It is also necessary to undertake a realistic appraisal of the capacity
of the security organisations and the civil authorities to manage and implement
ambitious security-sector transformation initiatives. Well-intentioned policy
that has not taken into account the resource constraints, institutional
limitations, human-resource limitations and political priorities of the
country concerned will act as no more than visions with little long-term,
operational utility. As Box 1-6 suggests, the managerial capacity of the
civil authorities is quite weak in many parts of Africa, making this an
issue that must be addressed as a matter of priority.
Developing and implementing viable transformation
strategies requires:
- Particular attention to capacity building;
- Realistic plans that can be implemented with available human,
institutional, and financial resources;
- Prioritisation of issues to be addressed;
- Comprehensive "force-field analysis" of the capabilities of
the organisation(s) to be transformed.
|
| Box 1-6. Civil-Military Imbalances in SADC Countries
|
"Comparative studies of the organizational structures
of the ministries responsible for defence in the [SADC] region show
that some of them still have inadequate institutional arrangements
for stable civil-military relations. In some defence ministries, the
military [are] dominant and civilians hardly make any meaningful contribution
to defence policy formulation and financial control. The military
principals, the chiefs of defence forces or force commanders, do not
have civilian counterparts or Principal Secretaries to jointly plan,
coordinate and execute policy."
Source:
Erastus I. Negonga, "Namibian Civil-Military Relations in
the New Millennium: Prospects and Challenges," Prepared for the ISS
Security-sector transformation Project, August 15, 2001.
|
1.4 The Handbook
1.4.1 Audience
| This handbook provides guidance on undertaking a process of security-sector transformation consistent with democratic governance principles and a human security agenda. It is primarily intended for security-sector practitioners both in the security organisations and among the civil authorities charged with managing and monitoring the activities of the security organisations. It is secondarily intended to assist policy makers, civil society, and those agencies that provide financial and technical support to efforts to strengthen security-sector governance in understanding the issues involved in a transformation process.
|
1.4.2 Content
Chapter 2 identifies the potential security universe in a country and provides
brief descriptions of each main group of actors. It argues that all actors
? official and non-official ? that affect the governance of the security
sector need to be engaged, if democratic governance of the security sector
is to be achieved. The five main categories of actors are: (1) organisations
authorised to use force; (2) civil management and oversight organisations;
(3) judicial, penal and public safety organisations; (4) non-state security;
and (5) civil society actors.
Chapter 3 outlines the requirements of security in a democracy. The essence
of the transformation of the security sector is the process of aligning
the sector with core values, principles and practices of democratic governance.
In addition to explaining the importance of democratic governance, the chapter
discusses: (1) the legal basis of the security sector; (2) transparency
in the security sector; (3) security-sector accountability; and (4) oversight
of the security sector.
Chapter 4 discusses generic aspects of policy development and implementation.
It explains why policy is important, and examines the political dimensions
of the policy process. It also offers some observations on the context in
which policies are developed and implemented. Finally, it discusses the
policy management process and describes its application in the security
sector, focusing on seven key issues: (1) the importance of human and institutional
capacity; (2) policy communication, dialogue, and debate; (3) policy analysis;
(4) factors influencing the decision to conduct a major policy review; (5)
policy development; (6) policy implementation; and (7) oversight.
Chapter 5 reviews the principles underlying financial management in the
security sector. A central premise of this chapter is that, from a public
policy and process perspective, the security sector shares many of the characteristics
of other sectors and that the citizens of any country will benefit from
a security sector that is subject to the same broad set of rules and procedures
as other sectors. The chapter describes how this process can take place
in the security sector in a manner that is consistent with democratic, civil
control of the security sector. It also examines a number of issues relating
to reform of the budgeting process that are especially relevant in the security
sector.
Chapter 6 examines security-sector reform from a regional perspective. It
starts by providing the context of regionalism in Africa as a background.
It then explains how democratic governance in the security sector fits within
regional security arrangements in Africa. The chapter also discusses harmonisation
and monitoring of security-sector governance within regional security arrangements,
and provides examples of African regional initiatives where security-sector
governance is beginning to show some promise and relevance. The chapter
concludes by discussing the role of ?regional hegemons? in the incorporation
of security-sector reform into the regional agenda.
Chapter 7 describes six major challenges facing African governments, African
civil society and external actors in transforming the continent?s security
sectors, which define the context in which security-sector transformation
takes place: (1) transforming the security sector in a country without a
tradition of democratic norms and practice; (2) understanding the political
context of transformation; (3) moving beyond the defence sector; (4) a highly
limited knowledge base; (5) finding acceptable limits to state secrecy while
respecting the need for confidentiality in certain areas, and (6) finding
the appropriate balance between democratic accountability and control on
the one hand and security sector professionalism and discipline on the other
hand.
|
1.4.3 Use
| This handbook describes critical processes and institutional relations that
must come into being if the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are to develop
democratic governance practices in the security sector and if external actors
are to provide meaningful support to these efforts. Although it includes
examples of good practice on a range of issues throughout the security sector,
the handbook is not in a position to provide definitive guidance on how
best to approach security-sector transformation in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather,
it aims to be a tool for promoting dialogue within the continent ? nationally,
regionally, and cross-regionally ? as well as among external actors and
African governments and civil society on concrete ways to enhance good governance
in the security sector that are consistent with African traditions and experience.
It is hoped that the handbook will encourage similar efforts at the national
level, tailored to meet the specific needs of individual countries.
|
2. The Major Security Actors
AIM
This chapter identifies the potential security universe in a country and
provides brief descriptions of each main group of actors. Security-sector
transformation processes often focus extensively on the security organisations,
secondarily on the civil oversight actors, and only rarely on the other
actors within the broad security community. This chapter argues that all
actors ? official and non-official ? that affect the governance of the security
sector need to be engaged if democratic governance of the security sector
is to be achieved.
Section 2.1 identifies five categories of actors that influence the quality
of democratic governance in the security sector: 1) organisations authorised
to use force; 2) judicial and public safety organisations; 3) civil management
and oversight organisations; 4) non-state security organisations; and 5)
non-statutory civil society actors. Section 2.2. discusses the actors legally
mandated to use force. Section 2.3 examines the judicial and public safety
organisations. Section 2.4 looks at the civil management and oversight organisations.
Section 2.5 reviews the non-state security organisations and section 2.6
discusses the roles of civil society actors. Section 2.7 considers regional
actors.
|
2.1 Five Key Actors
| There are five categories of actors that affect the quality of democratic
governance in the security sector: (1) organisations authorised to use force;
(2) civil management and oversight organisations; (3) judicial, penal and
public safety organisations; (4) non-state security; and (5) civil society
actors (Figure 2-1). The first three are generally seen to have a formal
role in contributing to security and are often called ?the security sector.?
In addition, there are a number of other actors that influence the content
and implementation of security policy in Africa. These can be divided into
two main groups: non-state security organisations and civil society organisations.
Box 2-1 lists the actors most commonly found in each category. The exact
composition of any group of security-related actors will vary from country
to country. The basic principle, however, remains the same: all actors that
have, or should have, an impact on democratic governance of the security
sector must be included.
|
2.2 Organisations Legally Mandated to Use Force
Discussions about security in Africa tend to focus on the role of the military,
which is charged with protecting the state, and particularly the army. This
reflects the wide
| Box 2-1. Five Major Categories of Actors Influencing
Security-Sector Governance |
- Organisations legally mandated to use force: armed
forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; intelligence services
(including both military and civilian agencies); secret services;
coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local
security units (national guards, presidential guards, militias, etc.).
- Judicial and public safety bodies: judiciary; justice ministries;
defence attorneys; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution
services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; correctional services;
customary and traditional justice systems.
- Civil management and oversight bodies: president/prime minister;
national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select
committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs;
customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies
(finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning
units); and statutory civil society organizations (civilian review
boards and public complaints commissions).
- Non-state security organisations: liberation armies, guerrilla armies,
traditional militias, political party militias, private security companies,
civil defence forces, local and international criminal groups.
- Non-statutory civil society bodies: professional organizations,
including trade unions; research/policy analysis organizations; advocacy
organizations; the media; religious organizations; non-governmental
organizations; the concerned public.
Source:
Based on "Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector:
An Institutional Assessment Framework," The Hague: Clingendael Institute for the
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003 |
spread, but by no means universal, tendency to favor the military, especially
the army, in resource allocation. It is also a manifestation of the direct
and indirect influence that the armed forces have often exerted over political
life in African states.
 |
A peacebuilding approach to security, however, draws attention to the fact
that achieving security for states and their populations is not a task that
the army or even the military can accomplish by themselves. Other state
organisations that are mandated to ensure the safety of the state and its
citizens, such as the police, the gendamarie, civilian and military intelligence,
border and coast guards, secret services and customs enforcement entities,
need to be part of the equation. In some countries, the influence, prestige,
and capabilities of paramilitary forces or intelligence services outweigh
those of the military, and one or more of them may receive the lion?s share
of resources.
One security body that consistently receives little consideration and generally
has very low prestige is African police services. This is highly problematic,
since an effective police service capable of ensuring public safety while
respecting human rights is an essential element of a peacebuilding approach
to security. In many countries, police services are only beginning to develop
a culture of service to the public and an understanding of the concept of
policing by the consent of the people. Thus, much more attention to the
tasking and orientation of African police services is warranted.
As far as tasking is concerned, the distinction between the functions carried
out by the military and other defence forces and those carried out by the
police is blurred in many African countries. Defence forces have been tasked
to carry out internal security-related activities, and police services have
been militarised or actually placed under the control of the military. The
line dividing police services and non-state security organisations is also
unclear throughout the continent. There are increasing numbers of private
firms, citizens groups, and other non-state actors engaged in policing-type
activities. This can range from patrolling neighbourhoods to the extra-judicial
"arrests" and even "sentencing" of perceived criminals.
Another complicating factor is that in most countries the police have not
received adequate resources to enable them to carry out their public-safety
functions effectively.
This does not mean, however, that the defence forces have necessarily been
adequately resourced. Throughout the continent there is a mismatch between
objective security needs, the tasks assigned to the security organisations,
and financial resources that urgently needs to be resolved. In doing so,
the failure to engage with the full range of defence and intelligence actors
runs the risk of jeopardising efforts to strengthen overall governance,
achieve human development, and make the most effective and efficient use
of state resources.
Box 2-2 outlines four key transformation principles that should be borne
in mind by governments and security organisations alike in order to maximise
state and personal security.
| Box 2-2. Good Practice: Maximising State and Personal
Security |
- The roles that each of the security actors plays must be well-defined
and transparent.
- The security organisations themselves must be professional.
- The security organisations must adhere to international law
and democratic governance practices, including their accountability
to legitimate civil authorities.
- The security organisations must also avoid involvement in the
economy or political life of the country.
|
|
2.3 Justice and Public Safety Organisations
Efforts to reform police services in Africa and elsewhere during the 1990s
led to the realisation that public safety and security is dependent on the
effective and efficient functioning of the enti|re criminal justice system:
the police, the prosecutors, the judiciary and the correction system. Strengthening
the capacity of the police to carry out criminal investigations, for example,
is of little consequence if the accused are released from jail for political
reasons. If the judiciary does not itself abide by the rule of law, it is
more difficult to make the case that the police or prison officials need
to protect the civil and human rights of those suspected, accused, or found
guilty of crimes. It is therefore important to supplement efforts to strengthen
the democratic governance of the police service with parallel efforts to
transform the judiciary and the correction system.
| Box 2-3. Good Practice: Relationship between Civil
and Military Justice Systems |
| The civil judiciary should not be subordinate
to justice systems in the security sector. For example, where military
justice systems exist, they should be limited to matters that are
clearly internal to the armed forces and verdicts should be subject
to repeal in civilian courts. Without this subordination to the civil
judiciary system, violations of human rights and other norms such
as anti-corruption may be punished differently from those in other
sectors, or not at all. |
The judiciary is not only a key component of the effective enforcement of
societal laws. It also has a major role to play in ensuring that the principles
and norms of democratic governance of the security sector, as reflected
in international and national legislation and other binding agreements,
are adhered to. Constitutional courts, for example, should evaluate the
constitutionality of the President or cabinet as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces and interpret the constitutionality of laws relating to the
security sector. The criminal justice system should judge the lawfulness
of the behaviour of security organisation personnel. For this, a functioning,
independent and well-resourced civil judiciary that is not subordinate to
justice systems in the security sector is essential (Box 2-3).
Different countries and jurisdictions structure justice system institutions
in different ways. In large degree, the adopted structure depends on the
nature of the state. The more centralised the political system is, the more
likely it is that criminal justice functions will be funded and administered
by national-level agencies. Federal political systems will give more authority
and funding responsibility to local- or provincial/state-level agencies.
This underscores the fact that there is no ?one-size fits all? solution
to the question of how to structure criminal justice systems.
Even more importantly, there are very widely different policies, procedures
and practices that govern the judiciary and the correction system across
Africa. African states also face the need to incorporate traditional systems
of justice into their formal legal systems, which essentially reflect European
and international laws.
Despite these contextual conditions, most
criminal justice systems in Africa, and indeed around the world, share
four core objectives:
- Crime prevention
- Investigation and prosecution of crimes
- Adjudication of criminal cases, and
- Punishment and rehabilitation of offenders.
|
Correctional services frequently receive the least attention from all justice
and law enforcement organizations in transformation processes despite the
need for improvement in the material conditions in prisons, the protection
of the rights of convicted offenders, and the need to find alternatives
to jail sentences as punishment for crimes. In common with many other countries
throughout the world, correctional systems in Africa suffer under the burden
of inadequate financial, material and human resources. This makes identifying
low-cost, and effective means of punishing and rehabilitating offenders
a high priority. Box 2-4 describes some elements of a community service
alternative to incarceration developed in Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s.
|
2.4 Civil Management and Oversight Organisations
Just as it is insufficient to focus on the military to the exclusion
of other organisations legally mandated to use force or on the police to
the exclusion of other components of the criminal justice system, providing
security for the state and its population is not the sole preserve of the
security organisations. Democratic governance of the security sector requires
an active role for the civil authorities that manage and monitor the security
organisations. The security of both the state and its population will be
maximised to the extent that the security organisations are subordinate
to democratically elected civil authorities. One of the major constraints
on achieving democratic security-sector governance across the African continent
has been restrictions on the ability of the civil authorities to manage
and oversee the activities of the organisations that are legally mandated
to use force to protect the state and its population. (Oversight is discussed
in more detail in section 3.5.)
To some extent, these problems arise from a lack of capacity among the civil
authorities, which can be remedied over time by a variety of educational,
training, and mentoring programmes. At the same, many of these problems
will not be overcome until the long history of unaccountable government,
executive dominance, and political involvement by the security organisations
throughout the continent is adequately dealt with. Many African governments
have taken or are in the process of taking the difficult political decisions
necessary to change this state of affairs, but considerable hard work lies
ahead.
| Box 2-4. Good Practice: Guidelines for Zimbabwean
Magistrates Sentencing Offenders to Community Service |
In 1992, legislation was approved in Zimbabwe that provided
various alternatives to jail sentences for individuals convicted of
violating the law. One of those alternatives was community service.
Within four years, community service became an integral part of the
sentencing process in Zimbabwe. Some 18,000 individuals were sentenced
to community service. Approximately 90 percent of them successfully
completed their community service. The remaining 10 percent were referred
back to the courts, rearrested or dealt with in some other way.
In order to ensure a uniform approach to sentencing offenders to community
service, guidelines for magistrates were developed. Some of key guidelines
are:
- Community service is not intended for the serious or persistent
offender. Offences such as murder, rape, armed robbery, theft of motor
vehicle, theft of bovine and a few others are specifically excluded.
- As community service is a community-based sanction, all courts
are urged to exercise caution. This is more so in the case of Zimbabwe
where the implementation and supervision relies to a large extent
on volunteers. The need to avoid creating a wrong impression in the
minds of the public and of maintaining public confidence in the scheme
is stressed.
- Most importantly, the guidelines provide that where a sentence
of imprisonment of 12 months or less is warranted then community service
should be considered in such cases. Community service is not to be
considered for offences attracting effective imprisonment of more
than 12 months.
- Even if a particular case falls within the 12-month guideline,
the need for a proper enquiry is stressed. Thus for example an offender
who has several previous convictions or does not have a fixed abode
is not eligible for community service. The guidelines also stress
the need for an offender to perform his community service as near
to his place of residence as is possible. This is done to minimize
hardship on the offender and obviate the possibility of the offender
defaulting on account of lack of means. In practice most offenders
do not travel long distances in order to carry out community service,
even in the rural areas.
- To ensure uniformity, the guidelines recommend 35 hours of community
service for each month imprisonment. This formula was developed by
taking into account the experience of other countries and the experience
of trial magistrates who impose the orders. The maximum number of
hours in 1998 was 420 hours, equivalent to 12 months in jail.
- This formula is not mandatory. Magistrates are urged to follow
it but can deviate on good cause shown e.g. a lower number of hours
can be ordered to suit the circumstances of a particular offender
such as a person of advanced age or an employed person who can only
carry out community service after normal working hours or during weekends.
- In cases where the offender is genuinely unable to pay a fine and
becomes liable to serve an alternative prison term, community service
should also be considered.
The guidelines also suggest appropriate wording of community service
orders.
Source: Justice
Paddington Garwe, ?The Zimbabwe Community Service Scheme,? Speech
delivered at the international symposium, "Beyond Prisons,"
held in Kingston, Ontario, March 1998, http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/forum/bprisons/speeches/10_e.shtml. |
Both the executive branch and the legislature should be involved in the
formulation and implementation of security policy. In most African countries,
formal security policies are poorly developed or non-existent, as are the
plans for implementing security policies. Where formal policies and plans
do exist, it is rare for the full range of executive and legislative branch
actors to have been involved in their development. Furthermore, implementation
is generally weak. Often, the security organisations themselves assume responsibility
for developing policy. (Managing the policy process is discussed in Chapter
4.)
Financial management of the security sector is another problem area, as
it generally does not conform to international practice. The central actors
in policy development and management include the ministries of defence,
interior/home affairs, and foreign affairs; office of the president/prime
minister; cabinet office; and national security adviser. The ministry of
finance, the security organisations, the legislature, and civil society
have important consultative roles. (Managing financial resources is discussed
in Chapter 5.)
The legislature, which is one of the most important civil oversight organisations
and has several important roles to play in monitoring the implementation
of security policy, faces special challenges in countries with a history
of executive dominance and rule by the security organisations. As members
of various oversight committees, legislators vet policies developed by the
executive branch and assess the way in which these policies are implemented.
Legislators hold the power of the purse, and must approve budgets and monitor
their implementation. Their responsibilities may also include a role in
the appointment of senior security organisation personnel and in shaping
and approving legislation. Additionally, the legislature exerts varying
degrees of control over the executive?s ability to wage war.
The government?s auditor-general is another important oversight actor, as
are the public protector, ombudsmen, constitutional courts, anti-corruption
and public accountability organisations. Auditors-general are often thought
of in terms of financial oversight, but they can also offer objective assessments
of policy and its implementation (Box 2-5). All of these actors are members
of the security sector and should be part of any transformation process.
All too often, they are sidelined, both in terms of their involvement in
the transformation of the security organisations and other key members of
the security sector, such as the ministry of defence or the ministry of
interior, and in terms of modernising and democratising their own structures
and functions.
|
2.5 Non-State Security Organisations
While efforts to improve the quality of democratic governance of the security
sector correctly focus on official actors with the mandate to use force
to protect the state and its population, the role played by non-state security
organisations cannot be ignored. Often, the activities ? or even the very
existence ? of these actors points up deficits in the formal security sector.
Some of the more common forms of non-state security organisations are: liberation
armies, guerrilla armies, traditional militias, informal militias, political
party militias, private security companies, civil defence forces, and local
and international criminal groups.
| Box 2-5. Good Practice: Functions of the Auditor General |
?Regardless of whether it falls under the Executive,
the Legislature or the Judiciary, it is imperative for the Audit Office
to be completely independent and truly autonomous. It should also
dispose of adequate resources to accomplish its mission. Its function
is three-fold:
Financial oversight
The Audit Office must verify the accuracy, reliability and thoroughness
of the finances of all organs of the Executive and public departments.
It must verify that all financial operations are carried out in accordance
with the regulations on public funds. Within the context of this oversight
function, the Audit Office must fulfil a mission of jurisdiction with
regard to public accountants and officials who authorize payments.
They must all be made accountable for the money they handle save in
the case of a discharge or release of responsibility. In cases of
misappropriation or corruption, the Audit Office is duty-bound to
report its findings to the judiciary.
Legal oversight
The Audit Office must verify that all public expenditure and income
are conducted in accordance with the law governing the budget.
Ensuring proper use of public funds
A modern Audit Office which functions in the interest of good governance
should ensure the proper use of public funds on the basis of the three
following criteria:
- Value for money: ensure that the resources used were put to optimal
use, both qualitatively and quantitatively;
- Effective: measure to what extent objectives and aims were met;
- Efficient: measures whether the resources used were used optimally
to obtain the results obtained.
This ex-post oversight is conducted on the initiative of the Audit
Office or at the request of Parliament.?
Source: General
Report on the IPU Seminar on Parliament and the Budgetary Process,
Including from a Gender Perspective, Bamako, Mali, November 2001,
cited in Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
and Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliamentary Oversight of the
Security Sector : Principles, Mechanisms and Practices, Handbook
for Parliamentarians No. 5 ? 2003, pp. 141-142.
|
2.5.1 Reasons for the Rise in Non-State Actors
Non-state security organisations have proliferated in Africa since the late
1980s. There are several central reasons for this phenomenon that relate
directly to the quality of democratic security-sector governance:
- armed conflicts that increasingly take on regional dimensions
- ineffective state security organisations
- the growth of crime, both domestically and transnationally
- regime protection
|
Armed Conflicts. The importance of non-state actors in
Africa has been underscored by armed conflicts such as those in Angola,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, where the
ability to provide the safe and secure environment necessary for human security
and human development has been compromised by the activities of a variety
of non-state security actors such as armed opposition groups, other informal
security organisations, and private security firms. While domestic groups,
often backed by regional governments or financed through the sale of natural
resources facilitated by foreign middlemen and international companies,
are responsible for most of the actual fighting, private security firms
have received considerable attention because of human rights abuses and
lucrative contracts which plunder the natural resources in exchange for
various security-related services. The South African firm, Executive Outcomes,
which gained notoriety because of its involvement in Sierra Leone, is one
example of international firms led by former military officers from a variety
of countries around the world, which have been involved in one way or another
in African wars.
Ineffective State Security Organisations. Domestically,
the inability of the state to protect its population or segments of the
population against violence has led to the rise of a wide variety of local
militia-type groups and private security firms. In some countries, privately-employed
security officers significantly outnumber uniformed police officers. In
2000, for example, South Africa counted 216,000 private security officers
compared to 90,000 uniformed members of the South African Police Service.
6
The proliferation of private security firms operating both domestically
and internationally has created some impetus to the attempt to regulate
such organisations. Box 2-6 describes some of the highlights of the South
African legislation governing "security service providers."
| Box 2-6. Good Practice: South African Regulatory
Framework for Security Service Providers |
"Without rule of law, democratic constitutions,
a system of checks and balances in government, or viable and functioning
institutions, sound security-sector governance is impossible."
Source: Republic
of South Africa, "No. 56 of 2001: Private Security Industry Regulation
Act, 2001," Government Gazette, vol. 439, no. 23051, Cape
Town, January 25, 2002, www.gov.za/documents/combsubst.htm
|
Private enterprise, wealthy citizens, and the international community are
especially likely to purchase private protection. The poor are more likely
to turn to "self-help" justice, including vigilantism. The Bakassi Boys
in Nigeria, for example, emerged from the inability of the police in the
city of Aba, in the eastern part of the country, to protect traders from
criminals. From the beginning, its members have engaged in extra-judicial
killings of suspected criminals. The Bakassi Boys nonetheless became popular
because its actions succeeded in reducing crime rates in a number of areas
and because of the serious problems with the capacity of the police and
the court system to provide justice. Over time, the "services" its members
provide have grown to include adjudication on a wide range of civil matters
such as marital and other family problems or unpaid debts. While there is
no doubt that these services are needed, there is no accountability in the
rendering of these, despite ? or perhaps because of ? the Bakassi Boys relationships
with several state governments in southeastern Nigeria. The members of the
Bakassi Boys have increasingly acted with impunity, and allegations of politically
motivated activities have escalated. While the Bakassi Boys represent one
extreme of non-state involvement in the criminal justice system, a diverse
group of Nigerian non-state actors ? traders associations, guilds, religious
bodies, community associations, for example ? have become involved in settling
disputes among their members.7
| Box 2-7. Regionalisation of Crime in Southern
Africa |
"Not only are organised criminal groups engaged
in a wide variety of criminal activities, but the responses also indicate
that crossborder criminal activities are extensive?. For example,
Botswana, a country with a relatively small population of 1,576,470,
and a criminal investigation department consisting of about 600 detectives
during 2000, indicated that, of the 34 categories of crimes listed
in the questionnaire, 20 involved crossborder or transnational organised
criminal activities. Politically and economically, Botswana has been
one of the most stable SADC countries during the past two decades.
It has been better placed than most SADC countries to make resources
available for combating crime and has developed a good track record
in this regard. However, even if it was able to devote more resources
towards the combating of organised crime, Botswana will find it very
difficult to curb organised crime without the more extensive involvement
of other countries in the region.
Peter Gastrow , Organised Crime in the SADC Region:
Police Perceptions, ISS Monograph no. 60, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies,
August 2001, www.iss.co.za.
|
Growth of Crime. Crime is also growing in many parts of
Africa. In surveys of the concerns of poor people, worries about physical
violence generally rank high. For instance, participatory poverty assessments
conducted by the World Bank and others have found that crime and violence
are among causes of unease for the poor. Criminals are increasingly becoming
well organised and well armed, but can also include loose, changing associations
of individuals, including businessmen and corrupt public officials, as well
as career criminals. Criminal groups are spreading beyond national boundaries.
The inability of the state to combat criminality contributes, in no small
measure, to the growth of violence. As Box 2-7 demonstrates, the regionalisation
of crime is rapidly outstripping the capacity of national governments to
take effective action and protect their populations. (See also section 2.6
on regional actors.)
Regime Protection. The desire of governments to remain
in power has also often led to the utilisation of informal security organisations,
including state-sponsored paramilitary groups and political party security
cells, to repress opponents and perceived opponents. In Zimbabwe, for example,
youth militias have been a mainstay of ZANU?s campaign strategy since the
first post-independence election. For the 2002 presidential election, they
were supplemented by gangs of "war veterans" who terrorised and forcibly
displaced both white landowners and their black farm workers.
6
Martin Schönteich, "Guarding the Guardians:
New Regulations for the Private Security Industry," www.iss.co.za.
7
Ukoha Ukiwo, "Deus ex Machina or Frankenstein Monster?
The Changing Roles of Bakassi Boys in Eastern Nigeria," Democracy & Development, vol. 3,
no. 1 (2002):39-51.
|
2.5.2 Impact of Non-State Security Organisations
In principle, some of these non-state actors could strengthen state or individual
security. If the state is unable to ensure an adequate policing capacity,
individuals may be more secure if they are able to call on the services
of private security companies or informal, community-based groups. The privatisation
of public sector functions may also result in a greater reliance on private
security firms for a range of security-related activities. Private firms
could take responsibility for security at government facilities, for guarding
strategic assets, assisting in recruiting and training security personnel,
and patrolling public areas. To the extent that these activities are carried
out professionally and the companies are regulated to ensure accountability
to the state and the public, the chances that security will be strengthened
increases and the negative behaviours associated with non-statutory security
actors are minimised.
