from the outset, thus ensuring that maximum efforts are made to 'indigenise' what are often, mistakenly, externally-led planning approaches.
8. The lower circle outlines the elements that are critical to ensuring the implementation of plans. These activities consist of planning, organising, directing, staffing, financing and controlling. In most post-conflict interventions, the two circles tend in practice to be disconnected. 'Policy' should clearly identify 'what' issues(s) should be addressed and 'why' these issues are important to the country. These issues should be identified by the Government of the country itself, at least as much as it is able to. The 'policy' which drives the process may be based on the 'foreign policy' (or a compromise between different policies) of external actors; there is often an absence of any strategic plans (although often a high number of various plans, a number which overwhelms local actors); and the resources deployed are as a result of foreign policy interests and their availability often dictates the way in which an overarching structure is developed on the ground. The resources applied are also often inadequate and hence pose real constraints to policy implementation. If expectations are thereby dashed, both the leadership and, more importantly, a population desperately in need of visible results, lose confidence in the emerging national security policy formulation process.
9. The link between the top and bottom circles is the crucial connection, shown in the diagram by way of the upward and downward arrows. The Model is neutral about the form of leadership. However, the Model does emphasise that the leadership should be strategic, local and unified. This is particularly important where senior advisers such as Special Envoys, High Representatives and other external lead actors work to a single concept of leadership and not their own agendas. Lastly, this strategic leadership must be based on vision, creativity and systems-thinking (Bonn, 2006) and should take ownership of the process from top to bottom.
10. The Cranfield (IWGNS) Model is meant to serve as a guide to assist strategic planners and practitioners in formulating appropriate questions to ask at each stage of the planning process. The

authors supporting the development of this model recognise the existence of a small number of other planning models which seek to offer guidance in this area. Recognising and building on these existing efforts, this Model i) acknowledges that the settings for each engagement are different ii) caters effectively to the broad stakeholder base which the exercise demands iii) offers flexibility and adaptation and iv) highlights the dynamic, changing nature of the environment and hence the process itself. It is accepted that this process may remain incomplete during the short to medium term. However, continued efforts to build and balance the elements in the top circle, develop an improved concept of 'strategic leadership' in the middle, and effect 'strategic management' in implementation in the lower circle – will encourage more effective and sustainable national security planning for post-conflict states.

**ANNEX 1**

Strategic Planning for National Security in Post-Conflict Countries  
*“The Cranfield (IWGNS) Model”*