Such regulation is, however, difficult to achieve. Even the South African
government, which has passed several laws aimed at regulating mercenary
activities, foreign military assistance and security service providers since
the late 1990s, has had difficulty in enforcing these laws. No other African
country, yet, has a similar legislation or regulatory capacity, thereby
making the potential for abuses much greater elsewhere on the African continent.
The domestic activities of private security firms may be easier to monitor
than the activities of mercenaries or other security actors abroad, but
most African countries lack the capacity to undertake effective domestic
monitoring of these actors.
Some actors are not amenable to regulation, however. Armed opposition groups
must either be defeated militarily or their grievances addressed through
a political process. Efforts to negotiate with the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, for example, were mostly unsuccessful, despite
the RUF signature on peace agreements. While some members of the RUF were
willing to follow the political path, it was still necessary to dominate
the group militarily. Private security groups and local militias that are
created to provide security in an environment where the state is unable
to do so will continue to exist, irrespective of state policy, until the
underlying problems, such as weak state security institutions, state bias
and preferential treatment, and fiscal crisis are overcome. Paramilitary
groups created by governments or ruling parties to help strengthen their
grasp on power will continue to exist until significant political changes
occur.
|
2.6 Civil Society Actors
Civil society consists of a broad range of non-state actors, including religious
groups, academics, policy researchers, the media, women?s groups, professional
associations such as the bar association, community-based organisations
and interested citizens. Civil society has three critical roles to play
in increasing the accountability of the security sector: by demanding for
change, acting as a watchdog, and providing technical input.
Civil society can play an important role in monitoring the development and
application of security policy and the activities of security organisations.
These watchdog activities can take various forms, such as through membership
in community advisory/oversight boards, the independent monitoring/analysis
of the activities of security organisations, and the dissemination of information
about security policies and their implementation to a broader public. Such
activities are meant not only to challenge government policies, but also
to inform debates and provide useful inputs into decision-making processes.
Independent civil society actors have made important contributions to security-sector
transformations in countries such as Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda.
Civil society can also act as an important resource for the security community
in a more formal sense. Most fundamentally, civil society can provide a
pool of knowledgeable individuals to staff government positions in relevant
agencies. Civilians can staff review boards and other oversight bodies,
and provide training to members of security organisations and civil oversight
bodies. Box 2-8 describes how citizen advisory committees can improve correctional
services. Civil society can also bolster the knowledge base of governments
by providing inputs on a broad range of topics, ranging from overall defence
policies, expenditure and procurement proposals, to the human rights record
of security organisations.
While there is sometimes an assumption that, by definition, civil society
organisations support a peace-building approach to security, that is not
always the case. Opinions on security policy are as diverse within civil
society as they are within government circles. Civil society groups can
become politicised and promote divisions within society rather than seeking
ways of overcoming disagreements and disputes and reaching compromise, or
they can simply fail to accept the need for responsible behaviour. For example,
the media can act both as a source of information and disinformation and
can foster productive national debate on security issues or strengthen divisions
within society.
| Box 2-8. Good Practice: Linking the Community,
Offenders, and Correctional Services |
"Citizens? advisory committees provide a vital
link between a correctional organization (both institutional and community),
offenders and the community. Advisory Committee members are members
from the community who volunteer to commit their time and skills to
assist improve the quality of a correctional organization. Their roles
include acting as impartial observers of day-to-day operations; providing
advice on the operation of a correctional facility/parole office and
the impact various decisions have on the community in which they are
situated; and providing a link between communities and the correctional
service. This best practice has been ongoing for over 30 years, and
has been identified as a national public service best practice and
an international best practice. This program is evaluated on an annual
basis."
Source: International
Corrections and Prisons Association, Best Practices,
www.icpa.ca/home.html. |
Civil society can also consciously avoid addressing security-related issues,
because it would require it to interact directly with security organisations,
which some members of civil society find distasteful. For example, professional
organisations, which during the 1980s constituted the majority of civil
society organisations in the Mano River Union countries, especially Liberia,
avoided dealing with problems of governance of all sorts because these were
deemed as being "political" and thus off-limits for these groups. Human-rights
and other civil society groups in many parts of Africa remain highly suspicious
of governments and security organisations and find it difficult to engage
in debates on security-related reforms and policies. Nonetheless, civil
society organisations in a growing number of African countries are engaged
in a range of security-sector governance activities, including monitoring,
research, training, dialogue promotion and facilitation activities.
|
2.7 Regional Actors
Although not part of the community of national actors that influence the
quality of security-sector governance, regional and multilateral actors
are part of the security landscape in Africa and can affect the quality
of security-sector governance at the national level. (Chapter 6 discusses
the impact of regional actors on security-sector governance and outlines
a number of factors that are central to the efforts to entrench security-sector
governance in regional bodies.) At the national level, the relevant external
actors include both official actors and civil society organisations. Among
the official actors, there are both broad-based organisations such as the
United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD and more narrowly
focused groups such as the Southern African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation
(SARPCO).
| Box 2-9. Mission and Objectives of SARPCCO |
(1) to promote and strengthen co-operation and
foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border
and related crimes with regional implications;
(2) to prepare and disseminate relevant information on criminal activities
that will benefit member countries in the effort to contain crime
in the region;
(3) to carry out regular reviews of joint crime management strategies
in the light of changing national and regional needs and priorities;
(4) to maintain a system and structure that ensures the efficient
operation and management of criminal records and effective joint monitoring
of cross-border crime.
Source: ?Combating
Cross-Border Crime - The Southern African Experience,? Speech by Juan
Kotze, Inspector, Interpol National Crime Bureau, Pretoria, South
Africa, March 23, 2000, at the Microsoft ?Combating Cross Border Crime
2000? Conference, Cape Town, South Africa
http://www.microsoft.com/europe/public_sector/Gov_Agencies/127.htm. |
Regional actors have become increasingly important as the regional nature
of many of the security problems confronting Africa has become clearer.
The wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Congo will not be resolved without
regional approaches. The land crisis in Zimbabwe has potentially explosive
implications for other countries in Southern Africa, such as Malawi and
South Africa. Cross-border criminal activities ? such as smuggling vehicles,
narcotics and firearms and illegal immigration ? have grown in magnitude
throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
These growing problems have begun to produce regional responses. Twelve
Southern African countries created the Southern African Regional Police
Chiefs Co-operation Organisation in the mid-1990s to combat cross-border
crime (Box 2-3). In West Africa, a concern about the illegal transfer of
small arms and light weapons led the sixteen members of the Economic Community
of West Africa (ECOWAS) to endorse a moratorium on the import, export and
manufacture of light weapons in the region at the end of 1998. Not all initiatives
to address regional problems are appropriate vehicles for strengthening
governance in the security sector. Efforts should be made, however, to identify
those regional initiatives and activities that lend themselves to strengthening
security-sector governance.
The program established to implement the West African Small Arms Moratorium,
the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
or PCASED, envisions training for military, security and police forces of
member states. Such training could, in principle, offer an opportunity for
reinforcing the importance of professionalization, human-rights protection,
transparency and accountability.8
Similarly, SARPCCO could be used as a vehicle for strengthening aspects
of sound governance in the police sector. Regional and sub-regional political
organisations, such as the African Union, SADC, ECOWAS, and the Mano River
Union are also bodies that can be encouraged to promote security-sector
transformation among member states. At present, however, these organisations
do not have the capacity to undertake the necessary activities.
|
Summary of Main Points ? Chapter 2
- All actors ? official and non-official
? that affect the quality of governance in the security sector
need to be engaged if democratic governance of the security sector
is to be achieved. This includes organisations legally mandated
to use force; judicial and public safety bodies; civil management
and oversight bodies; non-state security organisations; and non-statutory
civil society actors. In all cases, the exact configuration will
vary from state to state.
- Organisations legally mandated
to use force: A peacebuilding approach to security emphasises
the importance of relying on the full range of security bodies
to provide security for the state and its population. In doing
so, it is important that: 1) the roles each security actor plays
are well-defined and transparent; 2) the security bodies themselves
are professional; 3) security bodies adhere to international law
and democratic governance practices, including accountability
to legitimate civil authorities; and 4) security bodies involvement
in the economic or political life of the country.
- Justice and public safetybodies:
Public safety and security is dependent on the effective and efficient
functioning of the entire criminal justice system: the police,
the prosecutors, the judiciary, and the correction system. It
is therefore important to supplement efforts to strengthen the
democratic governance of the police service with parallel efforts
to transform the judiciary and the correction system. It is also
important to recognise that the policies, procedures and practices
governing the judiciary and correction system can vary widely,
and that African governments face the need to incorporate traditional
systems of justice into their formal legal system.
- Civil management and oversight
bodies. Democratic governance of the security sector requires
an active role for the civil authorities that manage and monitor
the security bodies. The security of both the state and its population
will be maximised to the extent that the security organisations
are subordinate to democratically elected officials. Both the
executive branch and the legislature should be involved in the
formulation and implementation of security policy. The central
actors include: ministries of defence, interior/home affairs,
finance and foreign affairs; office of the president/prime minister;
cabinet office; national security adviser; the legislature; auditor-general;
public protector; ombudsman; constitutional courts; and anti-corruption/public
accountability bodies
- Non-state security bodies:
Some of the more common forms of non-state security bodies are:
liberation armies, guerrilla armies, traditional militias, informal
militias, political party militias, private security companies,
civil defence forces, and local and international criminal groups.
Some of these non-state actors can strengthen state or personal
security, for example private security firms and traditional militias,
if their behaviour is professional and they are accountable to
the state and the public. Others are not amenable to regulation
and routinely undermine democratic governance of the security
sector.
- Civil society actors:
Civil society consists of a broad range of non-state actors, including
religious groups, academics, policy researchers, the media, women?s
groups, professional associations such as the bar association,
community-based organisations and interested citizens. Civil society
has three critical roles to play in increasing the accountability
of the security sector: demand change, act as watchdog, and provide
technical input. It is often assumed that, by definition, civil
society organisations support a peacebuilding approach to security,
but this is not always the case. Opinions on security policy are
as diverse within civil society as they are within government
circles. Civil society groups can become politicised and promote
divisions within society rather than seeking ways of overcoming
disagreements and disputes and reaching compromise, or they can
simply fail to accept the need for responsible behaviour.
- Regional actors: Although
not part of the community of national actors that influence the
quality of security-sector governance, regional and multilateral
actors are part of the security landscape in Africa and can affect
the quality of security-sector governance at the national level.
As at the national level, the relevant external actors include
both official actors and civil society organisations. Regional
actors have become increasingly important as the regional nature
of many African security problems has become clearer.
|
|
3. Democratic Governance and the Security Sector
AIM
The essence of the transformation of the security sector is the process
of aligning the sector with core values, principles and practices of democratic
governance.
Section 3.1 explains the importance of democratic governance in the security
sector. Section 3.2 discusses transparency in the security sector. Section
3.3 reviews issues of accountability. Section 3.4 reviews the legal basis
of the security sector. Section 3.5 discusses oversight of the security
sector.
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3.1 The Importance of Democratic Governance In the Security Sector
Democratic governance is a critical component of the stable and secure environment
necessary to promote human development and human security in Africa. As
the framers of the New Partnership for Africa?s Development (NEPAD) have
explained,
It is now generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the
absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance.
With the New Partnership for Africa?s Development, Africa undertakes to
respect the global standards of democracy, which core components include
political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties
and workers? unions, fair, open, free and democratic elections periodically
organised to enable the populace choose their leaders freely.9
Governance has received growing attention in Africa since the early 1990s,
from both domestic and external actors. Initially, the external actors tended
to emphasise economic governance ? establishing a predictable regulatory
framework, an effective and transparent public administration, and an independent
judiciary that is capable of resolving disputes, particularly business disputes.
Domestic proponents of governance have focused on political governance,
in particular developing systems of democratic governance in which people
can influence decisions that affect their lives.
Although "good governance" was increasingly recognised as central to consolidating
democracy and to promoting good development outcomes, very little attention
was given to the question of how the security sector is governed until the
late 1990s. However, sound governance of the security sector is crucial
for the success of democratic consolidation, poverty reduction, and sustainable
economic and social development. It is also essential for the quality of
security, which is about creating a safe and secure environment for the
state and its entire population.
The state is commonly understood as the social structure that commands the
monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a country. For the use of force
to be legitimate, the state itself must be legitimate. A legitimate state
is characterised by transparency, trust of the government by the governed,
and accountability.
- Legitimacy and trust are fostered by a state whose government
is democratically elected
and which operates on the basis of a constitution that expresses
the general will of the people. Legitimacy and trust thus require
direct and indirect participation in the affairs of state by the
people.
- Accountability involves both the right to hold the government
to account for its behaviour
and the capacity to sanction government officials whose actions
deviate from legal responsibilities. Thus, a central aspect of
developing democratic accountability is to establish the legal
basis on which the state operates. A second central element of
democratic accountability is to establish systems of oversight
that will have the capacity to ensure that relevant legislation
and regulations are implemented as intended.
- Democratic accountability also requires the development of a
system that allows for the direct and indirect participation of
the people in the affairs of state. Here too a high degree of
transparency is essential.
|
Specifically, with regard to democratic security-sector governance, there
has been an increasing effort on the part of African public-sector officials,
scholars and civil society activists to develop a set of principles of oversight
and governance in the security sector that can be applied across the continent.
Ten key principles that have become pivotal in the quest for effective democratic
governance of the security sector are summarised in Box 3-1. The remainder
of this chapter will focus on four aspects of democratic governance in the
security sector: (1) transparency, (2) accountability, (3) the legal basis
of the security sector, and (4) oversight.
| Box 1-3. The Preconditions for Democratic Security-sector
governance in Africa |
- Security organisations are accountable to elected civil authorities,
established
independent oversight agencies, and civil society.
- Security organisations adhere to international law and domestic
constitutional law.
- Information about security sector planning and budgeting are widely
available, both within
government and to the public.
- A comprehensive and disciplined approach to the management of
security sector
resources is adopted, based on internationally recognised principles
of public expenditure management.
- Civil-military relations are based on a well-articulated hierarchy
of authority between
civil authorities and the defence forces, and on a relationship
with civil society that is based on the respect for human rights
and a culture of civility;
- Civil authorities have the capacity to exercise political control
over the operations and
expenditure of the security organisations.
- Civil society has the capacity to monitor the security organisations
and provide
constructive input to the political debate.
- The political environment is such that civil society can be consulted
on a regular basis
on security policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues.
- Security-force personnel are adequately trained to discharge their
duties in a
professional manner that is consistent with the requirements of
democratic societies.
- Fostering an environment that is supportive of regional and sub-regional
peace and security as a high priority for policy-makers.
Meeting these benchmarks poses a significant challenge to all governments
around the world. Divergent trajectories of transition have produced
a wide assortment of post-transition political configurations on
the continent ? some complementary and progressive, others contradictory
and worrisome. This necessarily inhibits generalisation. Nevertheless,
it is clear that most African countries are committed to the development
of best practice mechanisms to support sound security-sector governance.
Source: These
principles were first elaborated in UK Department for International
Development, Security-Sector Reform and the Management of Military
Expenditure: High Risks for Donors, High Returns for Development,
Report on an International Symposium sponsored by the UK Department
for International Development, London, February 15-27, 2000, www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/ssrmes_report.pdf,
p. 46.
|
9
"The New Partnership for Africa?s Development," Part V. Programme
of Action: The Strategy for Achieving Sustainable Development in the
21st Century, October 2001, para. 79.
|
3.2 Transparency in the Security Sector
3.2.1 Why Transparency is Important
Transparency is the fundamental ingredient in accountable governance. Without
access to information about the formulation and implementation of laws,
policies, plans and budgets, it is impossible to hold any public servant
to account.
- A non-transparent security sector creates an environment conducive
to a range of abuses. It also undermines the professionalism of
the security forces.
- Non-transparency provides the perfect cover for off-budget transactions.
When a sig- nificant portion of a country?s security-related expenditure
occurs off-budget and is fed by off-budget revenues, not only
are core principals of fiscal responsibility in the public sector
violated. It is also highly likely that the operational capacity
of the security organisations will suffer and that the country
will not receive value for money.
- A non-transparent security sector creates an environment that
is conducive to system- atic, and gross violations of human rights
on the part of the security organisations.
- Non-transparency also facilitates the direct intervention of
security organisations in the political process.
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|
3.2.2 Confidentiality, Not Secrecy
Despite the potential for abuse, some degree of confidentiality is necessary in
the security sector. Problems arise when the need for confidentiality is
used to justify a reduction in scrutiny by appropriate management and oversight
bodies, as well as by the population at large. It is also important to be
clear about what is being held in confidence and why it is considered sensitive.
It is possible to retain a high degree
of confidentiality in highly sensitive areas without compromising
the principle of public accountability.
- War plans should be held in confidence. That the armed forces
are regularly exceeding
their budget allocations, are purchasing expensive military equipment
with scant attention to the need for or ability to maintain this
equipment, or are engaged in illegal, off-budget activities are
clearly sensitive matters, but should not be held in confidence.
- Certain issues pertaining to public safety may also need to
be held in confidence in
order to pursue and prosecute criminal suspects. The fact that
the police has violated human rights, that it fails to pursue
certain categories of offenders (such as rapists), or that offenders
regularly go free because the police lacks adequate investigative
skills or the judiciary is subject to political pressure are sensitive
matters but should not be kept secret.
- Intelligence agencies and their activities are accepted as necessary
for providing ad-
equate security. However, the often-covert character of their
activities should not lead to impunity or exemption from the rule
of law. A certain level of transparency will remain necessary,
especially with regard to the mandate and the budget.
|
|
3.2.3 Transparency of Legal Arrangements
Processes associated with governing the security sector need to be transparent
from start to finish. The manner in which the legal arrangements guiding
the security sector are arrived at is particularly important. That process
can set the tone for the subsequent implementation of those laws. In many
African countries, constitutions do not represent the will of the people
and were not arrived at through popular consensus. There are countries where
the constitution was forced on the population by an outgoing military administration,
with minimal representation from the population (for example, Nigeria).
In other countries, the government in power has altered the constitution
so significantly that it no longer has a semblance of the people?s will
(for example, Zimbabwe).
It is equally important that legislation governing the different security
organisations is arrived at in a transparent and participatory fashion.
Since constitutions typically only outline the relationship between the
civil authorities and the security organisations, the many details that
govern the actual operation of the security sector must be hammered out
separately in national legislation approved by the parliament.
- South Africa has produced policy papers, or "White Papers,"
on defence, intelligence, safety and security, participation in
international peace missions, and defence-related industries since
1994. Non-governmental experts have contributed to most of these,
and inputs were made into several of such documents by all relevant
stakeholders prior to being finalised. (See Box 3-2.) Such consultation
lengthens the process of producing legislation, but results in
a stronger product and greater buy-in on the part of key stakeholders.
- The South African Parliament approved the South African Police
Service Act in 1995 [No. 68 of 1995] and in 2003 had been debating
a defence bill for two years. The draft defence bill is published
in the Government Gazette and is available on the government website:
www.gov.za .
|
| Box 3-2. Good Practice: Consultative Process for
the South African White Paper on Safety and Security |
"The Minister released the final Draft White Paper
for public consultation after cabinet approval in May 1998. Extensive
consultation was undertaken with key stakeholders, role-players and
civil society in the following concurrent phases:
- Provincial public hearings
Public hearings were held in each of the provinces to ensure that
the final policy recommendations of the White Paper reflected
the views of provincial stakeholders, role-players and the public.
.
- National hearing
A national hearing was held from the 3rd to 5th August 1998 in
Parliament. A number of submissions were made, and provincial
reports on the submissions received from the public hearing process
were presented. Joint meetings of the National Portfolio Committee
on Safety and Security and the National Council of Provinces Committee
on Security and Justice deliberated on the issues raised through
the public consultation process on the 18th and 21st of August.
These deliberations informed the final drafting of the White Paper.
- Consultation with critical
audiences
Extensive consultation with critical audiences was undertaken
as outlined below:
- A Local Government Conference was held on 24 July 1998 at which
local government
initiatives related to crime prevention were reviewed, experiences
on the safer cities projects shared and the interventions outlined
in the White Paper discussed.
- Meetings were held with most of the political parties in Cape
Town to discuss relevant
issues raised by the White Paper.
- A workshop was held with the National Crime Prevention Strategy
partners on issues
relevant to crime prevention as outlined in the White Paper.
- Internal consultation process
- The South African Police Service circulated the Draft White Paper extensively within
their structures, and received numerous submissions. A consolidated report on these submissions was compiled by the Divisional
Commissioner of the National Management Services and sent to the Secretariat.
- Valuable meetings were held with most of the national government departments.
- The key trade-unions relevant to safety and security were also consulted.
"The final White Paper was presented to the Cabinet Committee for
Safety and Intelligence prior to the cabinet meeting of 9 September
1998 when the White Paper was approved. Parliamentary debates on the
White Paper were held during September 1998.
"A White Paper Conference was held on 11 September 1998 at which a
report back on the submissions and how they were incorporated was
presented.
"A user friendly booklet is being developed which will explain the
policy shifts contained in the White Paper and what it means for the
stakeholders and role-players in safety and security in South Africa."
Source: South
Africa, Department of Safety and Security, White Paper on Safety and
Security, "In Service of Safety," 1999 ? 2004, September 1998, www.gov.za/whitepaper/1998/safety.htm#drafting
www.gov.za/whitepaper/1998/safety.htm#drafting. |
Important as they are, consultative processes are only one part of the solution
to the problem of transparency. There also must be a conscious effort to
ensure as wide a dissemination of basic legal documents governing the security
sector as possible.
- Constitutions and subsidiary national legislation should be
disseminated among the
population. If national constitutions and subsidiary legislation
are not translated into local languages and the population does
not have much input in the formulation of the constitution or
other legislation, they will be seriously disadvantaged by not
knowing what the document says about how the security organisations
are to be governed and people?s rights vis-Ã -vis the security
organisations.
- An effort should be made to ensure that sufficient copies of
the constitution are pro-
duced for distribution to the population. To the extent possible,
these should be distributed free rather than sold and school children
should be specially targeted.
- Members of the security forces should have access to the documents
that define their roles and responsibilities.
|
Effective means of disseminating the basic legal documents covering the
security sector will contribute to the development of sound governance of
the security sector. An extensive dissemination program will strengthen
the demand for accountable governance of the security sector, including
effective oversight processes.
The people require more than information on the legal basis of the security
sector. They require information on the full range of security policies
and their implementation in order to perform key functions of civil society
in a democracy: creating watchdog organizations, getting involved in consultation
processes, and constructively proposing solutions to problems.
|
3.2.4 Transparency within Government
It is important not only for governments to provide information about the security
sector to their populations. It is equally important that governments are
internally transparent.
- All relevant executive branch officials should have access to
the information on security policies, plans, programs and budgets
that they need to fulfil their responsibilities.
- Legislators should have access to the same information in a
timely fashion to enable them to pass laws defining and regulating
the security sector and appropriating the necessary funds to enable
those laws to be implemented.
- In order for the accounts of the security organisations to be
routinely scrutinised for accuracy, value-for-money, and proper
usage of public funds, the relevant accounting and audit bodies
of the security organisations and the government as a whole should
have accurate and timely access to the information they require.
- The judiciary should have access to the information it requires
to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of laws and judge the lawfulness of the behaviour of
public servants in the security sector, including members of the
security organisations.
|
The wide dissemination of information within governments will help produce
policies that are consistent with the democratic governance of the security
sector and the effective implementation of these policies. At the same time,
it is extremely important to recognise that the security sector is unlikely
to have a higher standard of transparency than other parts of the public
sector. It is therefore important not to expect the security sector to become
an island of probity in a sea of poor practice.
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3.3 Security-Sector Accountability
3.3.1 Some Basic Considerations
The process of accountability aims to ensure that public officials are responsible
for the exercise of the authority accorded to them through the constitution
or other laws. As far as the security organisations are concerned, this
means that they must answer to those organisations legally mandated to oversee
their activities. It also means that the oversight bodies must have some
means of enforcing breaches of behaviour by the security organisations.
Democratic accountability in the security sector means
that the security organisations
- are subordinate to the civil authorities in democratically constituted
states;
- are obliged to explain their actions to the civil authorities
and civil society, and
- are subject to sanctions for inappropriate actions or inadequately
explaining their actions.
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There are two types of accountability: direct and indirect.
- Direct accountability in the security sector means
that members of the security organisations answer directly to
all or some portion of the population of a country.
- Indirect accountability holds politicians and bureaucrats
accountable for the actions of the security organisations by defining
a set of democratic governance criteria against which the security
organisations are to be measured.
|
Most security-sector accountability is indirect. There is some direct accountability
in the criminal justice sector through police commissions, police monitoring
groups, police-community liaison groups, community safety fora and the like.
The defence and intelligence sectors rely on indirect accountability.
An important aspect of security-sector accountability is the nature of the
legal arrangements for punishing those who commit offences relating to the
security sector. The legal basis of the security sector will be discussed
in more detail in section 3.4. Two points should be stressed here:
- To enhance accountability, procedures for punishment should
be clearly laid-out.
- All those accused ? both civilians and military ? should be
tried in open courts and
allowed to select their own lawyers from either the military or
the civil population. The practice, especially in West Africa,
where members of the armed forces accused of military-related
offences are tried through special military laws need to be re-examined.
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|
3.3.2 The Three Levels of Accountability
In order to strengthen the accountability of security organisations, it is necessary
to strengthen both norms and institutions. In doing so, it is important
to distinguish among different levels of accountability:
- Ideal-type accountability;
- Legal accountability;
- Operational accountability
These three levels of accountability mirror the three levels of policy discussed
in section 1.3.2.
| Box 3-3. Good Practice: National Legislation Incorporates
Legal and Cultural Norms Relating to Security Sector Accountability |
Legal Norms
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (UNGA Res 34/169,
1979)
- Geneva Conventions of 1949
Cultural Norms
- Separation of police and military functions
- Principles of democratic governance in the security sector (see
Box 3-1)
- Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government
(adopted
at the 2000 OAU Summit in Lomé, Togo, and based on the earlier decision
of the 1999 Algiers OAU Summit) |
Ideal-type accountability is enshrined in norms and principles
(Box 3-3). Difficult to achieve in practice, this sort of accountability
nonetheless establishes goals that every government should strive to attain.
Legal accountability involves ensuring that a country?s
laws translate principles and norms into legally binding requirements for
members of government, civil servants, and members of the security organisations.
There are many paths to achieving the objectives enshrined in norms and
principles. The precise form that a country?s policies, laws, and structures
take must be rooted in that country?s history, culture, legal framework
and institutions. The key point is for national laws to reflect the norms
and principles.
Operational accountability is accountability as it is actually
practiced. Operational accountability reflects a range of informal relationships
and methods of achieving goals, along with ? it is hoped ? international
norms and principles and national law. While informal relationships are
and will remain important in all environments, they must operate in accordance
with the country?s legal framework and international law.
The challenge is to align national laws with basic principles and norms,
and to progressively adjust "accountability on the ground" to the national
legal framework and the guiding principles enshrined in international norms.
As with all broad policy objectives, it is necessary to identify reasonable
steps along the way towards achieving these goals. While reaching these
goals may seem daunting in view of actual practice in a country, it is nonetheless
important to have them as an objective. One of the clear lessons of the
past is that when problems in the security sector are approached in a piecemeal
manner, without reference to broad objectives or underlying structural weaknesses,
accountability in the security sector has generally not improved significantly.
Indeed, a focus on short-term "solutions" that ignores the core problems
can actually aggravate those problems.
It is also important to understand that even long-established democracies
can improve the amount of information that they provide to their citizens
and need to be constantly vigilant on issues of accountability. Developing
and protecting a system of accountability is a continuous process.
|
3.3.3 Role of Civil Society
Although much of the democratic accountability in the security sector is indirect,
that is security organisations are legally accountable to the people through
representative organisations, civil society can play an important role in
promoting accountability of the security sector.
- Groups such as the media, human rights organisations, and security
policy analysis organisations can track behaviour, draw attention
to deviations from national and international law and international
good practice, and make suggestions on ways of improving accountability.
- Civilians can serve on police commissions, police-community
liaison committees, and other formal organisations.
- Non-governmental bodies, including community groups, may monitor
the activities of the police and other security organisations.
- NGOs can also promote dialogue between members of the security
organisations and the public in order to improve understanding
and improve the environment for accountability (Box 3-4).
- And, as in all sectors of government, an engaged public can
have a positive impact on the quality of accountability.
|
| Box 3-4. Civil Society Engagement in Sierra Leone |
In January 2003, the Sierra Leone civil society
organisation, Campaign for Good Governance and the US-based NGO, National
Democratic Institute collaborated and held a civil-military cooperation
workshop in Koidu Town in eastern Sierra Leone. This three-day event
initiated a dialogue between ordinary citizens, regional members of
Parliament, and 5 Brigade of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
(RSLAF). Much of the discussion centered around the relationship of
the RSLAF to the people and the importance of democratic control of
the armed forces, especially in relation to a strong legislative oversight
of the armed forces. At the conclusion of the workshop, participants
formed a civil-military Liaison Committee mandated to carry forward
actions recommended at the meeting and to facilitate additional dialogue.
Source:
www.ndi.org
and www.slcgg.org. |
|
3.4 The Legal Basis of The Security Sector
| The task of creating and maintaining a viable and legitimate state that is accessible,
efficient, accountable, transparent and equitable has been one of the most
critical and complicated challenges of the political transformation processes
that African countries are currently undergoing. Democratic governance requires
that efficient and well-functioning institutions and infrastructures of
government are legally backed and socially coherent.
|
3.4.1 Constitutional Provisions
The legal arrangements that guide the governance of the security sector are generally
enshrined in constitutions, which, for all African countries, are written
documents. Sections of constitutions that are particularly important are
those dealing with the armed forces, the police service, intelligence organisations,
the penal system, the role of the legislature, and the protection of human
rights (Box 3-5).
At a minimum, the constitution should specify:
- the lines of authority between all major stakeholders in the
security sector (both civil and security organisation),
- the basic responsibilities of each of these actors, and
- the broad democratic principles to which the members of the
security sector should, in their conduct as professionals, adhere.
|
| Box 3-5. Uganda Constitutional Provisions on Legislation
Regulating the Armed Forces |
"211(3) The Uganda Police Force shall be nationalistic,
patriotic, professional, disciplined, competent and productive; and
its members shall be citizens of Uganda of good character.
"212. The functions of the Uganda Police Force shall include the following:
- to protect life and property;
- to preserve law and order;
- to prevent and detect crime; and
- to co-operate with the civil authority
and other security organs established under this Constitution
and with the general population.
"213. (1) There shall be an Inspector-General of Police and Deputy
Inspector-General of Police (2) The Inspector-General and the Deputy
Inspector General of Police shall be appointed by the President with
the approval of Parliament....
"214. Parliament shall make laws-Â
- providing for the organisation and
administration of the Uganda Police Force;Â
- ensuring that members of the Uganda
Police Force are recruited from every district of Uganda; andÂ
- regulating, generally, the Uganda
Police Force. "
Source: The
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Chapter 12 "Defence &
National Security,", www.parliament.go.ug/chapt12.htm. |
Some constitutions have included no guidance on or have been revised to
eliminate important aspects of democratic governance. As the experience
of Malawi suggests, the fact that many of Africa?s new democracies have
emerged from prolonged authoritarian settings helps to explain this gap,
since the security forces are deemed to be above the law (Box 3-6). Increasingly,
constitution-making initiatives on the continent now incorporate security-sector
governance as a central requirement.10
Additionally, regional bodies are
also adopting regional constitutional principles and protocols regulating
the activities of member-states on issues pertaining to security-sector
governance.11
In line with these regional initiatives, NEPAD?s Africa Peer
Review Mechanism includes democratic control of the security establishments
as a benchmark for good governance in the approved action plan for democracy
and political governance.12
| Box 3-6. Good Practice: Incorporating the Security
Sector in Post-Authoritarian Constitutions |
Malawi?s independence constitution was revised
in 1966 to accommodate one-party authoritarian rule. It contained
no mention of the functions of the armed forces. Since there was no
civilian ministry of defence, the armed forces were managed through
the Office of the President and the Cabinet, and the 1966 constitution
revoked all clauses pertaining to the protection of human rights;
there were clear opportunities for using the armed forces for partisan
political purposes. In 1995, this situation was reversed as multiparty
democracy returned to Malawi. The new constitution contains an extensive
chapter on the human rights of the citizens of Malawi and clearly
specifies the functions of the Defence Forces of Malawi.
Source:
Hawa O. Ndilowe, ?Development of Democratic Civil-Military Relations
in Malawi: An Opportunity for Democratic Defence Governance for Malawi,?
Prepared for the ISS Program on Security-sector transformation, April
2000 and ?Malawi?s Constitution: Final Draft, Act no. 20 of 1994,?
www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Govern_Political/mlwi_const.html. |
10 See
Hassen Ebrahim, Kayode Fayemi & Stephanie Loomis, Principles and
Mechanisms of Constitution Making in Commonwealth Africa, (Delhi: CHRI,
2000)
11 For
example, The ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance
which was approved by the ECOWAS Heads of Government in December 2000.
12 See
summary conclusions of the NEPAD?s Expert Workshop on Processes, Mechanisms,
Benchmarks and Indicators for APRM. (Mid-Rand, NEPAD Secretariat, 2002)
and NEPAD, ?Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the Africa
Peer Review Mechanism,? NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI, March 9,
2003, http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprmobject.pdf.
|
3.4.2 National Legislation
Important as the constitution is, additional legislation is generally required
to flesh out the details of governing the defence, police, and intelligence
services and the penal system.
In order to support a peacebuilding approach
to security, a country?s security organisations should:
- the executive is responsible for proposing and implementing
legislation. A 1994 study concluded that in most countries with
democratic forms of government, the executive initiates about
90 percent of the legislation.13 (The United States is a major exception
to this rule.)
|
|
| Box 3-7. Uganda Constitutional Provisions on Legislation
Regulating the Armed Forces |
?Parliament shall make laws regulating the Uganda
Peoples? Defence Forces, and in particular, providing for:
- the organs and structures of the Uganda Peoples? Defence Forces
- recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of
members of the Uganda Peoples? Defence Forces and ensuring that members
of the Uganda Peoples? Defence Forces are recruited from every district
of Uganda
- terms and conditions of service of members of the Uganda Peoples?
Defence forces; and the deployment of troops outside Uganda.?
Source:
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Chapter 12, Section
210, www.parliament.go.ug/chapt12.htm. |
There is no agreed formula for the degree to which legislatures participate
in the process of lawmaking in democratic systems. National traditions,
historical experiences, and forms of government (parliamentary or presidential)
are some of the variables that affect the extent of the legislature?s participation.
For example, some democratic systems of government, notably Westminster-style
parliamentary systems, constrain the role of the executive branch more than
others. Despite this variability, it is possible to describe some of the
characteristics of systems with different levels of participation (Table
3-1).
In any system, including more established democracies, competition between
the legislature and the executive over their respective roles can be expected.
This reflects the constantly evolving balance between the power of the legislature
and the executive over time. In many Africa countries, power and initiative
continues to reside with the executive branch, while the legislature plays
a largely rubber-stamping role. Nevertheless, mechanisms do exist that can
help legislators maximise their influence over the lawmaking process.
It is important that legislators educate themselves about these mechanisms
because developing, adopting, and approving financing for their country?s
laws offer legislators a major opportunity to influence policy and restrain
executive power. (The other major opportunity ? the legislature?s oversight
role ? is discussed in Section 3.5.)
| Table 3-1. Participation of Legislature
in Lawmaking Process |
| Â |
Extensive Participation |
Limited Participation
|
Little/No Participation |
| Pre-Introduction |
Extensive executive consultation
with Parliament prior to introduction of major bills, budget (MPs
on Green Paper Commissions, MP?s comments on incorporated into legislation)
|
Consultation limited and
recommendations seldom incorporated into bills |
Bills introduced with no legislative
consultation and input |
| Introduction |
Individual members, including
opposition and backbenchers, may introduce bills with no restriction
|
Some limitations on member
bills (e.g., bills may not have financial consequences) |
All bills initiated by government
|
| Committee Review
|
Strong committee system:
Active hearing schedule
Ministers testify
Amendment power; subpoena power
Member/staff expertise |
Committees may have some
legislative responsibility, but may be unable or unwilling to aggressively
exercise it |
Inactive committee system with no independent authority and limited
expertise and resources |
| Legislative Capacity |
Legislators are sufficiently
trained, possess staff and resources to independently analyse proposals
and develop alternatives |
Legislature has some ability
to develop and promote its agenda, but may be limited by lack of resources
and/or political will |
Legislature is untrained, understaffed
and under-equipped, giving executive leaders major policymaking advantage |
| Source:
National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive
Relations, Legislative Research Series no. 6, Washington, DC,
2000, p. 37. |
Legislators can have influence
- during the pre-legislative stage, which is particularly important
in parliamentary systems
- in the process of initiating legislation
- by amending legislation
- by approving/rejecting legislation
|
Some of the mechanisms that legislators can employ to maximise their influence
are:
In order to support a peacebuilding approach
to security, a country?s security organisations should:
- Government commissions established to study and report on
an issue prior to legislation being initiated; commission reports
often published as ?green papers;? while commissions generally
composed of civil servants and ministers, there are precedents
for legislators participating.
- Resolutions expressing the view of legislators on a given issue;
non-binding but can be important to raise awareness on issues;
linkages with likeminded media and civil society organisations
helpful.
- Familiarity with rules of procedure, which can help legislators,
particularly in parliamentary systems, to overcome executive?s
reticence to involve them in the lawmaking process.
- Amending legislation, especially in committee.
- Opportunities for staff training and development, to enhance
the capacity of legislative staff and members to draft legislation;
increasingly available for security related issues in Africa.
|
13
David M. Olson, Democratic Legislative
Institutions: A Comparative View, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Scharpe, 1994) p. 87.
|
3.4.2 National Legislation
Important as the constitution is, additional legislation is generally required
to flesh out the details of governing the defence, police, and intelligence
services and the penal system.
In general,
- the executive is responsible for proposing and implementing
legislation. A 1994 study
concluded that in most countries with democratic forms of government,
the executive initiates about 90 percent of the legislation.
13
(The United States is a major exception to this rule.)
- the legislature is responsible for commenting on and approving/rejecting
legislations.
However, in some countries, their constitutions locate the power
of initiating legislation in the security sector with the legislature
(Box 3-7).
|
| Box 3-7. Uganda Constitutional Provisions on Legislation
Regulating the Armed Forces |
?Parliament shall make laws regulating the Uganda
Peoples? Defence Forces, and in particular, providing for:
- the organs and structures of the Uganda Peoples? Defence Forces
- recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of
members of the Uganda Peoples? Defence Forces and ensuring that members
of the Uganda Peoples? Defence Forces are recruited from every district
of Uganda
- terms and conditions of service of members of the Uganda Peoples?
Defence forces; and the deployment of troops outside Uganda.?
Source:
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Chapter 12, Section
210, www.parliament.go.ug/chapt12.htm. |
There is no agreed formula for the degree to which legislatures participate
in the process of lawmaking in democratic systems. National traditions,
historical experiences, and forms of government (parliamentary or presidential)
are some of the variables that affect the extent of the legislature?s participation.
For example, some democratic systems of government, notably Westminster-style
parliamentary systems, constrain the role of the executive branch more than
others. Despite this variability, it is possible to describe some of the
characteristics of systems with different levels of participation (Table
3-1).
In any system, including more established democracies, competition between
the legislature and the executive over their respective roles can be expected.
This reflects the constantly evolving balance between the power of the legislature
and the executive over time. In many Africa countries, power and initiative
continues to reside with the executive branch, while the legislature plays
a largely rubber-stamping role. Nevertheless, mechanisms do exist that can
help legislators maximise their influence over the lawmaking process.
It is important that legislators educate themselves about these mechanisms
because developing, adopting, and approving financing for their country?s
laws offer legislators a major opportunity to influence policy and restrain
executive power. (The other major opportunity ? the legislature?s oversight
role ? is discussed in Section 3.5.)
| Table 3-1. Participation of Legislature
in Lawmaking Process |
| Â |
Extensive Participation |
Limited Participation
|
Little/No Participation |
| Pre-Introduction |
Extensive executive consultation
with Parliament prior to introduction of major bills, budget (MPs
on Green Paper Commissions, MP?s comments on incorporated into legislation)
|
Consultation limited and
recommendations seldom incorporated into bills |
Bills introduced with no legislative
consultation and input |
| Introduction |
Individual members, including
opposition and backbenchers, may introduce bills with no restriction
|
Some limitations on member
bills (e.g., bills may not have financial consequences) |
All bills initiated by government
|
| Committee Review
|
Strong committee system:
Active hearing schedule
Ministers testify
Amendment power; subpoena power
Member/staff expertise |
Committees may have some
legislative responsibility, but may be unable or unwilling to aggressively
exercise it |
Inactive committee system with no
independent authority and limited expertise and resources |
| Legislative Capacity |
Legislators are sufficiently
trained, possess staff and resources to independently analyse proposals
and develop alternatives |
Legislature has some ability
to develop and promote its agenda, but may be limited by lack of resources
and/or political will |
Legislature is untrained, understaffed
and under-equipped, giving executive leaders major policymaking advantage |
| Source:
National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive
Relations, Legislative Research Series no. 6, Washington, DC,
2000, p. 37. |
Legislators can have influence
- during the pre-legislative stage, which is particularly important
in parliamentary systems
- in the process of initiating legislation
- by amending legislation
- by approving/rejecting legislation
|
Some of the mechanisms that legislators can employ to maximise their influence
are:
In order to support a peacebuilding approach
to security, a country?s security organisations should:
- Government commissions established to study and report on
an issue prior to legislation being initiated; commission reports
often published as ?green papers;? while commissions generally
composed of civil servants and ministers, there are precedents
for legislators participating.
- Resolutions expressing the view of legislators on a given issue;
non-binding but can be important to raise awareness on issues;
linkages with likeminded media and civil society organisations
helpful.
- Familiarity with rules of procedure, which can help legislators,
particularly in parliamentary systems, to overcome executive?s
reticence to involve them in the lawmaking process.
- Amending legislation, especially in committee.
- Opportunities for staff training and development, to enhance
the capacity of legislative staff and members to draft legislation;
increasingly available for security related issues in Africa.
|
13 David
M. Olson, Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View,
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Scharpe, 1994) p. 87.
|
3.4.3 Traditional and Informal Institutions
Apart from the constitution and subsidiary legislation, there are traditional
and informal institutions that can contribute to a well-governed security
sector. In the past, traditional leaders in many societies in Sub-Saharan
Africa were allowed to continue applying customary laws to "private" issues
at the same time as they were expected to dispense colonial law in the area
of "public law."
Today, elements of customary justice either co-exist with or have been incorporated
into formal justice systems in many countries. This is particularly important
in rural areas, where formal justice systems are often not present. Additionally,
a range of informal justice mechanisms have developed in urban areas. Some
of these mechanisms are based on modified traditional law structures and
procedures, and they focus on problem-solving. Others are established by
non-governmental organisations and focus on arbitration and conflict resolution.
These traditional and informal mechanisms are extremely important due to
the numerous limitations on formal systems of justice in Africa. Inadequate
resources reduce the reach of formal systems. Formal systems are also inaccessible
to many Africans, due to language problems, poverty, and the absence or
inadequacy of legal aid. Box 3-8 describes the key characteristics of a
system of justice that is accessible to all citizens.
| Box 3-8. Good Practice: Criteria for Accessible Justice |
Justice is accessible when:
- It is dispensed in or close to an individual?s community.
- It is affordable by ordinary people.
- Its procedures are simple but fair and consistent with cultural
expectations.
- It is fair and perceived as such by disputants and their families,
and does not reinforce historic biases against traditionally marginalised
groups such as women and youth.
- It is dispensed in the language of the disputants.
- It produces outcomes that emphasise community-building, the transer
of skills, recon ciliation, restoration and compensation.
- It is dispensed rapidly, to avoid animosities becoming entrenched.
- The timing of judicial proceedings take into account the livelihood
needs of disputants.
Source: Wilfried
Schärf, "Report on the Proceedings of the Consultative Group Meeting
on Access to Justice and Penal Reform in Africa, 18 ? 20 March 1999." |
There has also been a disconnect between African cultural and social practices,
which favour restorative and compensatory justice, and the adversarial nature
of formal justice systems. In consequence, traditional and informal justice
systems are receiving renewed attention, especially in terms of the ways
of marrying them to formal systems.
Some of the mechanisms that are compatible
with both formal systems of justice and customary justice systems
are:
- community service schemes,
- police-community liaison groups,
- community safety forums (which extend beyond the police to other
elements of the
criminal justice system and relevant local government bodies),
and
- the imposition of fines according to an individual?s capacity
to pay.
|
Customary systems of law are not always fully compatible with formal law,
or with the principles and norms underlying democratic governance. It is
important that these differences are acknowledged openly and that reasons
for excluding aspects of customary law are fully explained to the population.
|
3.5 Security-Sector Oversight
Throughout the world there is tension between the culture of secrecy that has
traditionally surrounded security activities and the need for accountability
in democratic societies. Mechanisms created to ensure democratic accountability
of the security sector frequently have to struggle against efforts by the
executive branch to limit their effectiveness. Civil oversight of the security
sector continues to be a work-in-progress in all countries.
Oversight of the security sector has traditionally been weak throughout
Africa. During the 1990s, African governments and publics increasingly came
to understand that to achieve democratic governance, government has to be
accountable to elected civil oversight actors and a range of independent
oversight agencies.
Oversight bodies can be divided into three
main categories:
- Legislative accountability bodies: such as public accounts committees,
defence com-
mittee, police/justice/internal security committee, intelligence
committee
- Independent accountability bodies: such as auditors general,
constitutional courts and
other relevant components of the judicial system, ombudsperson/public
protectors, anti-corruption agencies.
- Public-sector accountability agencies: such as inspectors general
of relevant minis-
tries and security organisations, budget monitoring units in ministries
and security organisations, ministerial contract tender committees,
due process/due diligence agencies.
|
Constitutions should guarantee the creation, existence and effective operation
of parliaments and independent oversight bodies that safeguard the interests
of people, mediate the excesses of government, and help to enforce the law.
The head of government generally has the authority to appoint the heads
of independent accountability bodies, subject to the approvalof the legislature.
The heads of public-sector accountability agencies are generally appointed
by the head of government or the appropriate minister.
|
3.5.1 The Constitution
Constitutions should, at a minimum, contain clauses on:
- the role of the legislature in national security policy formulation,
especially in countries emerging from prolonged authoritarian
rule;
- access to information on all security-sector issues;
- powers to declare war;
- powers over the budget;
- powers of approval of senior security-sector appointments;
- powers on the declaration of emergency powers and how these
affect non-derogable rights;
- professional autonomy of the military and prohibitions on military
interference in politics.
|
African constitutions are beginning to specify some of the relations between
the legislature and security organisations. The Ugandan and Zambian constitutions,
for example, define the laws that the Ugandan and Zambian Parliaments are
required to produce to regulate their defence forces (Box 3-7).
14 The South
African constitution mandates the creation of a parliamentary Joint Standing
Committee on Defence (Box 3-9). The Ghanaian constitution clearly outlines
the role of the Ghanaian Parliament in raising revenue, preparing budgets,
and tracking the expenditure of the public sector as a whole, including
the security sector.15
| Box 3-9. Good Practice: Constitutionally Mandated
Standing Committee on Defence |
The South African Constitution provides for a
parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence as part of the oversight
of the defence sector. The Constitution empowers this committee to
"investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, functioning,
organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness
of the National Defence Force and to perform such other functions
relating to parliamentary supervision of the Force as may be prescribed
by law."
Source: Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993,
www.gov.za/constitution/1993/1993cons.htm#SECTION228 and Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996, Schedule 6, Section 24(1),
www.gov.za/constitution/1996/96conssec6.htm#24 |
To be effective, independent oversight bodies must have a high degree of
autonomy from the executive and the legislature. Once the autonomy of oversight
bodies is in doubt, their legitimacy is also severely affected. Thus, either
the constitution (or subsidiary legislation where relevant) should:
- ensure that oversight agencies have access to adequate operating
budgets, for example through the consolidated fund.
- clearly delineate each oversight body?s functions and powers.
16
|
The Ghanaian Constitution, for example, prescribes how the Ghanaian Auditor-General
and his staff are to be financed (Box 3-10).
| Box 3-10. Financing Ghana?s Auditor-General |
The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana provides,
"187 (11) The salary and allowances payable to the Auditor-General
shall be a charge on the consolidated Fund?.
"187 (14) The administrative expenses of the office of the Auditor-General
including all salaries, allowances, gratuities and pensions payable
to or in respect of persons serving in the Audit Service shall be
a charge on the consolidated Fund."
Source: Parliament
of Ghana, "The Constitution,"
www.parliament.gh/hmeP/lawsproPag/theConst.htm |
14 Constitution
of Zambia - Part VII: Defence and National Security, [As amended by Act
No. 18 of 1996], http://zamlii.zamnet.zm/const/1996/const91.htm.
15
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992,
www.parliament.gh/hmeP/lawsproPag/theConst.htm.
16
While, in practice, it is preferable for the constitution to establish
oversight bodies and delineate their functions, some oversight bodies may
be created through national legislation. For example, the Zambian constitution
gives the legislature the power to create commissions and to determine their
functions and powers.
|
3.5.2 The Legislature
A vigorous legislature is a requirement of democratic governance in the security
sector. Table 3-2 outlines the key oversight roles of the legislature in
systems with different degrees of legislative oversight.
As far as the security sector is concerned,
the legislature often has the critical role of:
- laying down the legal framework of democratic security-sector
governance,
- reviewing and approving security establishments? policies and
budgets (and hence conditions of service),
- overseeing sectoral expenditure, procurements, operations, and
deployment.
|
In some constitutions, the Parliament is also empowered to:
- approve the declaration of war,
- oversee intelligence and security agencies (other than the police).
|
There is a range of tools that legislatures can employ in implementing the
democratic oversight of the security sector. These include general powers;
budget control; approval/rejection of peace missions and other deployments;
procurement; approval/rejection of security policies; approval/rejection
of personnel-related issues. Box 3-11 provides more information on each
of these categories.
| Table 3-2. Degree to which Legislatures
Conduct Legislative Oversight |
| Â |
Comprehensive Legislative
Oversight |
Limited Legislative Oversight |
Little or No Legislative
Oversight |
| Committee Oversight
|
Strong oversight by committees:
- Committees have adequate staff and expertise
- Ministers attend oversight hearings and respond promptly to written requests for information
- Investigations may be conducted, and/or visit embarked on sites
|
Committees respond solely
to issues brought to their attention, but lack comprehensive or proactive
approaches to oversight; Committees may lack critical expertise or
resources |
Lack of committee oversight;
Committee hearings seldomly include Ministers or other high-level
government officials; written requests for information are ignored |
| Public Accounts Committee
|
Separate, well-staffed and
funded Public Accounts Committees conduct coordinated oversight of
government expenditures; coordinate efforts with the Auditor General
|
Existing Public Accounts
Committees, but may be understaffed or under funded |
No Public Accounts Committee;
Legislative oversight of financial policy is under-resourced or non-existent |
| Parliamentary Questions
|
Frequent use of parliamentary
questions; Ministers are required to respond appropriately and promptly;
Prime Minister and other Ministers attend public ?Question Time? |
Legislature uses parliamentary
questions, Ministers often e vade questions and/or give insufficient
responses; opposition may be given adequate opportunity to raise issues
|
Limited or no use of parliamentary
questions; Ministers ignore written questions and do not attend ?Question
Period? |
| Independent External
Oversight |
Existence of independent,
well-staffed external oversight entities such as Auditor General,
Comptrollers, Ombudsman
|
Some institutions exist;
may be under-funded, understaffed, or underutilised by legislature |
No independent external oversight
entities; parliament must identify and pursue oversight issues on
its own |
| Source:
National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative Executive
Relations, Legislative Research Series no. 6, Washington, DC,
2000, p. 38. |
|
3.5.3 The Quality of Oversight
Creating oversight bodies is an important first step on the road to the democratic
governance of the security sector. It is also important to create an environment
that enables these bodies to function as intended.
The quality of oversight is critically dependent on a number of factors:
- Independence of oversight bodies
- Accountability of oversight bodies
- Guaranteed access of oversight bodies to financial resources
- Clear delineation of functions of oversight bodies
- Knowledge of security issues on the part of the personnel of oversight bodies
- Knowledge of the governing process on the part of the personnel of oversight bodies
- Confidence building between security personnel and civil oversight body personnel.
|
Independence: The most important of these factors
is the ability of oversight bodies to operate independently in their promotion
and protection of transparency, accountability, integrity and the free and
fair dispensation of justice and administration. If they are to be truly
effective, oversight bodies must be able to carry out their tasks without
interference from the executive, the security bodies and, in some cases,
even other oversight actors. This holds true for all the three categories
of oversight bodies: the legislative oversight bodies; independent oversight
bodies; and public-sector accountability agencies. Thus, the quality of
leadership is crucial for effective oversight. Adherence to the norms and
practices of democratic governance is required from a whole range of leaders:
heads of state and government, lower-ranking politicians and bureaucrats;
legislators; civil society; and security organisation personnel.
| Box 3-11. Good Practice: Legislative Instruments
to Maximise Oversight of Security Sector |
The following list is not intended to be exhaustive.
Rather, it is intended to illustrate the range of instruments that
may be available to legislatures in order to oversee the security
sector.
General powers
- Initiate legislation
- Amend or rewrite laws
- Question members of the Executive
- Hold hearings
- Summon members of the Executive to testify at legislative hearings
- Summon military staff and civil servants to testify at legislative hearings
- Summon civil experts to testify at legislative hearings
- Obtain documents from the Executive
- Carry out legislative inquiries
Budget control
- Obtain access to all budget documents
- Review and amend defence and security budgets
- Exercise budget control at the level of programmes, projects and line-items
- Approve/reject supplementary security-sector budget proposals
Peace missions/other foreign deployments
- Participate in decision-making before troops are committed abroad, including the mission mandate
- Review, amend, approve/reject mission budget
- Approve/reject rules of engagement
- Approve/reject risks of military personnel deployed
- Approve/reject chain of command/control
- Approve/reject duration of mission
- Visit deployed troops
Procurement
- Right to be fully informed by the Executive of procurement decisions
- Approve/reject procurement contracts
- Review : (a) need for new equipment; (b) selection of supplier; (c) offers of compensation/off-sets
General Security Policy
- Approve/reject policy concept
- Approve/reject crisis management concept
- Approve/reject force structure
- Approve/reject strategy/doctrine
Personnel Issues
- Approve/reject personnel plan
- Fix ceilings on manpower
- Approve/reject or be consulted on highest military appointments (such as the chief of staff)
Source: Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Inter-Parliamentary
Union, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles,
Mechanisms and Practices, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 5
? 2003, p. 76. |
One way in which leaders can promote more effective oversight is by not
attempting to use oversight bodies to further their own political or personal
agendas, to show favouritism to one or more groups in society at the expense
of the society as a whole, or to embarrass elected authorities by demanding
biased or partial judgments from oversight bodies. This will be facilitated
to the extent that the personnel of oversight bodies are chosen on the basis
of merit, rather than on the grounds of political, ethnic, religious or
other group affiliations.
Accountability: Oversight bodies must themselves
be accountable to the elected representatives of the people and to the people
themselves. One means of achieving accountability is to ensure that all
independent oversight bodies are accountable to parliaments. This means
limiting the use of extra-parliamentary commissions and other mechanisms.
| Box 3-12. Good Practice: Overseeing the South
African Strategic Defence Procurement (SDP) Process |
One outcome of the South African Defence Review
was the decision to procure a sizable amount of new military equipment.
The procurement process was completed in July 1999. Due to the complexity
of the procurement process, the Defence Audit Centre of the Office
of the Auditor-General decided that a special review should be carried
out, rather than a standard audit. Once completed in September 2000,
this special review was the subject of hearings and other discussions
within the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).
SCOPA subsequently suggested a joint review of a number of issues
relating to the procurement process by the Auditor-General, the Public
Protector, and the National Director of Public Prosecutions. This
joint investigation was carried out between November 2000 and November
2001.
The joint investigation concluded: "No evidence was found of any improper
or unlawful conduct by the Government." At the same time, it did identify
a number of "irregularities and improprieties" in the process. For
example:
- "In view of the magnitude and extent of the SDP procurement, the
time allocated for
each evaluation and execution was insufficient to ensure that it was
done properly and efficiently" (para 14.1.5).
- "The decision to allow bidders for the Corvette programme to supply
information after
the offers were submitted constituted a deviation from proper procurement
practice" (para 14.1.11).
- "Proper evaluation procedures were not consistently and diligently
applied and a proper
audit trail was not established throughout the procurement process"
(para 14.1.16).
- "ADS was given the opportunity to lower its inflated tender ? to
just below that of C2I2
over a period of more than a month. C2I2 was given a maximum of four
days to submit its tender (para 14.1.20)."
The report concluded with a series of recommendations designed to
overcome these situations and other problems identified in the course
of the joint investigation. The entire report and the executive branch?s
response to it are available to the public.
This inquiry quite clearly distinguishes between the government?s
responsibilities in the areas of defence procurement and sound procurement
practice. For example, Cabinet makes the final decision on procurement
on the basis of a variety of considerations, including relative cost
and the ability of the equipment procured to meet South Africa?s defence
needs. However, as the Joint Investigation Report notes: "Ultimately,
the decision about what the country can and cannot afford is one of
political choice" (para 14.1.12). The choice made by the cabinet may
not be popular with certain segments of the population, and they should
have the right to express their views on the decision. Nonetheless,
it remains the Cabinet?s responsibility to make the decision.
What is not acceptable is deviations from international good practice
norms in the area of procurement, such as the bending of procurement
rules to give preference to particular contractors, the profiting
of decision makers from the procurement process, or the failure to
conduct adequate needs assessments. In the case of the Strategic Defence
Procurement process, none of these problems were found to have influenced
the final outcome of the process. Despite that, it is important for
problems such as those pointed out to be recognised and addressed.
It is also important for the public at large to understand that these
problems exist, so that they can press the government for greater
accountability in subsequent procurement exercises.
Source: "Joint
Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Package,"
www.gov.za/Projects/procurement/invesigationreport.htm. |
A second component of enhancing the accountability of oversight bodies is
to ensure that their reports are made publicly available to the most extent
possible. While some portions of the reports issued by oversight bodies
may need to be held in confidence for reasons of national security, every
effort should be made to provide the maximum volume of information to the
public. Constant engagement with the public is key to building the legitimacy
of independent oversight bodies. It will also support their independence.
In a situation where oversight actors lack the capacity or the desire to
publicise their work, they expose themselves to the same accusations of
self-importance and arrogance that often create ill-will between governments
and the public. By publicising their findings, oversight bodies can make
an important contribution to public debate on fundamental issues of democratic
governance (Box 3-12).
Guaranteed Access to Resources: Effective operation
requires guaranteed access to adequate resources ? information, as well
as human resources, and funds. An independent source of financing is especially
important to prevent those government bodies, whose activities are reviewed
by oversight agencies, from keeping the oversight bodies from fulfilling
their mandates by starving them of resources.
| Box 3-13. Good Practice: Code of Conduct for the
Personnel of Oversight Bodies |
Members of oversight institutions, for example,
should:
- promote the principles of natural justice; promote and protect
human rights;
- act in an unbiased and impartial manner; not unfairly discriminate
against any member of the public on account of race, gender, ethnic or social
origin, colour, age, disability, religion, political persuasion,
conscience, belief, culture or language;
- avoid the use of the oversight institution to which s/he belongs
to unfairly promote or prejudice the interests of any person, political
party or interest group;
- avoid the use of such bodies to persecute individuals on the
basis of political persuasion;
- promote a sound, efficient, effective, transparent and accountable
administration in the course of his/her official duties and shall report fraud,
corruption, nepotism, maladministration and any other act which
constitutes an offence, or which is prejudicial to the public
interest to the appropriate authorities;
- avoid the use or disclosure of any official information for
personal gain or the gain of others;
- execute his/her duty in a transparent and accountable manner;
- uphold the integrity of the constitution (In a number of cases,
many of these institutions actually contradict, rather than reinforce the fundamental
tenets of the constitution.)
|
Delineation of Functions: The functions and powers
of each oversight body must be clearly delineated and recognised, ideally
in the constitution or in subordinate national legislation.17
These mechanisms will not prove effective, however, until they are completely respected by
all branches of government and by the security forces.
Knowledge of Security Issues: There is a serious
shortage of individuals who are well versed in security matters within oversight
bodies in most African countries. The need for technical knowledge of the
security sector is greater in some areas than in others. Legislators, for
example, require detailed knowledge of a range of security-related issues
in order to make decisions. Competent auditors can make significant progress
in identifying problems with financial management practices without detailed
knowledge of security issues, while assessing value-for-money requires them
to have more specialised knowledge.
Knowledge of Governing Processes: Oversight capacity
is limited not only by inadequate knowledge of security issues, but also
by inadequate knowledge of governing processes. For example, African legislators
frequently do not understand how to use the committee system effectively,
they lack experience in drafting legislation, and are uncertain about the
role and functioning of legislative oversight bodies.
Confidence building. In order to be able to execute
their oversight function adequately, oversight body personnel have to build
a relationship of trust with security body personnel. Such a relationship
of trust depends both on the capacity of oversight personnel to behave responsibly
and on the ability of the security body personnel to respect and accept
decisions by the oversight bodies.
17
While in practice it is preferable for the constitution to establish
oversight bodies and delineate their functions, some oversight bodies may
be created through national legislation. For example, the Zambian constitution
gives the legislature the power to create commissions and to determine their
functions and powers.
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Summary of Main Points ? Chapter 3
- The essence of security-sector
transformation is the process of aligning the sector with core
values, principles and practices of democratic governance, which
is a critical component of human development and human security.
- Sound security-sector governance
is crucial not only for the success of democratic consolidation,
but also the quality of security.
- Four aspects of democratic governance
that are critical for the security sector are: a) transparency;
b) accountability; c) the legal basis of the security sector;
and d) oversight.
- Transparency: Transparency
is the fundamental ingredient in accountable governance. Without
access to information about the formulation and implementation
of laws, policies, plans and budgets, it is impossible to hold
any public servant to account.
- It is possible to retain a
high degree of confidentiality without compromising the principle
of public accountability. In doing so, it is vital to be clear
about what is being held in confidence and why it is considered
sensitive.
- The process by which the legal
arrangements guiding the security sector are determined must
be transparent. Legislation governing the different security
bodies must also be developed in a transparent and participatory
fashion. A conscious effort must also be made to ensure that
the basic legal documents governing the security sector are
disseminated as widely as possible and that governments are
internally transparent.
- While the security sector
is unlikely to have a higher standard of transparency than
other parts of the public sector, the wide dissemination of
information will help produce policies consistent with democratic
security-sector governance and the effective implementation
of these policies. Among other things, it will strengthen
the demand for accountable governance, including effective
oversight.
- Accountability: Democratic
accountability in the security sector means that security bodies
are subordinate to the civil authorities in democratically constituted
states, must explain their actions to civil authorities (indirect
accountability) and civil society (direct accountability), and
are subject to sanctions for inappropriate actions for inadequately
explaining their actions.
- There are three levels of
accountability: 1) ideal-type accountability (norms and principles);
2) legal accountability (national legislation); and 3) operational
accountability (accountability as it is actually practiced).
The challenge is to align national laws with basic principles
and norms and to progressively adjust ?accountability on the
ground? to the national legal framework and international norms
and principles.? Developing and protecting a system of accountability
is a continuous process that all societies, irrespective of
their level of development, must undergo.
- Civil society has an important
role to play in promoting security-sector accountability, by
tracking behavior, drawing attention to deviations from national
and international laws and good practice, suggesting ways of
improving accountability, serving on public oversight and accountability
bodies, and promoting dialogue between embers of the security
bodies and the public.
- Legal basis of the security
sector: Democratic governance requires that the efficient
and well-functioning institutions and infrastructure of government
are legally backed and socially coherent.
- The constitution should, at a minimum, specify lines of authority,
basic responsibilities and broad democratic principles to which
members of the security bodies should adhere.
- National legislation fleshing out the details of governing the
defence, police, and intelligence services and the penal system
should be proposed by the executive. While there is no agreed
formula for the degree to which legislatures participate in the
process of lawmaking in democratic systems, legislatures in such
systems generally comment on proposed legislation, approve or
reject legislation, and implement legislation.
- Customary law institutions are extremely important in Africa
because of numerous limitations on formal systems of justice.
Mechanisms compatible with both formal systems and customary law
include a) community service schemes; b) police-community liaison
groups; c) community safety forums; and calculating fines according
to an individual?s capacity to pay. At the same time, customary
law systems are not always fully compatible with formal law, or
with the principles and norms underlying democratic governance.
These differences should be acknowledged openly.
- Oversight: Throughout
the world tensions exist between the culture of secrecy that has
traditionally surrounded security activities and the need for
accountability in democratic societies.
- There are three types of oversight
bodies: 1) legislative accountability bodies (public accounts
committees, intelligence committees and so on); 2) independent
accountability bodies (auditors general, constitutional courts,
ombudspersons and so on); 3) public-sector accountability
agencies (inspectors general for relevant ministries, ministerial
contract tender committees and the like). ? At a minimum,
the constitution should address the role of the legislature
in national security policy formulation; access to information
on all security-sector issues; powers to declare war; powers
over the budget; powers of approval of senior security sector
appointments; powers on the declaration of emergency powers
and how these affect non-derogable rights; and professional
autonomy of military and prohibitions on military interference
in politics.
- Independent oversight bodies
require access to adequate operating budgets and clearly delineated
functions and powers in order to have a high degree of autonomy
from both the executive and the legislature.
- Oversight functions of legislatures
in democratic societies frequently include a) establishing
the legal framework of democratic security-sector governance,
b) reviewing/approving security policies and budgets, and
c) overseeing expenditure, procurement, operations and deployments.
- The quality of oversight depends
on: a) the independence and accountability of oversight bodies;
b) guaranteed access of oversight bodies to financial resources;
c) clear delineation of functions of oversight bodies; d)
knowledge of security issues and governing processes among
oversight personnel; and e) confidence building between security
personnel and civil oversight personnel.
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4. Policy Development and Implementation
AIM
This chapter highlights the central features of the process of formulating and
implementing policy. It provides information on generic policy processes,
while recognising that the way in which such processes are undertaken will
vary from country to country.
Section 4.1 explains why policy is important. Section 4.2 examines the political
dimensions of the policy process. Section 4.3 offers some observations on
the context in which policies are developed and implemented. Sections 4.4
? 4.6 discuss the policy management process and describes its application
in the security sector. Section 4.4 focuses on four cross-cutting issues:
(1) the importance of human and institutional capacity; (2) policy communication,
dialogue, and debate; (3) policy analysis; (4) factors influencing the decision
to conduct a major policy review. Section 4.5 examines policy development.
Section 4.6 offers some guidance on policy implementation. (Oversight, which
is a central component of the policy process is discussed in Chapter 3.)
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4.1 Why Policy is Important
Policy in any sector is important for four inter-related reasons:
- It provides a clear series of guidelines within which strategies can be framed and activities can take place.
- It helps to discipline government behaviour by minimizing ad hoc and costly decision
making processes by promoting the optimal use of resources in pursuit of specific objectives.
- It provides people with a series of normative and practical guidelines through which
government can be assessed and held accountable for its actions.
- It confers predictability on the activities of government.
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4.2 The Politics of the Policy Process
The policy process is often equated with the formal institutional arrangements
that are its output ? legislation, policy documents, improved organisational
management, etc. In reality, the policy process is part of a complex political
process that reflects institutional relationships that are inherently political,
subjective and psychological. Where security organisations have become deeply
embedded in the political system and economy, simply writing new laws or
undertaking narrow institutional reforms will only have a limited effect
on progress towards the democratic civil control of the security sector.
It is therefore important to focus on changing the entire environment within
which the security sector operates.
African experience with reforming the security sector at the end of the
20th century and the beginning of the 21st century underscores the importance
of improved governance, greater transparency, respect for rules-based systems,
and the promotion and protection of human rights. Several areas are particularly
relevant in this regard:
- Addressing the constitutional dimensions of civil democratic control.
- Developing civilian expertise in security issues among politicians, government civil servants,
and civil society.
- Developing participatory and collective methods of managing the security sector that
are consistent with African culture and participatory democracy.
- Creating opportunities for networking and dialogue between members of the security
organisations and civilians.
- Agreeing to the division of labour among the different security organisations.
- Ensuring professional autonomy of the security organisations (Box 4-1).
|
Any effort to enhance the policy process in African security sectors must
be based on:
- accountability to the people
- participation, facilitated by an accessible process and a culture of inclusivity
- legitimacy
- transparency
- efficiency
- ownership
|
Box 4-2 describes the components of a national policy process that will
achieve these objectives.
| Box 4-1. Why Professional Autonomy of the Police
Service Matters |
The following list is not intended to be exhaustive.
Rather, it is intended to illustrate the range of instruments that
may be available to legislatures in order to oversee the security
sector.
Source: Amnesty
International, Policing to Protect Human Rights: A Survey of Police
Practice in Countries of the Southern African Development Community,
1997-2002, London, 2002, pp. 13-14. See also International Code of
Conduct for Public Officials (Article 1), (www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r059),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 51/59 of 12 December 1996. |
| Box 4-2. Good Practice: Legislative Instruments
to Maximise Oversight of Security Sector |
- The process itself is understood to be as important as the outcome of the process.
- The management and administration of the process is credible and respected.
- Conflicting aims and views are mediated upon in a manner that enriches the policy
debate and does not jeopardise its progress. This may necessitate conflict resolution and
consensus-building among key stakeholders.
- To promote transparency, participation, and credibility, all relevant stakeholders must
have access to all necessary information.
- The process is open to the diverse views existing in society. Dissenting views are
valued as enriching the policy debate and are a means of ensuring that the opinions of
various sectors of society are represented.
- Ordinary people are empowered to make effective contributions to policy development
and implementation by giving them the necessary tools to participate in the process.
- The entire process is accessible to ordinary citizens: in terms of physical proximity, the
languages used, the absence of jargon and overtly sophisticated language,
the provision of relevant information on the aims and objectives of the process in a timely manner.
- Priority is given to public education during policy development and implementation in
order to assist the public in understanding its rights and obligations.
Efforts are made to use appropriate media and other methods to reach out, especially, to the
disadvantaged and marginalised.
- The process is continuously reviewed and evaluated to confirm that operating
principles and minimum standards are adhered to.
- All actions violating the values enshrined in the output of the process should be
unequivocally rejected.
- Universally accepted rights must be reflected in all processes.
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4.3 The Policy Context
4.3.1 Policy Reform in Times of Change and Stability
Policy is developed and implemented in two different types of context: (1) periods
of significant change ? either in economic and political systems or in the
relevant institution itself and (2) periods where systems are essentially
stable. Both of these situations have different bearings on the possible
outcomes of a policy process.
It is important to consider the following
factors when engaging in a process of transformation:
- Nature of change. A decision to undertake major
policy changes is more easily made
during periods of significant change. In periods of relative system
stability, changes tend to be slower and more incremental. At
the same time, it may be easier to implement major changes under
conditions of greater system stability.
- The stakes. During periods of change, the political
and institutional stakes are high.
Failure to deal with the need for significant change in the security
sector has led to the overthrow of many governments. In times
of system stability, the stakes tend to appear moderate.
- Level of attention. Policy changes tend to
draw less attention when they are ?chosen?
during periods of system stability.
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4.3.2 Responding to Policy Reform
Whenever a policy is going to be introduced or modified, it is critical to take
into account the sentiments of the political society, civil society, the
state and the public. As far as possible, one must identify the major role
players required for the success of the policy (both inside and outside
the organisation concerned), determine their attitudes toward the proposed
changes, and analyse their influence over the formulation and implementation
of the policy.18
Responses to the introduction of a new policy also affects the context in
which the policy is developed and implemented.
Two factors are especially important here:
- The costs and benefits of the policy to be implemented
- The pace of policy implementation.
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Costs and Benefits. If the costs of the policy are to be
borne by many people but the benefits concentrated in the hands of a few
(for instance, purchases of new cars and houses for ministers), then the
response of the public is likely to be strongly negative. Where costs are
borne by a small sector of the population, while the benefits of the policy
are enjoyed by a larger number of individuals (for instance, levies on business
to support an economic development programme) public reaction is likely
to be muted.
In general, it can be anticipated that security-sector transformation will
benefit more people than those who will bear the costs. However, security
organisations do have the capacity to disrupt the constitutional order.
While many personnel of security organisations can expect to see their conditions
of service and professional status increase as a result of security-sector
transformation, some individuals may, in fact, lose their status or economic
opportunities. It is important to convince the vast majority of security
organisation personnel that they will benefit professionally from proposed
changes and it is equally critical to devise strategies of reducing opportunities
for spoilers to derail the transformation process.
The Pace of Policy Implementation. Policies that are implemented
rapidly and which affect many people evoke substantial public response (for
instance, raising the price of bread or fuel overnight). However, policies
that are gradually applied evoke much less public response (such as the
standardisation of driving licenses).
Since improving governance in the security sector is essentially a matter
of institutional and attitudinal transformation, it is likely to proceed
relatively slowly. This will provide breathing space for the security organisations
to adjust. However, dissatisfaction may be created among segments of the
population if certain types of behaviour, such as human rights violations,
are not altered rapidly.
18
The major actors in each portion of the security sector are discussed in
Chapter 2.
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4.4 Managing The Policy Process I: Cross-Cutting Issues
Figure 4-1 illustrates a generic policy management process. This can be applied
to policy processes in defence, public safety, and intelligence. While the
procedures described in Sections 4.4 ? 4.6 will always apply to all stakeholders
engaged in managing a policy process, the process itself should not be managed
mechanistically. Nor should it be over-managed. Rather, there should be
sufficient latitude to take into account the individual characteristics
of each policy process. Each policy process has unique characteristics,
and there can be no linear or rigid guidelines for managing a policy process.
The focus in sections 4.4 ? 4.6 is, therefore, on generic elements of the
policy process. Exactly how these elements are combined will vary from country
to country.
This section examines four cross-cutting issues that are critical to a well-managed
policy process:
- policy communication, dialogue, and debate
- adequate human and institutional capacity
- policy analysis
- factors influencing the decision to conduct a major policy review.
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4.4.1 Policy Communication, Dialogue, and Debate
A central tenet of democratic governance is that policy should be developed and
implemented in a transparent and participatory manner. That is why policy
communication, dialogue and debate are at the centre of the policy process.
Participants in the South African defence transformation process, for example,
stress the centrality of communication in a successful transformation process
in any sector (Box 4-3.) The formulation and implementation of policy should
also operate on the basis of the ?principle of shared responsibility.? This
principle dictates that participation in policy formulation is never the
prerogative of one ministry or one set of actors alone.
| Box 4-3. Good Practice: Placing Communication
at the Centre of the Policy Process |
?Communicate, and communicate, and communicate.
And when you are tired of communicating, communicate, and communicate
and communicate some more.?
Source:
Brigadier-General Solly Mollo (SANDF), Presentation
on ?Managing Change? to the ?South-South Dialogue on Defence Transformation,?
Accra, May 27-30, 2003. |
Diversity must be reflected in the ethos, strategy and process of the management
of policy. Thus, for example, intelligence policy should not be determined
solely by the body or bodies responsible for managing the intelligence services.
Nor should input be sought only from intelligence specialists.
Openness is required both within government and between government and the
public. All relevant governmental actors ? in all branches of government
? must have access to the information that they require to play their constitutional
roles in the policy process. The economic managers (finance ministry, ministry
of planning, and so on) are frequently left outside security-sector policy
processes in African countries. In democratic societies that follow sound
public expenditure management practices, the economic managers are involved
from the beginning in order to help provide a realistic financial framework
for policy development and implementation.19
Members of the public must
also be adequately informed to enable them to provide input into the policy
process and to assess government implementation of policies. The post-1994
South African experience of security-sector policy management produced a
number of useful mechanisms for strengthening consultation during policy
development (Box 3-2).
19
Chapter 5 contains more detail on financial management of the security
sector.
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4.4.2 Adequate Human and Institutional Capacity
Institutional and human capacities are crucial to ensuring the successful outcome
of any policy process. Policy that has been developed without taking into
account institutional and human-resource constraints will act as no more
than a vision with little long-term, operational utility. African countries
experience significant human and institutional capacity constraints throughout
the public sector. These constraints are often most severe in the security
sector. The capacity of civilians in both the public and non-governmental
sectors to participate fully in the processes of policymaking, implementation,
and oversight in the security sector is extremely weak in most African countries.
Perhaps ironically, security organisation personnel are also often poorly
prepared for the roles that they need to play in the policy process. In
most non-OECD countries, security organisation personnel are unable to assess
threats, develop plans for addressing these threats, or manage the resources
allocated to them effectively and efficiently. Because of the lack of civil
oversight, security organisation personnel have had little or no incentive
to carry out these functions rigorously.
It is therefore critically important to conduct a realistic appraisal of
the capacity of all relevant actors to develop and implement policy. This
involves asking:
- Do key actors have the knowledge and skills needed to fulfil
the roles that they are supposed to play in the policy process?
If not, are there ways of helping them to acquire, at least, some
of the necessary knowledge and skills in the short term, for example
through mentoring arrangements or seconding knowledgeable civil
society members in an advisory capacity?
- Do key actors have access to the information that they require
to play their assigned roles in the policy process? If not, what
needs to be done to improve their access to information? Is this
politically feasible?
- Are there major institutional impediments that will negatively
affect the policy process? If so, what can be done to alleviate
these in the short term and to rectify them in the longer term?
- Do key actors have sufficient weight to participate effectively
in the policy process? If not, to what extent is it possible to
alter the balance of power among key stakeholders?
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4.4.4 Initiating a Policy Process
Policy is always initiated as a result of a deliberate decision and it requires
appropriate authorization or mandate from an appropriate political or departmental
head. The decision to review security policy or some portion of it will
be made by the cabinet, the legislature, a minister, or a head of department.
Approval of the outcome of the review rests with the cabinet and/or parliament.
In some cases, security sector actors themselves will trigger a review in
an effort to pre-empt appraisals imposed by political actors and thereby
forestall major changes. If possible, efforts should be made by civil authorities
to co-opt such reviews.
In the security sector, there are four
major factors that initiate a major policy review:
- major shifts in the political environment within which security-sector
institutions operate
- major shifts in the strategic environment within which security-sector
institutions operate
- significant changes in the economic climate within which security-sector
institutions operate
- a cultural crisis within one or more of the security-sector
institutions
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Major Political Shifts. Political shifts can be
either internally or externally driven, and these are frequently a combination
of both factors. The vast majority of post-1990 transformation processes
within both the developed and developing world derived to some degree from
the end of the Cold War, which enabled norms such as human rights protection,
democracy, good governance, human development and human security to expand
internationally. In Sierra Leone, to take one example of a domestically-induced
shift, the war against the Revolutionary United Front made it impossible
to continue to ignore the failure of the political system to provide an
environment conducive to either human development or human security. In
consequence, the government set out in the late 1990s to reverse almost
40 years of security-sector unaccountability to civil authorities.
Major Strategic Shifts: Strategic shifts may result
from a fundamental alteration in the regional balance of powers (for instance,
at the end of the Cold War) or a shift in the sub-regional balance of powers
(such as in the demise of apartheid within South Africa). These may be long-term
or short-term in nature. Shifts that appear likely to endure require a reassessment
of a country?s security environment and the roles that security organisations
will play in protecting the state and its citizens against threats of violence.
In the current strategic context of Africa, most countries do not require
armed forces for ?traditional? roles and tasks associated with defending
the country against external threats. In the future, very few African countries
will have the luxury of maintaining armed forces for traditional roles alone.
Already many African armed forces are used for a variety of non-traditional
purposes, such as participation in regional security arrangements and peace
missions, aid to the civil authorities during natural disasters, delivery
of humanitarian assistance, support of domestic police services, protection
against poaching activities, and provision of maritime security. The role
of the police is also increasingly shifting and expanding to include, for
example, transnational crime.
Significant Economic Changes. Constrained economic
circumstances in many African countries have reduced budgetary outlays throughout
the public sector, and security organisations have not been immune to budget
cuts. Countries, such as Sierra Leone, that are also affected by conflict
find themselves in particularly difficult situations. The reprioritization
of national needs by governments has also led to a decline in the share
of the budget allocated to the security sector. The serious economic constraints
facing all security organisations throughout francophone West Africa at
the beginning of the 21st century ? especially the armed forces, police,
and gendarmerie ? led some security-sector officials to propose that security
policies need to be reviewed and brought in line with available resources.
In yet other cases, economic constraints can be created by the need to shift
financial resources within the security sector. There is a sense within
much of sub-Saharan Africa that the current crisis of public safety has
created an urgent need to transfer resources from defence to the police
and gendarmarie. The simultaneous rise in transnational threats to peace
and security may require a shift from traditional defence forces to paramilitary-type
forces and demand greater regional collaboration among police services.
Again, such shifts would need to be embedded in a review of security policies.
Cultural Crises. Wide-ranging transformation processes
are often initiated by a cultural crisis within a specific institution (which
may, or may not, be a product of changes in the external environment). The
armed forces in South Africa, Nigeria and Rwanda have been forced to transform
in light of their previous histories and the lack of representativeness
at all levels of their organisation.
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4.5 Managing The Policy Process II: Policy Development
Figure 4-2 portrays a generic policy development and implementation process that
can be applied to different parts of the security sector. It provides the
framework for the discussion in both this Section and Section 4.6. As with
all other generic processes discussed in this handbook, exactly how the
generic elements are combined will vary from country to country.
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4.5.1 Getting Started: Developing the Process Design and Guidance
Once a decision is made to conduct a major policy review, the first step is to
design the process itself. To this end, it is important to ask:
- What needs to be done?
- Who is responsible for managing the policy process? What other
role players are likely
to be involved and how will they interact with the process managers?
- How will the policy process be accomplished, and with what resources?
- Who will interpret the policy (which external and internal role
players for instance)?
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When these questions are answered, the major role players can be provided
with guidance on the policy review process by the cabinet,
the legislature or other mandated government body of a country.
This guidance should include:
- The overall direction of policy
- The issues to be addressed in the course of the review
- The fiscal framework within which the review is to be conducted
- Any required consultations
- The date by which the review must be completed
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4.5.2 Step 1: Carrying out a Security Environment Assessment
Once the process is designed and guidance has been issued, an assessment of the
overall security environment should be undertaken (Figure 4-3). This assessment
will examine potential threats to the country stemming from both internal
and external sources. The assessment will inform decisions about how the
issues that affect the country?s overall security situation will be addressed.
Some of these issues will require the attention of one or more of the country?s
security services. Non-security actors will address others. Yet, other issues
will be addressed by a combination of security and non-security actors.
The objective is to identify those areas where the defence forces will be
engaged; those areas where the police service will be engaged; and those
areas of concern to the intelligence services. It whould also seek to develop
a series of guidelines on the principles, values and framework of a broad
national security policy.
Very few countries conduct broad security environment assessments as the
basis for developing national security policies or sectoral policies on
defence, intelligence and justice/public safety. In the post-September 11
world, however, it is increasingly evident that countries need to have an
integrated vision of the requirements of the entire security sector, and
that defence policy, justice/public safety policy, and intelligence policy
should not be developed in isolation from each other.
Uganda is the first African country to have conducted a comprehensive security
environment assessment as a prelude to a defence review. That review identified
134 ?threat agents?, of which three were specific to the defence sector.
This outcome underscores the importance of including all relevant stakeholders
in the review process in order to assess how best the full range of security
challenges facing a country can be met.
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4.5.3 Step 2: Developing Policy Frameworks and Undertaking Strategic Reviews
Once the security environment assessment is completed, policy frameworks for defence,
justice/public safety and intelligence can be developed, and strategic reviews
conducted in order to operationalise these policies.
The processes in these three areas should, ideally, be managed in an integrated
manner in order to avoid contradictions and inconsistencies. In reality,
it is likely that the timetables for each area will be different. The South
African White Paper on Intelligence was completed in 1995. The White Paper
on Defence came up in 1996, while the White Paper on Safety and Security
was completed in 1998. Despite different timetables, it is nonetheless desirable
to ensure some linkage among these processes, as the outcome will be stronger
to the extent that they can inform each other.
It is also important to recognise that in some countries, policy development
and strategic reviews are conducted as a single process, whereas in other
countries they are two separate processes. Irrespective of how they are
phased, both policy development processes and strategic reviews should be
managed in a consultative manner that enhances the legitimacy and credibility
of the outcome.
The policy frameworks for the different sectors ? defence, justice/public
safety, and intelligence ? will naturally have somewhat different focuses.
However, all policy frameworks should ideally identify
- the main sectoral priorities (Box 4-4)
- the fundamental values that underpin the policy
- the legal basis of the policy
- the roles of key actors in each sector.
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| Box 4-4. Good Practice: Specifying Objectives
of Policy Papers |
South Africa?s White Paper on Safety and Security
lists three main objectives:
- Strategic priorities to deal with crime
- Roles and responsibilities of various role-players in the safety
and security sphere.
- The role of the Department of Safety and Security within the
Constitutional framework.
Source: South
Africa, Department of Safety and Security, ?Introduction,? In Service
of Safety, White Paper on Safety and Security, 1999-2004, September
1998, http://www.gov.za/whitepaper/1998/safety.htm#Intro |
While it is impossible to provide detailed cost estimates at this stage
of policy development
- policy frameworks and strategic reviews should reflect fiscal
realities.
|
A policy or strategic plan that is not financially sustainable places the
achievement of the safe and secure environment that is necessary for both
economic and political development in jeopardy. It also risks creating frustration
and resentment among the members of security organisations who are unable
to carry out all of their mandated tasks in a professional manner.
The strategic review process will produce a range of options for meeting
the objectives laid out in the policy framework for assessment by senior
policy makers. It is likely that additional information will be requested
on one or more of the options and that the proposals will be modified before
a decision is made to select one of the options.
Once the relevant executive branch actors have chosen an option, the policy
will be scrutinised by the legislature. The degree to which the legislature
is able to amend the proposed policy will vary from country to country.
All policies should ultimately be approved by the legislature.
The final step in policy development and strategic review processes is the
dissemination of the policy and other relevant materials to all stakeholders
and to the public. Of course, the quality of the policy is likely to be
higher to the extent that the public and all relevant stakeholders are adequately
consulted during all phases of the process, and not simply informed of its
outcome at the end.
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4.6 Managing The Policy Process III: Policy Implementation
Policy makers frequently give considerably attention to policy development than
to policy implementation. It is often assumed that a good policy will produce
satisfactory outcomes. In reality, policy outcomes are determined by government
actions, not what governments state they intend to do. Implementation is
thus the key ingredient of good policy.
There are many factors that influence the quality of policy implementation.
This section
- identifies a number of process factors that can help improve the
likelihood that policy will be implemented successfully
- discusses the importance of planning
- underscores the need for regular monitoring and evaluation.
Before considering these issues, there are two general characteristics
relating to policy development that should be borne in mind:
- Policy is never static. Both the political
and socio-economic environment can undermine and/or radically
shift the priorities outlined in any given policy. In consequence,
the policy management process must be flexible enough to accommodate
these changes and to reflect them in the implementation plan.
- The policy implementation process is as much a political
process as it is a technical process. While technical
skills are necessary to manage and implement policy, analytical,
synthetic, consensus-building, conflict-resolution, compromise,
contingency planning, and stakeholder-dialogue skills are equally
important.
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4.6.1. Maximising the Opportunities for Successful Policy Implementation
For policy to be implemented successfully, it is crucial that:
- The policy contains clear and consistent objectives.
- The policy identifies those factors that could influence policy
outcomes, such as target groups and incentives.
- The policy implementation process is structured so that the
people responsible for im plementing the policy actually implement
it and the intended outcomes are actually achieved.
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Five additional issues that need to be taken into account during the process
of policy implementation are that:
- Appropriate actors are assigned responsibility for implementation
and that they are capable of taking on the tasks assigned to them.
- Efforts are made to reduce the number of veto points and potential
blockages. Involving too many actors in policy implementation
inevitably retards the process and makes it vulnerable to selective
interpretation and implementation, and even obstruction.
- The necessary supportive rules, procedures and resources are
in place.
- The commitment of the leadership to the policy objectives they
have approved is genuine and sustained throughout the process
of implementation. This requires those in leadership to possess
appropriate political and strategic-management skills.
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- The commitment of target groups to policy objectives must be
developed and sus-
tained. This entails ongoing dialogue and consultation with these
target groups. The objective must be to ensure that all relevant
actors receive adequate information at all stages of the policy
process.
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As in other aspects of the policy process, it is critically important to
conduct a realistic appraisal of the capacity of relevant actors to manage
and implement policy. Attention should focus in the first instance on individuals
in key positions. Methods of on-the-job training such as mentoring arrangements
should be given priority and where possible, mentors should be sought from
countries that have undertaken similar transformation exercises. Major institutional
blockages should also be prioritised and methods of overcoming them negotiated
among the different stakeholders.
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4.6.2 Planning
Policies in any sector provide general guidance on the government?s objectives
and the norms and principles underlying these goals. In order to implement
policy, it is necessary to develop long-term strategic plans and to translate
these objectives into programmes that can be implemented and budgets that
can support the specific plans and programmes.
- Planning is important because no organisation operates effectively
in the absence of clear and realistic plans.
- Effective management and oversight of an organisation depends
on plans with measur
able outputs and agreed financial inputs.
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Needs, capabilities, and available resources have to be assessed and structures
must be developed that enable needs to be aligned with capabilities and
resources. Specifying needs and rigorously assessing requirements based
on these needs will demonstrate where there are resource gaps and should
lead governments to reallocate resources and/or to use available resources
more efficiently.
Defence, justice/public safety and intelligence plans are the documents
that specify the measurable outputs that these sectors will produce in the
pursuit of the government?s objectives against agreed financial allocations.
These sectoral plans should contain the following elements:
- The strategic profile of the defence/public safety/intelligence
organisations, including thier missions, visions, critical success
factors, and value systems.
- The analysis and critical assumptions underlying the strategic
plan.
- A clear statement of the required capabilities of each security
service.
- A clear statement of the way in which the relevant service needs
to be structured to deliver the required capabilities.
- The capital acquisition, facilities, and personnel plans to
support the delivery of those capabilities.
- The administrative outputs to manage the defence/public safety/intelligence
function, including the provision of policy, strategy, plans,
programmes, and budgets.
- The short- to medium-term operational tasks of the defence/public
safety/intelligence organisations.
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4.6.3 Monitoring and Evaluation
Regular assessments of the policy process are an important component of
policy implementation by helping to identify what has worked and what has
not worked with any particular aspect of policy implementation. The principle
of policy development, coordination and monitoring as a distinct driver
of change is gaining currency in many African countries. Of late, Ghana,
South Africa and Nigeria have all established within their Presidencies,
Offices of Policy Coordination and Monitoring to act as clearing houses
for policy formulation, as well as vehicles for monitoring and evaluating
policy implementation and performance.
| Box 4-5. Multiple Benefits of Regular Evaluation |
?Well-focused and properly timed evaluation can:
(a) provide the information needed to bring about mid-course corrections
in programs and projects; (b) allow for the analysis and resolution
of systemic or policy issues; (c) improve the design of future operations;
and (d) contribute to strategic policy and program decisions.?
Source: Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank, Public
Expenditure Management Handbook, Washington, DC: 1998, p. 112. |
Monitoring and evaluation have been some of the most neglected aspects of
the policy process. It is often assumed that once policy is agreed on, it
is ?cast in stone? and that no further changes are necessary to it. In fact,
policies need to be constantly assessed for their effectiveness and continued
relevance. Monitoring involves the routine checking of the policy against
the plan devised in the process design phase. Evaluation requires a critical
and detached examination of the objectives of the policy and the extent
to which these are being met.
Evaluations can be conducted at all stages of implementation and should
be done regularly (Box 4-5). Some evaluations should be conducted through
staff involved in implementing the relevant policy, while independent evaluators
should conduct others. In all cases, the findings of evaluations should
be fed back into the policy development and implementation process.
Monitoring and evaluation must be backed up by effective means of addressing
problems identified. Oversight is addressed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.
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Summary of Main Points ? CHAPTER 4
- Policy is important because:
(a) it provides clear guidelines for developing and imple-
menting strategies; (b) it helps to discipline government behaviour,
and to promote the optimal utilization of resources in the pursuit
of specific objectives; (c) it promotes accountability by providing
normative and practical guidelines; and (d) it encourages the
predictability of government actions
- The policy process is part of
a complex political process that reflects institutional rela-
tionships that are inherently political, subjective and psychological.
Therefore, for the policy process to operate effectively, it is
necessary to change the environment in which the security sector
operates.
- The context in which policy
is developed and implemented is critical. Key aspects of
context are: (a) political change versus political stability;
(b) the costs and benefits of the policy to be implemented; and
(c) the pace of policy implementation.
- Four cross-cutting issues that
are critical to a well-managed policy process are: (a)
policy communication, dialogue and debate; (b) adequate human
and institutional capacity; (c) policy analysis; and (d) factors
influencing the decision to conduct a major policy review.
- Policy Communication,
Dialogue and Debate: Communication is vital to a
successful transformation process. Participation is never
the prerogative of one ministry or set of actors alone. All
relevant governmental actors must have access to the information
required and the policy process must be characterised by a
spirit of openness between government and the public.
- Human and Institutional
Capacity: Policy developed without taking into account
institutional and human-resource constraints will lack long-term,
operational utility. Both civilians and security-body personnel
must have the capacity to engage fully in the policy process,
and prior to beginning a policy process, a realistic appraisal
of the capacity of all relevant actors to develop and implement
policy must be conducted.
- Policy Analysis:
Policy analysis is the backbone of a policy process and it
re-
quires good analytic and synthetic skills.
- Factors Influencing
the Decision to Initiate a Policy Process: In the security
sec-
tor, four major factors initiate a policy process: (a) major
shifts in the political environment; (b) major shifts in the
strategic environment; (c) significant changes in the economic
climate; and (d) a cultural crisis within one or more of the
security-sector institutions.
- Policy development consists of
a series of steps: ( a) developing process design and
guidance: (b) conducting a security environment assessment; and
(c) developing policy frameworks and undertaking strategic reviews.
- Process Design and Guidance:
It is important to lay out clearly what needs to be
done; who will manage the process; who will be involved in
it; what resources will be allocated to policy development.
- Security Environment
Assessment: Countries should examine potential threats
from both external and internal sources. Some of these threats
will require the attention of one or more of the security
services; non-security actors will address others. Based on
these, it will be possible to develop a series of guidelines,
principles, values and framework for a broad national security
policy.
- Policy Frameworks and
Strategic Reviews: Once the broad security policy is
developed, policy frameworks for defence, public safety and
intelligence can be developed. All policy frameworks should
seek to identify (a) main Sectoral priorities; (b) fundamental
values underpinning the policy; (c) the legal basis of the
policy; and (d) the roles of key actors. Policy frameworks
should reflect fiscal realities. Strategic reviews should
then produce options for meeting the objectives laid out in
the policy framework. All decisions should be disseminated
widely.
- Policy implementation is the
key ingredient of good policy. For policy to be
implemented successfully, (a) the policy must contain clear and
consistent objectives; (b) factors that could influence policy
outcomes must be identified; and (c) the policy process must be
structured in a way which guarantees that people responsible for
implementing policy do so and its intended outcomes are achieved.
- Policies provide guidance on
the government?s objectives, and the norms and
principles underlying these goals. To implement policy, long-term,
strategic plans must be developed. Effective management and oversight
of policies depend on plans with measurable outputs and agreed
financial inputs.
- Policies need to be constantly
assessed for their effectiveness and continued relevance.
Monitoring involves the routine checking of policy against plans.
Evaluation requires a critical and detached examination of the
objectives of the policy and the extent to which these objectives
are being met.
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5. Managing Financial Resources
AIM
Sound fiscal management of the security sector is essential if a country is to
have effective, efficient and professional security organisations that are
capable of protecting the state and its population against internal and
external threats. Integrated planning, policy-making, and budgeting systems
are necessary in order to achieve an appropriate allocation of public sector
resources and to manage these resources effectively and efficiently. This
chapter provides guidance on how this integration can be achieved in the
security sector.
Section 5.1 explains the importance of following good practice in security-sector
budgeting and discusses key principles of sound budgeting that should be
applied in all sectors. Section 5.2 outlines a generic security-sector policy,
planning and budgeting process, and describes how the security sector can
be integrated into it. |
5.1 The Ten Principles of Sound Budgeting
It is often argued that because of the sensitivity of security issues, the security
sector is different from other segments of the public sector, and that a
higher decree of secrecy is warranted in it, including on budgetary issues.
In fact, from a public policy and process perspective, the security sector
shares many of the characteristics of other sectors. Therefore, the people
of any country will benefit from a security sector that is subject to the
same broad set of rules and procedures that are applied in other sectors,
including those pertaining to the budgeting process.
Sound fiscal management of the entire security sector is essential if a
country is to have effective, efficient and professional security forces
that are capable of protecting the state and its population from internal
and external threats. Highly autonomous security forces that are able to
act with impunity in the economic and political spheres are invariably professionally
weak and highly cost-ineffective.
- Budgeting systems are structured differently throughout the
world.
- The principles that underlie these systems should not vary.
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There are ten principles of sound public expenditure management that are
widely accepted as the basis on which systems of budgeting should be constructed
(Box 5-1). It is important to understand that these principles reflect goals
that public officials should have in front of them as a guide. No public
expenditure system anywhere in the world gets top marks on all of these.
The point is to progressively improve adherence to them.
There is no justification for the security sector to violate any of these
principles. The way in which it implements them may be a bit different from
some other sectors, but the principles must not be infringed upon. All of
these principles are relevant to a well-managed budgeting process.
Six of these principles are often highlighted as needing particular attention
in terms of managing the security budgeting process in Africa:
- the transparency of budgetary processes and information
- the accountability of decision makers for the actions they
take
- the comprehensiveness of the budget
- the predictability of revenues backing that budget and the
macroeconomic policies on which those revenues depend
- the contestability of the budget process
- the honesty with which estimates of revenue and expenditure
are developed
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The principles most frequently cited in relation to the security sector
are transparency and accountability. Transparency is the cornerstone on
which an accountable security budgeting process is built. Transparency and
accountability are crucial issues in the allocation and management of security-sector
resources at all levels of planning, programming and budgeting.
- If security-sector resource allocation and management are not
transparent, security organisations will never be able to achieve
public support or the co-operation and support of the broader
government.
- If not accountable to government and people, the security sector
becomes a cause unto its own and will not be aligned with national
interests and priorities. It will easily be corrupted and decision-making
will be easily manipulated towards self-interests.
|
It is clear that some degree of confidentiality is necessary in the area
of national security. But this need should not be used to justify a lower
level of oversight or lack of adherence to internationally recognised standards
of public expenditure management. Different forms of oversight may be necessary
in some areas relating to national security, but in general there should
be a high level of transparency in the security-sector budgeting process.
| Box 5-1. Multiple Benefits of Regular Evaluation |
- Comprehensiveness: The budget must encompass
all fiscal operations of govern-
ment, i.e. off-budget expenditure and revenue are prohibited.
- Discipline: Decision-making must be restrained
by resource realities over the
medium term; the budget should absorb only those resources necessary
to implement government policies; and budget allocations should
be adhered to.
- Legitimacy: Policy makers, who can change policies
during implementation, must
take part in and agree to the original policy.
- Flexibility: Decisions should be pushed to
the point where all relevant information is available.
- Predictability: There must be stability in
macro and strategic policy, and in the fund
ing of existing policy.
- Contestability: All sectors must compete on
equal footing for funding during budget planning and formulation.
- Honesty: The budget must be derived from unbiased
projections of revenue and expenditure.
- Information: A medium-term aggregate expenditure
baseline against which the budg etary impact of policy changes
can be measured and accurate information on costs,
outputs and outcomes derived should be available.
- Transparency: Decision makers should have all
relevant issues and information
before them when they take decisions and these decisions and their
basis should be communicated to the public.
- Accountability: Decision makers are responsible
for the exercise of the authority provided to them.
Source: World
Bank, Public Expenditure Management Handbook, www.worldbank.org/publicsector/pe/handbooks.htm#English.
This report is also available in French. |
It is important to be clear about the distinction between confidentiality
and the lack of public scrutiny. It is possible to retain a high degree
of confidentiality in highly sensitive areas without compromising the principle
of democratic accountability.
- An issue may be sensitive ? off-budget activities, for example
? but it should not be kept secret.
- War plans, on the other hand, should be held in confidence.
|
Even so, holding certain subject matters such as war plans in confidence
does not mean an absence of democratic accountability. It simply requires
appropriate systems of clearance and procedures for consulting the legislature
and other oversight bodies.
Civil involvement and control of overall budget decisions, as well as careful
auditing at all levels, can help ensure that resources are actually used
to accomplish policy objectives. Nevertheless, the most effective solution
to this problem is a commitment at all levels to national interests and
objectives, and the development of clear and transparent planning, programming
and budgetary processes and systems to implement them. These processes must,
of necessity, be aligned with the national management framework. Transparency
and accountability are enhanced through the system of performance agreements,
as this relies on the definition of clear output objectives and performance
standards and the agreement on the required resources. The system is also
based on negotiation, ensuring better insight, understanding and co-operation.
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5.2 Incorporating the Security Sector into Government-Wide Fiscal Management Processes
There are five inter-related components to managing public expenditure in any
sector: (1) sectoral/strategic planning; (2) reviewing the previous year?s
performance; (3) determining what is affordable for the entire public sector;
(4) allocating resources by sector; and (5) using resources efficiently
and effectively.
For these processes to be effective, each sector needs to follow good practices
internally and to link with the broader government-wide fiscal management
and oversight process. All of these must occur within the framework of democratic
governance and the principles of sound budgeting and financial management.20
This section discusses how the process should work in the security sector,
as portrayed in Figure 5-1.
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5.2.1 Step 1: Sectoral Planning Process
As in any other part of the public sector, defence, public safety and intelligence
budgets should be prepared against a sectoral strategy. Chapter 4 describes
the process by which security policy frameworks are developed and translated
into plans that can be costed. Several points are worth repeating here:
- The policy and operational review processes should, ideally,
be as transparent and inclusive as possible. In so far as these
are based on broad consultations among the relevant stakeholders,
and the final product is made public, for example through the
publication of a policy paper and operational strategies, the
legitimacy of the processes will be strengthened.
- Within the government, the broad range of relevant actors with
mandates relating to defence, intelligence, and justice/public
safety should be involved in this process, not just the ministry
of defence or interior affairs, or the Office of the President.
It is also important that key financial management actors, such
as the finance ministry, the budget office, and the public accounts
committee in the legislature are adequately consulted.
- All sectoral policy development and planning should occur within
an agreed financial envelope.
- Defence, intelligence, and public safety organisations should
be consulted, but they should not drive the process. One of the
fundamental errors in thinking on security, especially defence,
is that security organisations are responsible for providing ?security?
and as such can prescribe how they themselves will be tasked,
structured, equipped and funded. In reality, it is the government
as a whole that is responsible for the security of the state and
its population, and that determines how security organisations
will be tasked, structured, deployed, and resourced. The security
services have an important advisory role to play in this process,
but input must be sought from a wide variety of other actors,
as well as indicated in Figure 4-2.
- Major reviews of security policies will occur at intervals.
It is important, however, to constantly monitor existing policies
to ensure that they continue to conform to realities and that
they are being implemented appropriately.
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 |
The importance of developing affordable and sustainable policies and plans
for the security sector cannot be stressed too many times. Economic considerations
need to be taken into account throughout the entire strategic planning process.
Defence forces, police services, paramilitary units, and intelligence services
all cost money. A country will not be secure if it develops policies that
it cannot resource in an open, accountable and sustained manner. Thus, part
of the guidance on the review process should include the fiscal framework
for the security sector and its constituent parts. Throughout the entire
process, the finance minister and other key economic managers need to be
informed and consulted. Options for force structures need to be developed
within the context of financial parameters and the risks associated with
buying a certain level of security (Figure 5-2).
- It is always necessary to accept some degree of risk, since
it is impossible to protect against every contingency.
- The final decisions taken must reflect economic realities.
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5.2.2. Step 2: Reviewing Previous Year Performance
While strategic reviews occur infrequently, it is important that the outcome of
the previous year?s fiscal planning and implementation
| Box 5-2. Good Practice: Information to be Captured
by FMIS |
- Approved budget allocations for both recurrent and capital
outlays
- Sources of financing for programmes and projects
- Budget transfers
- Supplementary allocations
- Fund releases against budgetary allocations
- Data on commitments and actually expenditures as against budgeted
allocations
Source: World
Bank, Public Expenditure Management Handbook, p. 65, www.worldbank.org |
should be be reviewed at the beginning of the annual budget cycle. The efficient
and effective management of resources in any sector, including the security
sector, requires that information on performance be fed back into the budgeting
process, as shown in Figure 5-1. While defining and measuring performance
in the defence sector is more difficult than in many other sectors, a focus
on readiness/capability has been shown to be helpful to any discussion of
the role, structure, performance, and resource needs of the defence forces.
However performance is defined, the review of the previous year?s budgetary
performance will be facilitated by a well-functioning financial management
information system (FMIS). The types of information that should be captured
by FMIS are shown in Box 5-2.
|
5.2.3 Step 3: Determining What is Affordable
Government policies in any sector must be affordable. Affordable policies require
a sustainable macroeconomic balance, which is critical to the long-term
economic health of a country.
- To attain a sustainable macroeconomic balance, governments must
give high priority to exercising discipline over total public
expenditure.
|
Government-wide fiscal discipline is critical because an easily expanded
resource envelope allows governments to avoid firm decisions
| Box 5-3. Examples of Fiscal Indiscipline
in Africa |
- Government officials, military officers and heads of state
and government have intervened in the resource allocation process
with flagrant disregard for established procedures and pre-determined
spending priorities.
- Military officers have presented the treasury with invoices
for expenses incurred outside the budget framework.
- Defence ministers have refused to share the details of defence
spending with finance ministers and parliaments.
- The full fiscal implications of arms procurement decisions,
including debt incurred for military purposes, are frequently
than reflected in budgets.
|
on prioritising policy objectives. At the other end of the spectrum, without
a solid floor for the expenditure envelope, resources are not predictable
and operational performance will suffer. Fiscal discipline is weak in many
African countries. While the security sector is by no means the only sector
responsible for the expansion of the resource envelope in the course of
the fiscal year, it frequently enjoys a privileged position, particularly
with reference to the armed forces (Box 5-3).
Although the defence forces and intelligence services are likely to receive
preference in times of fiscal shortfalls, this is by no means guaranteed
(Box 5-4). In general, however, it is the other security organisations such
as police services, gendarmerie forces, and border guards that tend to experience
less stability and predictability in their funding. The outcome in terms
of the ability to provide real security for countries that routinely underfund
their security organisations is, of course, far from optimal.
| Box 5-4. Problems Caused by Underfunding African
Armed Forces |
While the military often enjoys a privileged position
in terms of resource allocation in Africa, resource constraints have
made some African governments to fail to provide the armed forces
with adequate resources to carry out their assigned missions. This
not only places at risk the safe and secure environment that is necessary
for both economic and political development, it also creates frustration
and resentment among the armed forces.
Representatives of the West African armed forces, gendarmerie, and
police services who participated in a workshop on democratic governance
in the security sector in Dakar, Senegal in October 2001, argued that
adequate transparency in the defence sector is critical in order for
the serious underfunding that afflicts armed forces throughout the
region to be clear for all to see. They suggested that there is both
disdain for the military among civilians and a belief that military
security is a comparatively low priority among those who control their
countries? financial resources. In their view, this not only leads
to inadequate military budgets and thus inadequate external security,
it can also heighten internal insecurity through a threat of coups.
|
This is why it is extremely important for governments to have in place institutions
that can achieve long-term macroeconomic stability, determine the overall
resource envelope for public expenditure, and enforce government decisions
on expenditure priorities and levels.
It is particularly important that:
- Methods of evading fiscal ceilings such as guarantees, off-budget
expenditure and arrears, which can subsequently undermine fiscal
stability, are discouraged.
- Mechanisms for reviewing the potential impact of assuming debt
before approving major capital purchases exist and are applied
to the security sector. There is evidence that a lack of such
mechanisms has had destabilizing effects on fiscal policy down
the track. This is particularly relevant to defence procurement
(Box 5-5)
- There should also be clear rules for any reallocation during
budget execution, including in response to a shortfall in revenue.
|
One method of reducing opportunities to weaken fiscal discipline, which
is found in other key sectors like health and education, is to adopt a medium-term
forward planning process that is linked to medium-term revenue projections
(Box 5-6). In fact, defence officials are frequently favourably disposed
to medium-term frameworks because procurement of military equipment and
construction of military facilities involve multi-year expenditures. Adopting
a medium-term framework makes it harder to avoid fully costing defence programs,
particularly outlays on arms procurement and major construction projects.
The South African National Defence Forces have embraced the medium-term
expenditure concept in an effort to obtain consistent financing.
| Box 5-5. The Importance of Transparency in Procurement
Processes: The Tanzanian Air Traffic Control System Purchase |
In December 2001, a month after Tanzania received
$3 billion in debt relief aimed at improving the government?s capacity
to support improvements in education, health, water supply, roads
and other priority areas, the UK approved Tanzania?s purchase of a
$40 million BAE air traffic control system. The deal had been under
negotiation for several years, but the decision created considerable
concern within Tanzania and the UK, as well as the World Bank and
the IMF.
Although the system was ostensibly chosen because it could be used
for both civil and military air control, technical evaluations conducted
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at the request
of the World Bank in 2001 and 2002 concluded that the system did not
provide value-for-money. It was primarily a military system based
on dated technology, additional expensive equipment would be required
to make it functional for civil purposes, and it cost four or five
times more than a civil aviation system more suited to Tanzania?s
requirements.
The World Bank opposed the purchase, expressing concern about the
debt implications of the purchase. Both the World Bank and the IMF
refused to extend credits to enable the Tanzanian government to finance
the purchase. This led Tanzania to seek commercial funding from Barclay?s
Bank. While Barclay?s proposed to lend the money to the government
at well below market rates, Tanzania would still be paying more for
the loan at the agreed rate than if the Bank or the Fund had provided
credits. The financing deal was reportedly "deliberately structured
to fit just inside the IMF?s rules for poor indebted countries." The
IMF requires all borrowing to be at rates equivalent to containing
a grant element of 35 per cent. The Tanzanian deal reportedly included
a 35.9 per cent grant element.
Ibrahim Lipumba, the leader of the Tanzanian opposition, claimed that
the deal was negotiated without adequate consultation with the Tanzanian
parliament and that parliamentarians had only learned the details
from UK press reports. He also noted that the public expenditure review,
which was meant to take in the views of all civil society, never addressed
the issue. Civil society groups issued a statement in February 2002
calling for wider participation in future decisions to incur substantial
debt for any purpose.
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown and the then-UK Secretary
of State for International Development, Clare Short both argued strenuously
within cabinet against the approval of the deal, but were defeated.
The Ministry of Defence had used a provision licence procedure that
enabled equipment to be built and partially shipped even before the
export license was agreed. This essentially forced the cabinet?s hand.
Nonetheless, the U.K Department for International Development, DFID,
withheld £10 m in budgetary support in early 2002 over concern about
the Tanzanian government?s commitment to poverty reduction.
The budget support was resumed in mid-2002 after Tanzanian President,
Benjamin Mkapa, promised Clare Short that future public spending decisions
would received a higher level of scrutiny. Mkapa resisted efforts
to publish the ICAO report, but did begin negotiations with BAE to
reduce the price of the overall deal. The UK Arms Export Control Bill
was amended to include sustainable development as one of the criteria
for agreeing to future export licenses, although critics argue that
some loopholes remain that could allow similar deals to be approved.
Source: World
Bank Development News, "World Bank Could Bar $40 Million Tanzania
Air Traffic Deal," December 21, 2001, www.worldbank.org/developmentnews,
search Development News Archives under December 21, 2001; Alan Beattie,
"IMF ?should have prevented? BAE?s Tanzania deal," Financial Times,
Mar 27, 2002; "Tanzania: Critics Decry Purchase of Air Traffic Control
System," Irinnews.org, February 13, 2002, www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=20848;
David Hencke, Charlotte Denny and Larry Elliott, "Tanzania Aviation
Deal ?a Waste of Money?," The Guardian, June 14, 2002; David
Hencke, "Tanzania Wants New Deal on Air System," The Guardian,
June 15, 2002; Charlotte Denny, "Tanzanian Aid Back on Track After
Air Control System Row," The Guardian, July 4, 2002.
|
| Box 5-6. Benefits of Multi-Year Expenditure Frameworks |
Multi-year expenditure frameworks can help governments
to:
- Improve the linkage between policies and objectives and inputs
and outputs;
- Make the budgeting process more transparent, especially by
improving on monitoring;
- Focus on outputs and service delivery;
- Increase ownership of sectoral ministries.
|
Full costing is therefore critically necessary
for the operational effectiveness of security organisations.
- Full costing helps make the case for a particular level of funding.
- It clarifies the sustainability of individual programs.
- It helps to maximise efficiency and effectiveness in cases where
budget cuts be
come necessary.
|
In general, however, it has been difficult for African governments to develop
realistic multi-year plans, given the lack of predictability of government
revenues and the reliance on a strong institutional base. Yet, a medium-term
framework is important because the security sector needs more than a one
year planning and budgeting timeframe. South Africa?s success in adopting
a multi-year framework demonstrates that this is not impossible in the African
context.
|
5.2.4 Step 4: Allocating Resources by Sectors
Once the overall resource envelope is agreed on, resources must be allocated according
to priorities both within sectors and among sectors. This process involves
political bargaining among a wide range of actors. It must be informed by
a set of sectoral strategies and, wherever possible, information on performance.
Once the authorities responsible for central budget management set the budget
envelope for defence/intelligence/public safety, the ministry responsible
for managing the relevant sector (defence, interior and so on) should take
the lead in developing initial budget projections in collaboration with
the relevant security services.
From an efficiency perspective, it is particularly important to get the
allocation right between recurrent and capital budgets. Within recurrent
expenditure, it is also important to strike an appropriate balance between
wages and salaries, and between operations and maintenance. Unless this
balance is achieved, there may be capital investments that are not properly
maintained. Practices such as keeping "ghost" soldiers/police officers on
the payroll and channelling security-related personnel costs through other
ministries complicate this calculation. Moreover, recurrent funds may be
spread too thinly. For equipment procurement, it is critical to evaluate
up-front the full life-cycle costs of materiel.
- It is very important that the security sector competes on equal
footing for resources with other sectors.
- It is also important that the process of allocating resources
among sectors takes place in a transparent and accountable manner.
|
This means that the central budget office should assess the appropriateness
of the ministries? budget requests. To do this, finance ministries must
have the capacity to analyse security programs, just as they should have
the capacity to analyse other sectoral programs. Even where the budget office
is confined to ensuring only that the defence/intelligence/public safety
budget conforms to the guidelines laid down and that its costings are reasonable,
this should be underpinned by a knowledge of policy issues. Given the weaknesses
in the disciplining framework in many developing countries and the failure
to demand performance (in terms of outputs and outcomes) from ministries,
it is important that budget offices should build the capacity to engage
in policy debates.
The challenging role of the budget office not only ensures that decision
makers confront the full range of issues, it also will contribute to raising
the quality of proposals from ministries over time. Moves towards more output-
and outcome-oriented systems will only place more demands on budget offices
to understand policy issues. Given the limited policy capacity in many countries,
it is, of course, essential that this policy capacity must be effectively
allocated across central agencies and between central agencies and line
ministries.
- The central budget office should ideally consider spending proposals
within a medium- term resource envelope and should seek to ensure
tight links across policy-making, planning, and budgeting.
- This enhances the likelihood that that budget ceilings and floors
will be respected and security outcomes, however implicit, will
be achieved.
|
Again, it is important to recognise that in all countries, resource allocation
decisions involve very difficult trade-offs between the security and non-security
sectors as well as within the security sector itself. The trade-offs are
more difficult in poorer countries.
- It is, therefore, important that the executive delivers the
final appropriation request to the legislature by a date that
affords legislators adequate time to evaluate and debate the spending
proposal before the beginning of the new fiscal year and before
a vote on the budget is required. Exact procedures are likely
to differ from one political system to another.
- Advance agreement should be reached on mechanisms that can mediate
between the executive and legislative branches of government in
the event of disagreements over budget appropriations.
- Additionally, methods of consulting with the public on the proposed
trade-offs can strengthen the entire process by contributing to
a national consensus on priorities.
|
If a country is placed on a war footing and is forced to transform its economy
to respond more effectively to unforeseen security needs, the budget system
must be able to respond to the situation too ? allocations and the pattern
of appropriations will need to change to reflect the change in government
priorities. The executive should always be able to react swiftly to major
security threats and many constitutions empower the executive to take exceptional
action should the need arise. A key issue with respect to the management
of security expenditure in such instances is the ability of government to
avoid emergency regulations that undermine the ability to revert to good
practices once the war is over.
|
5.2.5. Step 5: Using Resources Efficiently and Effectively
Once a budget has been approved by the legislature and monies appropriated, the
goal is then to ensure that resources are used efficiently and effectively
in the implementation of the strategic sectoral priorities. This requires:
- Careful monitoring and evaluation of operational performance,
both within the security services and by civil servants.
- Well-functioning financial management information systems.
- Transparent procurement practices.
|
Monitoring and Evaluation of Operational Performance.
As a general rule, funds appropriated should be spent for the purposes and
in the amounts intended. This is necessary for sound fiscal planning and
management, as well as for the operational effectiveness of the security
services. Stability in policy and funding, particularly during the budget
year, is important for operational performance. It is difficult to assess
stability in policy if there is no strategy for defence/intelligence/public
safety and no predictability of funding. At the same time, without transparent
and comprehensive defence/intelligence/public safety budgets, it is difficult
to achieve predictability of funding.
Well-Functioning Financial Management Information Systems.
FMIS are critical if decision makers and public-sector managers are to obtain
the financial data that they require in controlling aggregate expenditure,
prioritising expenditure among and within sectors, and generally operating
in a cost-effective manner. It is also extremely important that irregularities
identified in the course of monitoring performance should be addressed.
Failure to do so may create or reinforce a climate within which non-compliance
can flourish. (See also Section 5.2.2 and Box 5-2.)
| Box 5-7. Tracking Defence Spending in Zimbabwe |
In Zimbabwe, not withstanding its involvement
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, defence expenditure has often
not been used efficiently and effectively, with negative effects on
the basic needs of service personnel and the readiness of the force
as a whole. The Parliamentary committee responsible for security sector
oversight issued reports highlighting specific problems. Some of the
shortcomings identified include overcrowded, deteriorated troop living
facilities, overcrowded military medical facilities, which also had
no medicines available, and grossly underfunded ration allowances
that forced commanders to send troops on protracted home leave to
ensure that they were fed. Conditions described in the committee?s
1998 report also affected the capability of the armed forces. For
example, military units that were surveyed lacked most or all of the
vehicles necessary for effective functioning, while the vehicles actually
on hand tended to be very old, dilapidated, or unusable due to the
lack of spare parts. Similar deficiencies were noted on the level
of aircrafts.
The government has shown no interest in addressing the problems identified
by these reports. The intervention in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo demonstrated where its priorities lie. An alternative approach,
which may be difficult to implement in the current political environment
in Zimbabwe, would be to encourage the Zimbabwean Defence Forces themselves
to conduct their own tracking surveys as part of a post-conflict reassessment
process.
Source:
Martin Rupiya and Dan Henk, ?Funding Defence:
Challenges of Buying Military Capability in Sub-Saharan Africa,? unpublished
working paper, ca. 200l, p. 29. |
Transparent Procurement Practices. As Box 5.5
demonstrates, transparency in procurement is a critical element in achieving
value for money and cost-effectiveness. Procurement should be open to public
scrutiny with expenditure fully accounted for. Purchases should also reflect
actual, rather than perceived, threats and equipment should be relevant
to agreed tasking. (See Appendix 3 for a discussion of distinctive features
of defence procurement.)
The security sector should meet the same standards of accounting applied
to non-security organisations.
- Security ministries should maintain an internal audit unit and
consideration might be given to supporting the establishment of
an inspector-general function. Inspectors-General normally have
the responsibility of investigating allegations of security breaches,
fraud, waste, abuse and commercial impropriety. They may also
be asked to undertake independent reviews of internal systems
and processes through evaluations, audits, and fraud risk assessments.
As such, the position has many of the features of internal audit
but would be expected to subsume that function. As a normal rule,
the IG would be part of the internal management.
- The auditor-general should audit security-related accounts regularly,
along with those of the different security services. The results
of these external audits should be reported in a timely fashion
to the legislature, and irregularities addressed rapidly.
- Cash flow and expenditures should be monitored closely. Methods
of verifying the number of personnel in the different security
organisations and those employed by security-related ministries,
and the linking of salary and wage payments to actual employees
facilitate these tasks.
- Tracking studies, carried out by or for one or more of the security-related
ministries, can be an important tool for determining whether resources
are reaching their intended tar-gets (Box 5-7).
- Client surveys may also be useful in the justice/public safety
sector. As Box 5-8 demonstrates, client surveys in non-public
safety sectors may identify issues relevant to the public safety
sector.
- Finally, as in any sector, feedback from monitoring and evaluation
into strategic planning is critical.
|
While it may not be appropriate to push for a greater performance orientation
in the security sector where the public sector as a whole remains deficient
in this regard, information on security-related performance should be an
objective. This would be particularly important with regard to defence preparedness,
which is akin to outputs. Clear objectives, specification of preparedness,
measures of performance supported by monitoring and evaluation should all
be encouraged. Value-for-money audits by an external auditor also helps
to focus attention on issues of efficiency and effectiveness, and the defence,
intelligence, justice/public safety sectors should not be excluded from
the mandates of the external auditor and other oversight bodies. Where a
more performance-oriented budgeting system is being implemented, defence/intelligence/public
safety should be considered for inclusion in any pilot phase.
| Box 5-8. Good Practice: Client Survey of Nicaragua
Bus System Points to Public Safety Shortfalls |
??[T]he Ministry of Construction and Transportation
(MCT) has been spurred on to undertake innovative actions based on
the findings of two rounds of [client] surveys. The initial survey
of bus riders indicated that the quality of service was poor. For
bus riders, security was an important aspect of quality and 14 percent
of riders indicated that they had been assaulted on the bus in the
last year. The initial survey also indicated that bus drivers rarely
respected the official fare of 85 cordobas ? 90 percent did not return
the 15 cordoba change when a 100 cordoba note was presented. The survey
also showed that riders would be willing to pay a higher fare if quality
of service improved. The ministry responded by raising the official
fare and taking steps to enhance public awareness of the problem.
A year later a follow-up survey was conducted. In contrast to the
previous year, 90 percent of riders reported that the new fare was
being respected. However, the quality of service had deteriorated.
There was a 60 percent increase in assaults from the previous year.
This brought the MCT, the National Police, the Managua Mayor?s Office
and the bus companies together to discuss actions to improve security
on the buses. A number of recommendations followed, including the
introduction of plainclothes policemen on buses, and establishment
of an adequate reward system for good behavior.?
Source: Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management Network, Public Expenditure
Management Handbook, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998, p.
87, Box 5-7. |
|
5.3 Key Considerations in Reforming Budgeting Systems
Many of the lessons that have been learned in the course of reforming budget systems
mirror the good practices described throughout this handbook. This section
briefly reviews several of the main issues that should be taken into account
when seeking to strengthen the budgeting process in the security sector.
- Successful budget reform In any sector requires comprehensive,
broad-based changes. Budget systems do not exist in a vacuum.
They are tightly linked to other systems, most importantly political
and managerial systems. If these other systems do not function adequately,
it will be difficult for budget systems to produce desired outcomes.
There is considerable evidence that the chances of success are greater
when the focus is on a transformation of institutional structures than
on discrete reforms, for many of the same reasons that a comprehensive
transformation of the security sector is more likely to succeed than
piecemeal reforms.
- ?Comprehensive? is not the same as ?simultaneous.?
In common with other institutional transformation processes, building
transparent and accountable budget systems that produce desired outcomes
is a complex and lengthy
| Box 5-9. A Comprehensive Approach to Budget
Reform |
?Much of the skepticism about comprehensiveness
might lie in a misconception of what is meant by the term. Comprehensiveness
is not about trying to do everything at once. Rather, it is about
taking a holistic approach to diagnosing problems, understanding
all the interlinkages and evaluating the institutional impediments
to performance, and then finding the most appropriate entry point
to launch a phased reform process. Phasing can be fast or slow,
depending on country conditions, and could eventually expand to
become comprehensive.?
Source:
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Public
Expenditure Management Handbook, Washington, DC: The World
Bank, 1998, p. 78. |
undertaking. The challenge is to develop a plan for progressively strengthening
budget systems (Box 5-9). There is no universally applicable sequence
in which reforms should be introduced. It is necessary to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of individual budget systems, as well as the
strengths and weaknesses of other systems linked to the budget system,
and develop a plan based on local circumstances.
- The most effective way of reforming a budget system is to
focus on the principles of sound budget management. There are
different ways of applying these principles, and countries must determine
what works best for them. Additionally, because budget reform is fundamentally
institutional reform, focusing on introducing specific tools or techniques
instead of principles, processes, and systems will rarely, if ever,
produce a well-functioning budget system.
- It is critically important to have the basic building blocks
of sound budget management in place. This means understanding
?budget basics? such as accounting, budget examination, estimating,
forecasting, monitoring, and evaluating.
- All budget systems face the challenge of finding the balance
between long and medium-term commitments and the flexibility to meet
unforeseen events. This is particularly problematic in the
security sector. Defence budgets are especially challenging in this
respect. Defence budgeting involves identifying possible future events
that the defence forces might have to meet in the knowledge that capabilities
will have to be developed within a finite resource base.
- In common with other types of institutional transformation,
reforming a budget system requires an implementation strategy.
Such a strategy must be flexible, but it must exist.
- One of the central tenets of sound budget management is access
to information. Access to accurate information is critical
to strengthening the decision-making process. However, it is important
to understand that more and better information will not produce better
decisions by itself. Policy choice is political and it is necessary
to understand the various factors that affect decisions.
|
Summary of Main Points ? CHAPTER 5
- From a public policy and process
perspective, the security sector shares many of the characteristics
of other sectors. The same broad set of rules and procedures applied
in other sectors should therefore be applied to security-related
budgeting.
- Budgeting systems are structured
differently throughout the world but the principles that underlie
these systems should not vary.
- The two public expenditure
principles most frequently discussed with relation to the
security sector are transparency and accountability.
- Transparency is the cornerstone
on which an accountable security budgeting process is built.
- Some degree of confidentiality
is necessary but this should not be used to justify a lower level
of oversight or lack of adherence to internationally recognised
standards of public expenditure management. Different forms of
oversight may be necessary for some areas relating to national
security, but in general, there should be a high level of transparency
in the security-sector budgeting process.
- There are five inter-related
components to managing public expenditure in any sector:
- Sectoral Planning Process:
As in any other part of the public sector, defence, public
safety and intelligence budgets should be prepared against
a sectoral strategy. All sectoral policy development and planning
should occur within an agreed financial envelope in order
to ensure that policies and plans would be affordable and
sustainable. It is always necessary to accept some degree
of risk, as it is impossible to protect against every contingency.
- Previous Year?s Performance:
Strategic reviews occur infrequently. The outcome of the previous
year?s fiscal planning and implementation period must, however,
be reviewed at the beginning of each annual budget cycle.
A well-functioning financial management information system
will facilitate this review.
- Affordability: Government
policies in any sector must be affordable, which requires
a sustainable macroeconomic balance. This in turn requires
government-wide fiscal discipline. Government must have institutions
that can achieve these objectives in place . It is especially
important (a) to discourage methods of evading fiscal ceilings,
(b) to apply mechanisms for reviewing the potential implications
of assuming debt prior to major capital purchases to the security
sector, and (c) to have clear rules for reallocation during
budget execution. One method of reducing opportunities to
weaken fiscal discipline used in other key sectors is to adopt
a medium-term forward planning process linked to medium-term
revenue projects.
- Sectoral Allocation of Resources:
The process of allocating resources according to priorities,
both within sectors and among sectors, involves political
bargaining among a wide range of actors. It involves very
difficult trade-offs between the security and non-security
sectors and within the security sector itself. These trade-offs
are more difficult in poor countries. That said, once the
authorities responsible for central budget management set
the budget envelope, the ministry responsible for managing
the relevant sector (defence, public safety, intelligence)
should take the lead in developing initial budget projects
in collaboration with the relevant security bodies. Central
budget offices need the capacity to assess the appropriateness
of ministries? budget requests.
- Efficient and effective resource
use. Once a budget has been approved by the legislature and
monies appropriated, the goal is to ensure their efficient
and effective use to implement strategic sectoral priorities.
This requires: a) careful monitoring and evaluation of operational
performance to ensure that funds appropriated are spent for
the purposes and in the amounts intended; b) addressing irregularities
identified by monitoring; c) the existence of well-functioning
financial management information systems; d) transparent procurement
practices, e) ensuring the application of the same standards
of accounting applied to non-security bodies.
- Several general points should
be taken into account when seeking to strengthen the security-sector
budgeting process:
- Successful budget reform
requires comprehensive, broad-based changes, most importantly
in political and managerial systems.
- ?Comprehensive? is not the
same as ?simultaneous.? A plan should be developed to progressively
strengthen budget systems.
- The most effective way of
reforming a budget system is to focus on the principles of
sound budget management, since there are many way of applying
these principles and countries must determine what works best
for them.
- The basic building blocks
of sound budget management must be in place.
- All budget systems face the
challenge of finding the balance between long-term and medium-term
commitments and the flexibility to meet unforeseen events.
- In common with other types
of institutional transformation, reforming a budget system
requires an implementation strategy.
- One of the central tenets
of sound budget management is access to accurate information.
|
|
6. Regional Actors and Security-Sector Governance
AIM
This chapter examines security-sector governance from a regional perspective.
Section 6.1 outlines the context of regionalism in Africa. Section 6.2 explains
how democratic governance in the security sector fits within regional security
arrangements in Africa. Section 6.3 discusses harmonisation and monitoring
of security-sector governance within regional security arrangements. Section
6.4 discusses examples of African regional initiatives where security-sector
governance is beginning to show some promise and relevance. Section 6.5
discusses the role of "regional hegemons" in the incorporation of security-sector
reform into the regional agenda.
|
6.1 The context of regionalism in Africa
While regionalism is not new in Africa, a number of factors seem to have promoted
the virtues of regionalism among African leaders and peoples in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The peculiar context of the 1990s definitely redefined
the nature of both politics and conflict. Triggered by both external and
internal factors, the crisis of hegemony and legitimacy of the average African
state found refuge in the attempt to seek a common response to the problems
at home. These factors include:
- The shifts that occurred in global and geo-political power relations,
in particular the end of the cold war and the retraction of the
imperial security umbrella, which allowed former client regimes
to be challenged in ways unimaginable in the past.
- The retreat of the superpowers placed greater prominence on
the role of and competition between regional powers in conflict
and conflict management.
- The consequent need to develop new sources of funding, including
the exploitation of natural resources and criminal activity (drugs,
etc), made the conflict parties (both governments and rebel groups)
potentially less amenable to external pressure.
- New particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity,
often structured around religion and ethnicity, replaced the extant
?universalistic? debates between ?capitalism? and ?socialism?
that had underpinned the Cold War, reinforcing the erosion of
a sense of common citizenship fostered by state contraction and
popular disillusionment with politics.
- The erosion of the institutional capacity of the average African
state, the most profound aspect of which was the decomposition
of the security apparatuses, affected the ability of the state
to ensure its own security as well as that of the community.
- African states were subjected to multiple sources of pressure
that eroded their sovereignty, from above: the cooption of crucial
areas of policy initiative by the IFIs and a variety of donor
agencies, from below: the activation of civil society and the
increasing power and resources controlled by the non-governmental
sector.
- The centrality of the state declined as a consequence of contracting
resources and capacity to deliver essential services, with various
implications for its ability to act as the centre of social cohesion
as well as for perceptions of citizenship;
- State militarism became the progenitor of the psychology of
militarism, the loss of a culture of dialogue, the implanting
of a culture of violence, and the discouraging of peaceful conflict-resolution
and processes of change.
- The increasing availability and privatisation of the instruments
of violence transformed the military balance between state and
society. This derived from massive retrenchments and growing surplus
of military assets globally, simultaneously coupled with a breakdown
in the supply-side and demand-side controls on global arms markets
and (locally) the recycling of decommissioned weaponry as most
of the wars of the 1980s wound up.
- New forms of violent national and trans-national crime have
emerged.
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Given the above context, it is evident that achievement of democratic governance
in one or more country does not necessarily guarantee the entrenchment of
core values of governance in the particular state, unless the nations on
its borders also imbibe the values collectively. The experience in the Mano
River Basin of West Africa and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa
have amply demonstrated how bad governance practice in the security sector
in one country can potentially impact negatively on the security situation
in adjoining states.
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6.2 Why Security-sector Governance Requires a Regional Approach
There are four main reasons why democratic governance in the security sector requires
regional approaches:
- Common security needs
- Cross-border nature of security challenges
- Collective response to regional security issues
- Co-ordination and harmonisation of actions and policies by external
actors
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Common Security Needs. At the regional and especially
sub-regional levels, states face broadly similar security challenges, much
of which security-sector transformation is designed to address. For example,
in West Africa, an overriding concern has been on how to end one of the
most serious threats to democratic development in the sub-region ? coups
d?état and unlawful truncation of elected authorities ? further highlighting
the need to subject the military institution to democratic control. This
threat is itself symptomatic of a deeper crisis of governance, which lies
at the root of conflict and insecurity in many states.
Cross Border Nature of Security Challenges. Genuine
and effective transformation of the security sector in each state cannot
be achieved in isolation of developments at the sub-regional level. In the
same vein, specific occurrences or processes within one state might affect
sub-regional processes. When comprehensive reform of the security sector
is embarked upon, whether in isolation or as part of a reconstruction process
at the national level, there is sometimes a risk that this effort might
be derailed by developments external to the state. Armed conflict in a neighbouring
state often brings with it cross-border issues, such as the trafficking
and proliferation of small arms, child soldiers, and the extraction of natural
resources. The consequences of civil conflict can rapidly spread to a reforming
state in the sub-region and ultimately affect the transformation processnegatively.
For example, the outbreak of armed conflict in Liberia was seen to have
ignited war in Sierra Leone in 1991, at a time when the Momoh regime was
initiating a referendum to return the country to multi-party rule. Similarly,
the rebuilding process in Sierra Leone in the aftermath of war in that country
was threatened by continued insecurity in Liberia.
Collective Response to Regional Security Issues.
There is increased recognition that the common nature of the threat facing
African states requires collective action and harmonised policies, even
if this is concentrated at the sub-regional or neighbourhood level. Such
action has been most visible, for example, in the area of response to crisis.
The then-OAU (now African Union), the Southern African Development Community
and the Economic Community of West African states have been compelled to
respond to regional crisis, albeit at varying levels. The most commonly
cited examples have been ECOWAS? responses to crises in Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Guinea-Bissau. The type of (often complex) regional peace operations
that were mounted in response to these crises highlighted the importance
of developing common values and principles in the management of such missions.
Co-ordination and Harmonisation of Actions and Policies by
External Actors. There is growing awareness among bilateral
and multilateral actors that at a minimum, a common approach to security
and development should be adopted, even if at the sub-regional level. This
has in part led to increased focus on capacity development for regional
and sub-regional institutions in Africa, including the African Union, SADC
and ECOWAS. Part of the United Nations? response has included, for example,
a decentralisation of aspects of its functions through the establishment
of regional offices ? as seen for example by the recent creation of a UN
Office for West Africa. The office for the Great Lakes region of Africa
also takes a sub-regional approach. External support for a regional approach
has also been reflected in the endorsement provided by the G-8 for the New
Partnership for Africa?s Development adopted by African leaders during the
establishment of the African Union in South Africa in July 2002, including
the establishment of the Peace and Security Council and the Common African
Security and Defence Policy.
For a reformed security sector that will promote and ensure an environment
conducive to sustainable development in the region, it is important that
the donor community and the African ruling class subscribe to a common reform
agenda, while working within a regional framework.
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6.3 Harmonising and Monitoring Security-sector Transformation within Regional Security Arrangements
The main issues in security-sector transformation within regional security arrangements
relate to harmonisation and monitoring. The harmonisation of security-sector
transformation principles within regional security arrangements should normally
be the responsibility of the secretariat of the organisation responsible
for managing regional security. Perhaps the first thing that has to be ensured
is the creation of well-laid-out structures within that organisation for
the management and co-ordination of security issues. In Africa, both ECOWAS
and SADC have, in the last few years, invested considerable time and resources
on restructuring their security arrangements. This should be the first step
towards having a security-sector transformation agenda incorporated into
regional security schemes.
Before security-sector transformation can be successfully harmonised and
monitored at the sub-regional level, there should be an appreciation of
its impact on and benefit to regional security. Regional and sub-regional
organisations would need to undertake several steps before the benefits
of security-sector transformation can become apparent. Tangible progress
in this regard would normally be more noticeable at the sub-regional level
than at the continental level. Arguably, impact of reform would ultimately
become visible at the regional level when the benefits of reform are realised
within various sub-regions.
Some of the steps that must be undertaken in order for national security-sector
transformation to be relevant for purposes of harmonisation at the regional
and sub-regional levels include:
- Commitment to certain principles, such as democracy, human rights,
good governance and the rule of law. These principles underpinned
the formation of SADC, particularly in the creation of its organ
for Politics, Defence and Security. Similarly, although the initial
Treaty of ECOWAS in 1975 did not explicitly include such values
or guiding principles, this organisation, which was initially
established to ensure economic integration in West Africa, adopted
a new treaty in 1993. The revised treaty explicitly states adherence
to these principles. The continental body, the Organisation of
African Unity, in transforming itself to the African Union has
also taken steps to reform. NEPAD has been the most ground breaking
continental agenda in recent years.
- A simultaneous commitment by several member states to democratic
values and good governance at the national level, most visibly
reflected in the holding of free and fair elections and commencement
of reform processes. Progress becomes more visible at the sub-regional
level, when the more influential states in a neighbourhood undergo
reform within the same time frame.
- Common understanding of the centrality of security-sector transformation
in the developmental process among a cross-section of critical
regional stakeholders and partners.
- A common set of guiding principles for sound security-sector
governance, to which all stakeholders subscribe.
- Creation of structures and capacity within regional organisations,
to harmonise the common policies and principles and ensure implementation
at national and regional levels. This should include, for example,
the incorporation of principles of sound security-sector governance
in the functioning of regional peace forces or standing forces.
- Recognition that the process of transformation must be owned
by local stakeholders and cannot be driven solely by external
actors.
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The benefits of this process are likely to be most visible in the area of
regional operations. West Africa has thus far presented perhaps the most
prominent example in this regard. A number of crisis situations, which led
to military operations, have compelled member states to find more effective
ways of responding to such situations. The first of such crisis situations
occurred in Liberia from December 1989 through 1997, when elections were
held in the country. In response to this crisis, a peace force, ECOWAS Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was dispatched to Liberia. Within 18 months of
the start of the Liberian war, a civil war began in Sierra Leone, which
was in part exacerbated by the Liberian war. West African states would later
have to respond to that crisis as well and, for a few years, Nigeria and
Ghana assisted in maintaining security in Sierra Leone. An ECOMOG force
later became active in the country, particularly after the junta ousted
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in May 1997. In 1998, following a civil crisis
in Guinea-Bissau, an ECOMOG force was also dispatched to that country.
These operations have provided valuable lessons for ECOWAS member states
and indeed for the larger international community. One of these is the recognition
that early warning and early action would form one of the best strategies
to prevent the degeneration of conflict into the scale of crises witnessed
in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Early action may ultimately involve preventive
deployment of military forces. Related to this is the need for uniform training,
doctrine and collective political control of sub-regional multinational
forces deployed to respond to crisis at several levels. The ECOMOG operations
in Liberia and Sierra Leone revealed the disparity in doctrine and variation
in training standards (required for different aspects of the operation from
peacekeeping to enforcement) by troops from different contributing nations.
Additionally, the conduct of troops in the treatment of warring factions
as well as the civilian population revealed a disparity in standards. Troops
from countries that had experienced long-term authoritarian/dictatorial
rule, for example, exhibited far less respect for, or understanding of,
basic human rights. This invariably affected how the host population perceived
the force. Arguably, the conduct of troops that have gone through reform
or transformation in their home institutions would meet the expected human
rights and other standards.
This situation was compounded by the apparent lack of political control
by the authorizing body, ECOWAS. Rather, political control often came from
the largest contributing country, Nigeria. Also, the contributing states
sometimes appeared to have conflicting interests in the outcome of the crisis
and this had the tendency to influence the actions of their contingents
on the ground. Arguably, this problem will diminish as member states collectively
adopt common values of democracy and good governance and undergo reforms,
accordingly, at the level of states as well as at the regional level.
A second lesson relates to the domestic political situation in the countries
most likely to contribute troops to sub-regional efforts to promote regional
security. This will be crucial to the process of achieving democratic control
of forces within the regional organisation. As more countries embark on
the process of achieving democratic control of the security sector, there
will be increased potential for effective operations at the sub-regional
level. This will have some potential for influencing militaries in other
countries yet to embark on this process. In particular, successful transformation
processes in the countries with the larger armies and thus potentially greater
capacity to contribute troops to peace operations in the region are likely
to have positive impact on the transformation of other militaries. For example,
successful security-sector transformation in a country like Nigeria, with
the ability to contribute and indeed an history of contributing as many
as 10 battalions to regional operations, will no doubt have a positive impact
on the overall environment of a peace operation in its neighbourhood. (Of
course, a correct balance should always be sought between external and internal
engagement, in order not to undermine national defence and security.) In
contrast, the impact of a similar level of reform in countries like Mali
and the Gambia, which even though consistently contributed to regional operations
in West Africa, might not be immediately felt in the area of operation.
Third, the restructuring taking place within some regional organisations
will, in turn, have an impact on the process of transforming the security
sector in certain member states. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security will be one of the most
important channels through which some national militaries/security establishments
will be transformed. The key elements of the Mechanism, and the implementation
process, as well as implications for the transformation of the security
sector at the national level are discussed below.
The monitoring of the impact of security-sector transformation should ideally
be performed by a cross-section of groups, including the secretariats of
organisations, governments of respective countries in the region, civil
societies groups in these countries and members of the international community.
All these groups may have to work together to ensure effective implementation.
The fact, too, that each of these groups are likely to be concerned with
different aspects of the security-sector transformation process means that
it would be possible for them to have a wider scope of monitoring. However,
of these groups, the monitoring role of civil society is perhaps the most
difficult to secure given the limited link between them and inter-governmental
organisations.21
21
Again, ECOWAS has made significant progress here with its recent commitment
to the establishment of a Civil Society Unit within the Secretariat. Equally,
the African Union has included an Economic, Social and Cultural Council
(ECOSOCC) as one of the key governing components in the Constitutive Act,
specifically responsible for coordinating civil society input into the workings
of the African Union. The statute of ECOSOCC was recently approved at the
AU Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in July 2004. This clearly stipulates
the mode of applying for membership.
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6.4 Regional Initiatives and the Role of Security-sector Reform
6.4.1 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Peacekeeping
The mechanism for collective conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping
and security under the Protocol, which was signed in 10th December 1999,
has a number of features, which provide an indication of the likely impact
of its implementation on West African armed forces and, in particular, on
security-sector transformation processes.
In its bid to implement the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised
Treaty, ECOWAS has been undergoing restructuring to strengthen cooperation
between member states in the areas of Early Warning, Conflict Prevention,
Peacekeeping, Cross-border Crime Control and the proliferation of small
arms, amongst other things. This suggests the possibility of joint operations
and common approach between national armies, navies, police services, air
forces and immigration services.
The institutions of ECOWAS charged with the responsibility of implementing
the Mechanism include the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the
Mediation and Security Council, the Defence and Security Commission, and
the Executive Secretariat.
One significant development is that the Authority of Heads of State and
Government no longer has sole responsibility for taking decisions on key
actions in the sub-region. A measure of decision-making power has been given
to the Mediation and Security Council. This Council will consist of nine
members ? seven elected by the Authority of Heads of State and the present
and immediate past Chairs of the Authority.
- The Mediation and Security Council will deliberate at the levels
of Heads of States and Government, and the Ministerial and Ambassadorial.
- The Council is charged with a range of tasks, which include
taking decision on peace and security matters; implement policies
designed to achieve conflict prevention, resolution and peacekeeping;
authorising all forms of intervention and taking decisions on
the deployment of political and military missions and their mandates.
- The Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders,
and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group will support the work
of the Council.
- ECOMOG, which has now been formally established, will be comprised
of ?stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in
their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment?.
- As stipulated in the Protocol, ECOMOG?s tasks will entail: observation
and monitoring; peacekeeping and restoration of peace; humanitarian
intervention in support of humanitarian disaster; enforcement
of sanctions including embargo; preventive deployment; peace-building,
disarmament and demobilization; and policing activities.
- The Protocol has also established a Peace and Security Observation
System, for purposes of early warning ? consisting an Observation
and Monitoring Centre in the Secretariat, and four Observation
and Monitoring Zones based in Cotonou, Monrovia, Ouagadougou and
Banjul.
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The Mechanism may be applied under a number of situations and they include
the following cases:
- Aggression against a member state or the threat of it;
- Conflict between several member states;
- Internal conflict that threatens to result in humanitarian disaster,
or poses threat to peace and security in the sub-region;
- Serious violation of human rights and the rule of law and in
the event of the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically
elected government.
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6.4.2 Implications for Security-Sector Transformation
These developments within ECOWAS have a number of implications, not just for broad
regional and international security, but particularly for the future of
the African security establishments (particularly the formal armed forces)
and their transformation:
- Unified training and doctrine relevant to the concept of operations
envisaged would be essential for the success of operations envisaged
under the protocol. This might require separate planning for preventive
deployment, peacekeeping, enforcement and multi-functional operations.
- A division of labour among key contributing states may be developed.
For example, Ghana, which has a record and apparent preference
for traditional peace-keeping, could specialise in preventive
deployment and peacekeeping. Nigeria and Guinea, which have demonstrated
readiness to participate in enforcement operations including ensuring
compliance with embargos, could be tasked with operations which
require the use or the threat of the use of force. Senegal could
be tasked with peace-building functions, given the nature of its
role in the select peace operations.
- A common understanding and the acceptance of strict conditions
for deployment of troops will be essential. This would include
adherence to the values collectively adopted by member states
? such as preventing human rights violations, upholding the rule
of law, and firmly opposing coups d?état.
- The ECOWAS Secretariat should be the nerve-centre for initiation
and implementation of peace operations, and political control
must rest with the organisation throughout these operations, if
the regional approach and efforts to regulate the conduct of regional
peace forces is to be successful. The establishment of a Parliament
within ECOWAS might eventually set the sub-region on the way to
achieving effective governance of a sub-regional military force.
The level of interaction and collaboration by civil society groups
across borders and their linkage (formally or informally with
ECOWAS) will also determine the extent to which that organisation
will influence the transformation process in national militaries.
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6.4.3 NEPAD and the Relevance of Security-Sector Governance
The New Partnership for Africa?s Development is seen thus far as the most visible
reflection of the commitment of African leaders to security and development
in the new international environment. Since its launch in Zambia in July
2001 and its endorsement by African leaders at the establishment of the
African Union in South Africa in July 2002, NEPAD has attracted the attention
of Africans and the international community alike. Efforts are underway
to translate this vision into a concrete plan of action.
One of the underlying considerations in the NEPAD agenda is that peace and
security are prerequisites for sustainable development. As such, NEPAD identifies
the need to strengthen existing conflict prevention mechanisms in the region
and it outlines the following four key areas in which sub-regional institutions
will require a focus:
- Prevention, management, and the resolution of conflicts
- Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement
- Post conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction
- Combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons
and landmines
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Implementing the NEPAD agenda will undoubtedly require the harmonisation
of security policies at the sub-regional, as well as state levels. But this
agenda implies a holistic approach, which requires a primary focus on broader
human security issues including civil-military relations, public safety,
crime prevention and access to justice, the management of defence policy
processes in a democracy, and re-professionalisation and transformation
of African security organisations, among other issues.
The lessons from ECOWAS discussed above will be useful in this regard. A
commitment to such an agenda at the national level will act as a major catalyst
for evolving effective regional security arrangements. The reform of the
security sector with a primary focus on these human security issues discussed
above will ensure a more systematic and professional management of regional
security issues, particularly where preventive deployment or other peace
operations become necessary. Ultimately, the successful implementation of
the NEPAD agenda, though a ?long haul?, should yield significant benefits
for regional peace, security and development in Africa.
In addition, if fully worked out along the lines proposed in chapter 3,
the African Peer Review Mechanism also offers regional institutions the
opportunity to play a critical role in monitoring democratic governance
in the security sector, including the harmonisation of doctrine, standard
operating procedures, codes of conduct and so on.
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6.4.4. Role of Regional Hegemons or Influential States
Discussions about the role of powerful regional countries in maintaining peace
and security have been on for some time, and it appears that this will remain
so for some time to come because of the economic and military disparities
among nations. This is not peculiar to Africa. Even in developed regions
of the world, the burden of regional management of conflict and security
has never been equally shared. In Africa, countries that have been performing
this role, even if informally, are Nigeria and South Africa in West and
Southern Africa respectively. However, there have been challenges to these
countries in their assumptions of this position of regional hegemons, (whether
reluctantly as in the case of South Africa, or seemingly eagerly as in the
case of Nigeria). Nonetheless, these two countries, alongside other African
states that are gradually playing influential roles (such as Algeria and
Senegal), have been a major driving force in the initiation of the NEPAD
agenda.
Regional hegemons have an important link with security-sector transformation.
First, they often have the potential to influence and to support the implementation
and harmonisation of security-sector reform within regional security mechanisms.
It is thus crucial that these states have the clout and credibility to effectively
influence such processes. Although both Nigeria and South Africa have now
embarked on a process of democratisation (with reforms at different levels
and varying degrees of success), it does not remove the possibility that
the crisis of credibility may surround any of these regional powers. Yet,
the extent to which they themselves have achieved a transformation of their
security sectors will determine the extent to which transformation can be
useful at the sub-regional level. Nigeria, for example, has consistently
contributed about 70% of the ECOMOG force. The extent to which the country
succeeds in transforming its security sector will ultimately impact, positively
or negatively, on the overall conduct of the force.
In assigning responsibility to any regional power, the possibility of a
reversal in its democratic and moral stance should also be considered. Similarly,
the question has to arise on the dangers to regional security if the regional
hegemon itself experiences major civil conflict. Although this has not happened
in recent years, it is an issue that is worth examining so that alternative
approaches that could provide a balance of power might be explored.
Ultimately, the success or failure of the effort to evolve sub-regional
and regional arrangements in the promotion of security and development in
Africa will depend, in large part, on the role of the most powerful nations
and the extent of cooperation that exists between them. For example, the
initiation of the NEPAD and its implementation plans might not have reached
the present stage in the absence of the active collaboration between the
various leading states, not the least of which are South Africa and Nigeria.
Similarly, Nigeria will play a central role in the success or failure of
the implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism. Successful transition and reform
processes in Nigeria will only enhance any progress realised at the sub-regional
and, indeed, regional levels. However, developments in ECOWAS could also
assist the process of transformation of the Nigerian security establishment,
for example, as it will help to define a mission for the institution and
identify the focus of military planning, as well as training and doctrine,
which may enhance inter-service relations and inter-operability.
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6.5 Towards a Regional Framework for Security-Sector Governance
Although the African experience demonstrates that cooperative security is possible,
even among states that lack common values, the future success of cooperative
security depends not only on spreading values of governance that promote
human security, but also on developmental regionalism that intensifies economic
ties, even in the quest to foster the sense of a ?security community?. The
closer the ties among states and their citizens, the more limited the opposition
to security-sector governance becomes.
Hence, given the context of regionalism described above and the challenges
to cooperative security in Africa elaborated upon in this handbook, a number
of factors are central to the success of efforts to entrench security-sector
governance in any regional bloc. They include, but are not necessarily limited
to, the following key elements:
- Understanding the nature of the post-colonial state and prospects
for nation-building in Africa;
- Subscribing to and institutionalising core regional values and
norms;
- Deepening democratic and open governance, and preventing violent
conflicts through political processes;
- Promoting long term conditions for security and development
by utilising human security as a bedrock for peace;
- Developing an integrated peace-building approach to security-sector
governance ? through the promotion of governmental and non-governmental
approaches and the consideration of peace-keeping, peace-making
and post-conflict transformation within a continuum;
- Entrenching democratic governance of the security sector by
establishing a clear definition of roles for security services,
while enhancing the professionalism of the sector;
- Building the capacity of African institutions for early warning,
as well as enhancing their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve
conflicts;
- Strengthening developmental regionalism as a means of addressing
the negative aspects of globalisation;
- Establishing the parameters of genuine continental and global
partnership ? including the clarification of roles across sub-regional
bodies, the African Union, and United Nations institutions.
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Whilst it is difficult to be prescriptive about the framework for security
cooperation in Africa, it is gratifying to note that most of these issues
are fully reflected as the key responsibilities of the new African Union
Peace and Security Council that were approved at the African Union Summit
in Durban, especially in relation to NEPAD and in the various sub-regional
mechanisms.
The challenge is one of promoting and monitoring regional core values of
ownership, participation, openness and transparency, accountability, fundamental
freedoms and the rule of law, as well as the implementation of agreed principles.
The overriding importance of responsible politics and responsive leadership
in building regional security cooperation is evident from the above. Until
both are present, the best that can be hoped for remains hegemonic regionalism,
which may keep the peace, but can hardly promote the fundamental values
of ownership and democratic governance.
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Summary of Main Points ? CHAPTER 6
- Securing the core values of democratic
governance in any African state requires
acceptance of these values sub-regionally and regionally.
- There are four main reasons why
democratic governance in the security sector
requires sub-regional/regional approaches:
- Common security needs
- Cross-border nature of security
challenges
- Collective response to regional
security issues
- Co-ordination and harmonisation
of actions and policies by external actors
- The main issues in security-sector
transformation within regional/sub-regional
security arrangements are harmonisation and monitoring.
- Harmonisation requires commitment
to principles such as democracy, human rights,
good governance and the rule of law; a common understanding
of the centrality of security-sector transformation among
key regional stakeholders and partners; a common set of guiding
principles for sound security-sector governance; structures
and capacity within regional and sub-regional organisations
to harmonise common policies and principles; and recognition
of the importance of local ownership on the part of external
partners.
- Monitoring should be performed
by a cross-section of groups, including secreta-
riats of regional/sub-regional organizations, regional governments,
civil society groups, and members of the international community.
- The establishment of the Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Resolution and
Peace-building within ECOWAS may affect the transformation of
West African security bodies (particularly the armed forces) in
several ways, and:
- Unified training and doctrine
will be essential.
- A division of labour among
key contributing states may be developed.
- A common understanding and
acceptance of strict conditions for the deployment of
troops will be essential, including adherence to the values
collectively adopted by member states.
- Political control of peace
operations by ECOWAS will also be essential, which opens
opportunities for oversight by an eventual ECOWAS parliament.
- Implementing the NEPAD peace
and security agenda will require a primary focus on
human security issues, including civil-military relations, public
safety, crime prevention, access to justice, management of defence
policy processes in a democracy, and re-professionalisation and
transformation of African security organisations.
- An effective African Peer Review
Mechanism will offer regional institutions the
opportunity to play a critical role in monitoring democratic governance
of the security sector.
- Regional hegemons have the potential
to influence and support the implementation
and harmonisation of security sector transformation within regional
security mechanisms. The extent to which such countries succeed
in transforming their own security sectors will have an impact
on regional security sector transformation. The reversal of security-sector
transformation or broader democratisation processes in regional
hegemons can have negative implications, regionally and sub-regionally.
At the same time, developments at the sub-regional and regional
levels can support transformation processes among regional hegemons.
- Some of the key factors affecting
the success of efforts to entrench security-sector
governance in any regional bloc include:
- Understanding the nature
of the post-colonial state and prospects for nation-build-
ing in Africa
- Acceptance and institutionalisation
of core regional values and norms of ownership,
participation, openness and transparency, accountability,
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law
- Deepening democratic and
open governance, and preventing violent conflict through
political processes
- Developing an integrated
peace-building approach to security-sector governance ?
through the promotion of governmental and non-governmental
approaches, and the consideration of peace-keeping, peace-making
and post-conflict transformation within a continuum
- Entrenching democratic governance
of the security sector by establishing a clear
definition of roles for security services, while enhancing
the professionalism of the sector
- Strengthening developmental
regionalism as a means of addressing the negative
aspects of globalisation.
- Responsible politics and responsible
leadership is of overriding importance in building
regional security cooperation.
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7. Confronting the Challenges of Security Sector Transformation
AIM
This chapter summarises some of the major challenges facing African governments,
African civil society and external actors in transforming the continent's
security sectors discussed throughout this handbook with a view to clarifying
the context in which security-sector transformation takes place:
- The challenge of transforming the security sector in a country without
a tradition of democratic norms and practice.
- The challenge of understanding the political context of transformation.
- The challenge of moving beyond the defence sector.
- The challenge of a highly limited knowledge base.
- The challenge of finding acceptable limits to state secrecy while respecting
the need for confidentiality in certain areas.
- The challenge of finding the appropriate balance between democratic accountability
and control on the one hand and security body professionalism and discipline
on the other hand.
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7.1 Challenges in Transforming the Security Sector
This handbook constitutes a first cut at documenting critical processes and
institutional relations that must come into being if the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa are to develop democratic governance practices in the security sector
and if external actors are to provide meaningful support to these efforts.
Where possible, examples of actual practice have been included and challenges
facing transformation processes have been highlighted. However, there is
very little information available on the processes by which countries in
Africa have tried to strengthen democratic security-sector governance. This
has prevented the handbook from providing detailed examples of how particular
countries have overcome specific challenges.
Nonetheless, the handbook has sought to provide a sense of the context
in which security-sector reform in Africa is carried out. This chapter
highlights six key challenges to the effectiveness of security-sector
transformation processes that are discussed throughout the handbook. Many
of these challenges are similar to those faced when transforming any sector
in a democratising country. However, the special role occupied by many
African security forces in their country?s political and economic system
makes these challenges more intractable when it comes to transforming
the security sector. In developing and implementing security-sector transformation
processes, strategies need to be developed to minimise the negative effects
of these challenges.
- The Challenge of Transforming the Security Sector In a Country Without
a Tradition of Democratic Norms and Practice.
Transforming the security sector along the lines described in this handbook
requires a simultaneous movement toward a democratic form of governance.
In countries without a long tradition of democracy, this process will be
long and full of obstacles. It will be particularly difficult where the
transformation process seeks to eliminate prerogatives previously enjoyed
by members of the security agencies. It can be anticipated that efforts
to root out the legacies of authoritarian rule will produce obstruction
and resistance by security organisations.
The security organisations are not, however, the only ones with democratic
deficits. Human and institutional capacity in the civil sector often lacks
both depth and breadth in African countries. This means that the capacity
of the civil authorities to both manage and oversee the security organisations
is frequently extremely limited. In particular, the thrust of democratisation
efforts in Africa has generally been toward empowering parliaments. However,
parliaments may contribute very little to accountability in the short to
medium-term as they are often unable to challenge the executive effectively,
misunderstand the nature of their functions, or are too weak to carry out
these functions. Additionally, inherent limitations of the multi-party system,
where the party in government also controls parliament, reduce the capacity
of the legislature for effective oversight. It is thus essential that civil
society, including the media, and other oversight actors, such as the judiciary
and auditors-general, be brought into the equation if public accountability
is to be assured. Democratic, civil control of the security sector becomes
a reality only when all elements of the ?civil? ? executive, legislature,
judiciary, and public ? are present. In this regard, it is particularly
important to identify and address instances where long involvement of the
security organisations, particularly the military, in politics has led to
the militarisation of society. Conscious efforts must be made to overcome
the effects of militarisation on civilians as well as on members of the
previously privileged security organisations.
Thus, the transformation of the security sector along the lines described
in this handbook will require the collaboration of democratically-minded
politicians, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, members of the security organisations,
and civil society. As a matter of priority, these actors need to undertake
a force-field analysis of existing capabilities within relevant institutions
and then base their strategy for security-sector transformation on a realistic
appraisal of institutional capabilities. External actors seeking to assist
this process must also be aware of existing institutional capabilities
and tailor their support accordingly.
-
The Challenge of Understanding the Political Context of Transformation.
Transforming the security sector is fundamentally a political enterprise.
Nonetheless, there often is a tendency on the part of both local stakeholders
and external actors to minimise the political aspects of transformation
in favour of more concrete technical activities. Giving attention to strengthening
democratic systems will help to address some of the potential obstacles
to security-sector transformation inherent in a country?s political context
such as the concentration of power in the executive branch, a lack of accountability
of public officials at all levels, impunity on the part of security organisations,
and corruption. It will nonetheless also be necessary to tackle these problems
in the security sector more directly. In particular, in developing and managing
a transformation process, it is essential to understand critical political
relationships, how and why decisions are made, and the incentives and disincentives
for change.
At the same time, it is important to understand that these types of problems
persist even in mature democratic systems. It is therefore not only necessary
to acknowledge that vested interests and informal relationships among
key actors will influence outcomes and to develop strategies for dealing
with these factors during a transformation process. It is also important
to develop systems that contain mechanisms for continually reviewing the
degree to which democratic objectives are adhered to and for addressing
problems as they arise even after the transformation process has been
consolidated.
- The Challenge of Moving Beyond the Defence Sector.
In Africa, much of the discussion and most of the policy initiatives relating
to governance of the security sector have focussed on the armed forces.
While there are good reasons for this, the justice triad (courts, police,
and corrections) and intelligence agencies represent no less of a challenge
to democratic control. The armed forces have threatened democracy in dramatic
but episodic ways, largely through coups d?état, but also through
more limited forms of pressure and veto. The conduct of the police is much
less dramatic but affects the daily conduct of the business of democracy
more deeply. The police are the public face of the state and their ability
to enforce the law, along with the other elements of the justice system
(courts and correction system) determines the actual scope of democratic
freedoms enjoyed by the population. Police corruption is pervasive and undermines
civil institutions, particularly the courts, while corrupt or ineffective
court systems undermine the capacity of the police to conduct their professional
duties effectively and efficiently. Because of their covert character, including
extensive links with foreign counterparts, the extraordinary reach of modern
surveillance and intelligence-gathering techniques, and their lack of transparency
and public accountability, intelligence agencies tend to be particularly
resistant to oversight. Yet they are a particular threat to democratic freedoms
when they also assume police powers, as is routinely the case in many African
countries. Intelligence and secret police agencies have functioned as death
squads, agents of torture, and political agents provocateurs.
A concerted effort therefore needs to be made to include all organisations
mandated to use force to protect the state and its population in transformation
processes. In particular, it is necessary to resolve ambiguities over the
boundary between ?external? and ?internal? security and to achieve an agreed
division of labour among the different security organisations.
Additionally, there are many security organisations in Africa that are
not formally mandated to use force to protect the state and its population
but are nonetheless part of the security landscape in African countries.
These also must be taken into account when transformation strategies are
devised. Their ability to act as spoilers needs to be assessed and strategies
should be developed either to develop methods of overseeing their activities
or to remove them from the scene.
- The Challenge of a Highly Limited Knowledge Base.
African experiences in the area of security-sector reform and transformation
have been poorly documented to date. This is not because countries have
not sought to improve the quality of security-sector governance, although
there have been relatively fewer reform or transformation efforts than in
some other regions of the world, notably East and Central Europe. Rather,
the process of developing this handbook has underscored the relative lack
of documentation on and analysis of how the process of change has been
conceived and managed.
In part this reflects the secrecy that has shrouded the security sector
in Africa. In part it reflects a lack of focus on process. Even in the
case of South Africa, which has undergone a significant transformation
process since the mid-1990s, outcomes have been documented more consistently
than the processes undertaken to achieve these outcomes. Thus, there is
good information on the various white papers that have been produced,
legislation that has been passed, and the structures that have been created.
Analyses have focused on the extent to which structural changes have been
implemented and have produced concrete changes in the intended direction.
There has been considerably less documentation and analysis of the processes
in South Africa that produced these outcomes. Throughout Africa, more
consistent investigation of reform and transformation processes is required,
and it is hoped that this handbook will help to stimulate documentation
of processes of change.
- The Challenge of Finding Acceptable Limits to State Secrecy While Respecting
the Need for Confidentiality in Certain Areas.
Although transparency is
the fundamental ingredient in accountable governance, some degree of confidentiality
is necessary in democratic security sectors. A major challenge of security-sector
transformation processes is to achieve a workable balance between the need
for transparency and the legitimate requirements of confidentiality. In
doing so, it is important to understand that the security sector is unlikely
to be more transparent than other parts of the public sector. The temptation
to set higher standards of behaviour for the security organisations than
for civilian politicians and bureaucrats should, therefore, be avoided.
Systems need to be developed by the civil authorities, in consultation with
civil society, that define what will be held in confidence and describe
the measures that will be employed to ensure adequate oversight. Developing
these systems may involve difficult negotiations between the civil authorities
and representatives of the security services, especially where the principle
of civil management and oversight is not well entrenched. Governments may
find it useful to draw on the experiences of other countries that have recently
developed such systems, both within Africa and in other regions.
- The Challenge of Finding the Appropriate Balance Between Democratic Accountability
and Control On the One Hand and Security Body Professionalism and Discipline
On the Other Hand.
Public order has deteriorated significantly in many African countries over
the last decade. There are multiple reasons for this state of affairs, including
spillover effects and legacies of conflict, inadequate allocation of resources
to justice and public safety, and political involvement of security organisations
which has undermined the professional capacities of members of the different
security services. There thus is a clear and demonstrable need to strengthen
the capacity of those organisations responsible for law enforcement to carry
out their duties in a manner consistent with democratic governance and the
rule of law. Re-professionalisation of the security organisations is therefore
high on the agenda of many African countries.
Professionalism of the security organisations is a central element of democratic
governance of the security sector and thus should form a part of any transformation
strategy. Absolute control by the civil authorities over the security organisations
is impossible. Rather, one should think in terms of shared responsibilities
within the framework of democratic governance. Professional security organisations
accept their subordination in policy matters and resource allocation decisions
to the civil authorities. They do not engage in politics or economic activities.
They function strictly within the rule of law. In turn, the civil authorities
are obliged to meet their responsibilities toward the security organisations
? for example by clearly delineating the roles and obligations of the security
organisations and allowing the security organisations to carry out those
activities within their sphere of competence without undue political interference,
and by providing members of the security organisations with appropriate
training, education and remuneration.
Throughout Africa, the civil authorities and security actors have interfered
in each other?s realms on many occasions. For instance, civilians ? particularly
politicians ? have undermined the professionalism of the security organisations
by involving security personnel in partisan political activities and in
commercial activities. The civil authorities have also interfered in areas
clearly within the prerogative of the security organisations themselves
? for example decisions about promotions below the most senior level.
For their part, African security organisations, mainly the armed forces,
have frequently overthrown the civil authorities, engaged in corrupt activities,
and abused the human and civil rights of ordinary Africans.
There are four elements of professionalisation that are particularly relevant
in the African context:
- The technical dimension: Can I fire a weapon; carry out a criminal investigation;
develop a compelling and accurate intelligence brief?
- The political dimension: Do I understand and respect the nature of my
relation- ship with my political masters?
- The normative dimension: Do I possess an ethical framework within which
I execute my responsibilities on a day-to-day basis?
- The cultural dimension: Is my conduct consistent with the cultural peculiarities
of my country and its diverse people?
All of these require attention when efforts are made to re-professionalise
African security forces.
|
7.2 Conclusion
This handbook does not provide definitive guidance on how best to approach
security-sector transformation in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather, it aims to
be a tool for promoting dialogue within the continent ? nationally, regionally,
and cross-regionally ? as well as among external actors, African governments
and civil society on concrete ways to enhance democratic security-sector
governance that are consistent with African traditions and experience. It
is hoped that the handbook will encourage similar efforts at the national
level, tailored to meet the specific needs of individual countries.
The processes defining democratic governance in the security sector that
are discussed in this handbook should be seen as end product of a long period
of transformation. No country in the world currently fully implements all
of the processes that should, in principle, guide state actions in a democratically
governed security sector. These processes and the institutional transformation
objectives they imply should be seen as a set of goals that governments
and societies work to implement incrementally. As with all broad policy
objectives, it is necessary to identify reasonable steps along the way toward
achieving these goals.
While reaching these goals may seem daunting in view of actual practice
in a country, it is nonetheless important to have them as an objective.
Problems in the security sector must be approached from the perspective
of broad goals and underlying structural weaknesses. A focus on short-term
?fixes? in any sector will fail to deal with the core problems. Training
to enable the police force, the gendarmerie, or the armed forces to carry
out a particular task for example will not result in a more effective force
if there is a fundamental mismatch between stated policy, on the one hand,
and resources available to implement that policy, on the other hand, leaving
the security body in question without adequate resources to carry out its
assigned tasks. Technical solutions can aggravate underlying structural
weaknesses. The precise shape and pace of change in each country will depend
on a range of factors. This handbook seeks to assist its users to develop
a holistic view of the state of the security sector in their own countries
and prepare them to map out process for strengthening democratic governance
of the security sector.
|
Note on Editors, Authors and Contributors
Nicole Ball is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for International
Policy in Washington, D.C., USA. Ms. Ball is also a Visiting Professor at
the University of Maryland, College Park, United States. Nicole Ball is
one of the most quoted authorities on the management of the security sector
world wide and has worked extensively as a consultant to the World Bank,
United Nations Development Programme, OECD-DAC and United States Agency
for International Development as well as to the governments of United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and Sweden. She has written over 100 academic books, monographs,
journal articles and policy briefs on security and economy, and serves on
the editorial advisory board of several journals on the security sector.Â
?Kayode Fayemi is Director of the Centre for Democracy
& Development and Scholar?in ?residence in the Program of African
Studies at Northwestern University, USA. Dr Fayemi is one of the pioneers
of security sector governance discourse in Africa and has been in the leadership
of Global Network on Security Sector Reform since its establishment in 2002.
He is also an adviser to the Executive Secretary of the Economic Community
Of West African States and has worked as a consultant to the Department
For International Development-UK, OECD-DAC, and United Nations Development
Programme on security and governance issues. He is Editor-in-Chief of
Democracy & Development: Journal of West African Affairs, on the
Editorial Board of the Journal of Security Sector Management and
on the adjunct faculty of the African Centre for Strategic Studies of the
National Defense University, USA. He has written extensively on security
sector issues in transition and post-conflict states.Â
?Funmi Olonisakin is the Director of the Conflict, Security
and Development Group at the International Policy Institute, King?s College,
London. Prior to her current position, Dr Olonisakin was an adviser in the
Office of the UN? Secretary General?s Special Representative on Children
affected by Armed Conflict, United Nations in New York. She has written
on regionalism, peace support operations, security sector reform in Africa.Â
Rocklyn Williams is a former Commander of the African National
Congress (ANC) guerilla unit, Umkhoto We Sizwe(M.K). He holds a
Ph.D from the University of Essex in England. He was until recently the
Director of Policy at the South African Department of Defence and subsequently
the Head of African Defence Sector Programme at the Institute of Security
Studies in Pretoria, South Africa. Col. (Dr.) Williams has written and lectured
extensively on the security sector in Africa. He has also consulted for
the African Union, OECD, SADC, Department For International Development,
and numerous institutions on security sector transformation. He is on the
Advisory Board of the GFN-SSR and on the Editorial Board of the Journal
of Security Sector Management.
Mark Shaw works for the United Nations Office of Drugs
and Crime in Vienna, Austria. Mr. Shaw was formerly a Senior Researcher
at the South African Institute for International Affairs at the University
of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. He has published extensively
on managing police reform within broader security sector reform agenda.Â
Ntsiki Motumi is a serving officer in the South African National Defence
Force. A former officer of the Umkhonto we Sizwe ? the guerilla army of
the African National Congress, Brig-General Motumi heads the Social Welfare
Department of the SANDFÂ
Janine Rausch is a Senior Researcher based at the Centre
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Reputed for extensive work on policing and criminal justice system in Southern
Africa, she has written and consulted widely on police reform in Africa.Â
Len Le Roux served in the South African Department of Defence
(DoD) from 1964 to 2000. During the period 1995 to 2000, he was involved
in the development of the South African White Paper on Defence, the Defence
Review, and the D0D Transformation Project. After leaving the DoD (with
the rank of Major General) in 2000, he joined the ISS, as head of the Defence
Sector Programme.Â
Martin Rupiya is Senior Researcher with the Defence Management
Programme at ISS. Previously (2002), he was a visiting Senior Research Fellow
with the Centre for Africa?s International Relations within the Department
of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
Prior to this, he served as Director of the Centre for Defence Studies (1993)
and Senior Lecturer in War & Strategic Studies in the Department of
History at the University of Zimbabwe (1990). Martin holds a PhD in Military
History, University of Zimbabwe (UZ); an MA from Kings College London, UK;
a BA Hons. in Economics and History, and a Diploma in War & Strategic
Studies, University of Zimbabwe.Â
|
Appendix 1: Collaborating Institutions
Centre for Democracy & Development (www.cdd.org.uk)
The Centre for Democracy and Development is an independent, non-governmental
research and training institution, which aims to promote the values of democracy,
peacebuilding and human security in Africa, and especially in the West African
sub-region through the provision of policy-oriented scholarship, networking
and coalition- building work and extensive capacity-building initiatives.
CDD?s research and training projects cover Governance, Human Rights, Peace
and Security, and Environment, Gender, and Economic Development issues.
In less than a decade of its existence, it has become a central reference
point for researchers and activists as a result of its work on human security,
peace building, international justice and democratic governance.
Institute for Security Studies (www.iss.co.za)
Based in South Africa, the Institute for Security Studies is one of the
continent?s leading research centres that is dedicated to the understanding
of human security issues, particularly in Southern Africa. The Institute
seeks to conceptualise, inform and enhance the security debate in Africa
through independent applied research and analysis; facilitating and supporting
policy formulation; raising awareness of decision-makers and the public;
monitoring trends and policy implementation; collecting, interpreting and
disseminating information; national, regional and international networking;
and building capacity.
Center for International Cooperation (www.ciponline.org)
Based in Washington, D.C., USA, CIP seeks to promote U.S. foreign policy
based on international cooperation, demilitarization and respect for basic
human rights. The Center for International Policy was founded in 1975, in
the wake of the Vietnam War, by former diplomats and peace activists. The
Center has led and played a vital role in an impressive number of citizens?
initiatives. Working closely with allies in Congress, the Center campaigned
to make sure that a government?s human rights record became a factor in
allocating foreign aid. In the 1980s, the Center staff became the Washington
advocates for Costa Rican President Oscar Arias?s peace plan for Central
America. The Centre has continued to play an important role in the promotion
of transparency and accountability in US foreign policy.
|
Appendix 2: Workshop Participants
Workshop 1 - Hotel Novotel Dakar, Senegal, 18 - 19 October, 2001
| Workshop 1 ? Hotel Novotel Dakar, Senegal, 18 ? 19 October, 2001 |
| NAME OF PARTICIPANT |
CONTACT |
ROLE |
POSITION/ ORG. |
Assoumane DIALLO
|
Député à l?assemblée Nationale du Mali
(BP 284 Tel : 21 57 24) |
Participant |
Parlement, MALI |
Col Nouhoun Sangare
|
Adjoint chef de l?Etat-Major Particulier du Président de la République
du Mali
Email : nsangareml@yahoo.fr
|
Participant |
Présidence de la République du Mali |
Comm. Faustin Haba
|
Commissaire Divisionnaire de Police, Secrétariat d?Etat à la sécurité
République de Guinée
Fax : 41 55 76 |
Participant |
Secrétariat d?Etat à la sécurité , GUINEA |
Col Lawel Chekou Kore
|
Haut Commandant de la Gendarmerie Nationale . BP 230 Niamey Niger
|
Participant |
Gendarmerie, NIGER |
Dr Soulé Dankoro
|
Député à l?assemblée Nationale du Bénin. Président commission des
relations Extérieures, de la coopération au développement , de la
défense et sécurité |
Participant |
Parlement, BENIN |
Karim Sy
|
Assistant du Président (Gl Lamine Cissé)
7, bis rue Wagane Diouf- Dakar
Email: ksy@sentoo.sn
Tel : 638 48 76 |
Participant |
OIDEC (Observatoire de la Démocratie et de la gestion des crises
et conflits), SENEGAL |
Dr Comfort Ero
|
International Crisis Goup-Brussels 149, venue Louis, 1050 Belgium.
( In Freetown ?13 b Old railway Line Tengbeh Town, Freetown Sierra
Leone)
Email: cero@crisisweb.org/comfortero@yahoo.co.uk |
Participant |
International Crisis Group, SIERRA LEONE |
Ms Nicole Ball
|
Centre for International Policy 1755 Massachusetts Avenue Suite
550 Washington DC 20036 USA
Email: nball@cidcm.umd.edu |
Handbook Editor & Contributor
|
Centre for International Policy, USA |
| Col Aliou Moussa Sow |
Ministère des Forces Armées Building Administratif 8ème étage- Dakar
SENEGAL |
Participant |
Ministère des Forces Armées, SENEGAL |
| Emmanuel-René moise |
Ministère des Forces Armées Building Administratif 8ème étage- Dakar
SENEGAL |
Participant |
Ministère des Forces Armées, SENEGAL |
| Hon. Mbaye Ndiaye |
Président Commission Défense /Sécurité Assemblée Nationale du Sénégal
|
Participant |
Assemblée Nationale, SENEGAL |
| Dr. J Kayode Fayemi |
CDD |
Handbook Editor & Contributor |
CDD |
| Generall Papa Khalil Fall |
Ministere des Forces Armees, Dakar-SENEGAL |
Chair of deliberations |
Ministere des Forces Armees, SENEGAL |
| Dr Momar Coumba |
Diop Chercheur IFAN-CAD BP 206 Dakar Fann |
Participant |
Université Cheikh Anta Diop, SENEGAL |
| Prof Adebayo Olukoshi |
Executive Secretary, CODESRIA, Dakar-SENEGAL |
Participant |
CODESRIA |
|
WORKSHOP 2 - 'Governance and Security Sector Transformation: Developing a Practitioners'/Policymakers' Handbook, Abuja, Nigeria, 25 - 26 October 2001
| WORKSHOP 2 - 'Governance and Security
Sector Transformation: Developing a Practitioners'/Policymakers' Handbook,
Abuja, Nigeria, 25 - 26 October 2001 |
| NAME OF PARTICIPANT |
CONTACT |
ROLE |
POSITION/ ORG. |
| Capt.(NN) Jeff Biekro |
Director of Naval Training, Ministry of
Defence , Ghana |
Participant |
Tel: 233 21 760 293
Fax: 233 21 761 1390
E-mail: geoffreybiekro@hotmail.com
Add: C/O Navy Headquarters,
Ministry of Defence Burma Camp
Accra, GHANA |
| Col. Seyni Garba |
Head of Peacekeeping
Office of the President |
Participant |
Add: Haut Commissariat a la Restauration
de la Piax,
BP 834
Naimey, NIGER
Tel: 227 72 38 44
Fax: 227 72 38 43
E-mail: seyni.garba@caramail.com |
| Lt. Col. Saa Anthony Sinah |
Director of Personnel,
Armed Forces of SIERRA LEONE |
Participant |
Add: Defence
Headquarters, Cockerill North, Wilson Road
SIERRA LEONE
Tel: 232 27 23 15
Mobile232 (0) 76 610 989 |
| Gen Ishola Williams (Rtd) |
Secretary-General |
Participant
|
Africa Strategic & Peace Research Group
302 Iju Water works Road,
Iju-Ishaga
Lagos, NIGERIA
Tel: 2341 492 5535
Fax: 2341 4924280
Email: afstrag@infoweb.abs.net
afstrag@cyberspace.net.ng |
| Col Idowu Akinyemi |
Commandant |
Participant |
School of Military Intelligence
Directorate of Military Intelligence.
6, Child Avenue, Apapa
Tel: 234 1 587 18 70 |
| Col Bello Fadile (Rtd) |
Former Director of Legal Services, Nigerian
Army |
Participant |
HELPLINE ORGANISATION,
139 YAKUBU GOWON WAY
P.O. BOX 13014
JOS, PLATEAU STATE. Nigeria
Tel: 073-463364 or 463770.
Email: bfadile@infoweb.abs.net |
| Capt.(NN) Matthew Quashie |
Deputy Commandant
(Navy) |
Participant |
Ghana Staff Collage
Teshie,
Ghana |
| Col Gabriel Udama Musa
|
Military Analyst |
Participant |
Office of the National Security Adviser.
Department of State Services
National Headquarters
P.M.B 253
Abuja, NIGERIA
234 8137 / 234 81 50 |
| Col Gabriel Udama Musa |
Military Analyst
|
Participant |
Office of the National Security Adviser.
Department of State Services
National Headquarters
P.M.B 253
Abuja, NIGERIA
234 8137 / 234 81 50 |
| Gen (Rtd) Arnold Quainoo, MV |
Executive Director |
Participant |
Center for Conflict Resolution
Accra
Ghana
Tel/Fax: 233 21 767 405
E-mail: cencor@africaonline.co.gh |
| Dr Kwesi Aning |
Senior Researcher |
Participant |
African Security Dialogue & Research,
Kofin Annan Way, Atomic Junction, Legon,
Ghana
Office +233 (510) 515
E-mail: kwesianing@hotmail.com |
| Dr Adedeji Ebo |
Head of Political Science Dept |
Participant |
Department of Political Sciences
Nigeria Defence Academy
Kaduna
E-mail: ebo@wwlkad.com
|
| Dr Okey Ibeanu |
Senior Lecturer |
Participant |
Department of Political Science,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
042-771731, 771198
Email; ibeanu@cddnig.org ,
ibeanu@hotmail.com |
| Colonel Craig Cocker |
Adviser, Ministry of Defence, NIGERIA
|
Participant |
Defence Advisory Team,
Defence Attach?
British High Commissioner?s Residence
Mississippi Street, Maitama District, Abuja |
| Ms Oby Ezekwesili |
Special Assistant to the President on Budget
Matters. |
Participant |
Head of Budget Monitoring & Price Intelligence
Unit,
The Presidency, State House
Abuja Nigeria |
| Mr Kandeh Bangura |
Deputy Inspector General |
Participant |
Sierra Leone Police
Police Headquarters
George Street
Freetown, Sierra Leone
Tel : 00 232 22 22 50 47
Fax: 00 232 22 22 77 01 |
| Mrs Elizabeth Tysonga Alpha-Lavalie |
Deputy Speaker & Chair, Public Accounts
Committee; Member, ECOWAS Parliament |
Participant |
House of Parliament
Freetown,
Sierra Leone
Tel: 232 22 22 39 39
Fax: 232 22 22 24 83 |
| Dr Gani Yoroms |
Research Fellow |
Participant |
National War College
PMB 323 Garki, Abuja
Nigeria |
| Ms Amina Salihu |
Training Programme Officer |
Participant |
Centre for Democracy & Development
17b, Mississippi Street, Maitama District, Abuja
09-4134152/3/5, Nigeria
E:mail: asalihu@cddnig.org |
| Mr Otive Igbuzor |
Research programme Officer |
Participant |
Centre for Democracy & Development
2, Olabode Close, Ilupeju Estate,
PO Box 15700, Ikeja, Lagos
Nigeria
Tel/Fax: +234 1 8043221
E: mail: igbuzor@cddnig.org |
| Dr J. ?Kayode Fayemi |
Director CDD |
SST Project Team Member & Handbook Editor |
Centre for Democracy and Development
Unit 6, Canonbury Yard
190A New North Road
London N1 7BJ
U.K.
Office Tel : +44 (20) 72 888 666
Office Fax : +44 (20) 72 888 672
E-mail: kfayemi@cdd.org.uk |
| Ms Nicole Ball |
Senior Fellow, CIP |
SST Project Team Member & Handbook Editor
|
Centre for International Policy 1755 Massachusetts
Avenue Suite 550 Washington DC 20036 USA
Email: nball@cidcm.umd.edu |
?Dapo Oyewole
|
Special Project Officer / Executive Assistant
, CDD |
SST Project Coordinator
|
Centre for Democracy and Development
Unit 6, Canonbury Yard
190A New North Road
London N1 7BJ
U.K.
Office Tel : +44 (20) 72 888 666
Office Fax : +44 (20) 72 888 672
Email: doyewole@cdd.org.uk |
|
WORKSHOP 3 - WORKSHOP ON SECURITY SECTOR HANDBOOK, SOUTH AFRICA, 1 - 2 NOVEMBER 2001
| WORKSHOP 3 - WORKSHOP ON SECURITY
SECTOR HANDBOOK, SOUTH AFRICA, 1 - 2 NOVEMBER 2001 |
| NAME OF PARTICIPANT |
POSITION/ ORG. |
COUNTRY |
CONTACT |
| Diane Abrahams |
ISS |
RSA |
Tel: 27 12 3469500
Fax: 27 12 460 0998
E-mail: diane@iss.co.za |
| Nicole Ball |
CIP |
USA |
Tel: 202 232 3317
Fax: 202 232 3440
E-mail: nball@cidcm.umd.edu |
| Gavin Cawthra |
CDSM (P & DM-Wits) |
RSA |
Tel: 27 11 717 3506
Fax: 27 11 717 3695
E-mail: cawthra.g@pdm.wits.ac.za |
| Jakkie Cilliers |
ISS |
RSA |
Tel: 27 12346 9500
Fax: 27 12 460 0998
E-mail: jkc@iss.co.za |
| Kayode Fayemi |
CDD |
UK |
Tel: 44 207 288 8666
Fax: 44 207 288 8672
E-mail: kfayemi@cddnig.org |
| Paulino Macaringue |
MoD |
Mozambique |
Tel: 258 1 49 3223
Fax: 258 1 49 3223
E-mail: p_macas@yahoo.com |
| Len le Roux |
Handbook Contributor |
RSA |
Tel: 27 83 233 3958
E-mail: lenleroux@xsinet.co.za |
| J G (Pal) Martins |
SaferAfrica |
RSA |
Tel: 27 82 987 1806
E-mail: palmartins@hotmail.com |
| K Mhlakaza |
Police Service |
Lesotho |
Tel: 266 317 262
Fax: 266 310 045 |
| Tsepe Motumi |
DoD |
RSA |
Tel: 27 12 355 6207
Fax: 27 12 355 5368
E-mail: tsepemotumi@hotmail.com |
| E M Muyaluka |
Botswana Police
|
Botswana |
Tel: 267 351 161
Fax: 267 314 833 |
| E I Negonga |
MoD |
Namibia |
Tel: 264 612 042 055
Fax: 264 612 32518
E-mail: enegonga@mod.gov.na |
| Njuguna Ndungu |
IDRC |
Nairobi |
Tel: 254 2 713160/1
Fax: 254 2 711063
E-mail: nndungu@idrc.org.ke |
| Dapo Oyewole |
CDD |
UK |
Tel: 44 207 2888 666
Fax: 44 207 288 8672
E-mail: dapo@cdd.org.uk |
| J K Phalane |
SAPS |
RSA
|
Tel: 27 12 339 3146
Fax: 27 12 339 3157
E-mail: phahlanej@saps.org.za |
| Martin Rupiya |
CDS |
Zimbabwe |
Tel: 263 4 744 441
Fax: 263 4 744 451
E-mail: rupiyam@africaonline.co.zw |
| Rocky Williams |
ISS |
RSA |
Tel: 27 12 346 9500
Fax: 27 12 460 0998
E-mail: rocky@iss.co.za |
|
WORKSHOP 4 ? WORKSHOP ON SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION HANDBOOK PRASLIN, SEYCHELLES 8-9 NOVEMBER 2001
| Workshop 1 ? Hotel Novotel Dakar, Senegal, 18 ? 19 October, 2001 |
| NAME OF PARTICIPANT |
CONTACT |
ROLE |
POSITION/ ORG. |
Assoumane DIALLO
|
Député à l?assemblée Nationale du Mali
(BP 284 Tel : 21 57 24) |
Participant |
Parlement, MALI |
Col Nouhoun Sangare
|
Adjoint chef de l?Etat-Major Particulier du Président de la République
du Mali
Email : nsangareml@yahoo.fr
|
Participant |
Présidence de la République du Mali |
Comm. Faustin Haba
|
Commissaire Divisionnaire de Police, Secrétariat d?Etat à la sécurité
République de Guinée
Fax : 41 55 76 |
Participant |
Secrétariat d?Etat à la sécurité , GUINEA |
Col Lawel Chekou Kore
|
Haut Commandant de la Gendarmerie Nationale . BP 230 Niamey Niger
|
Participant |
Gendarmerie, NIGER |
Dr Soulé Dankoro
|
Député à l?assemblée Nationale du Bénin. Président commission des
relations Extérieures, de la coopération au développement , de la
défense et sécurité |
Participant |
Parlement, BENIN |
Karim Sy
|
Assistant du Président (Gl Lamine Cissé)
7, bis rue Wagane Diouf- Dakar
Email: ksy@sentoo.sn
Tel : 638 48 76 |
Participant |
OIDEC (Observatoire de la Démocratie et de la gestion des crises
et conflits), SENEGAL |
Dr Comfort Ero
|
International Crisis Goup-Brussels 149, venue Louis, 1050 Belgium.
( In Freetown ?13 b Old railway Line Tengbeh Town, Freetown Sierra
Leone)
Email: cero@crisisweb.org/comfortero@yahoo.co.uk |
Participant |
International Crisis Group, SIERRA LEONE |
Ms Nicole Ball
|
Centre for International Policy 1755 Massachusetts Avenue Suite
550 Washington DC 20036 USA
Email: nball@cidcm.umd.edu |
Handbook Editor & Contributor
|
Centre for International Policy, USA |
| Col Aliou Moussa Sow |
Ministère des Forces Armées Building Administratif 8ème étage- Dakar
SENEGAL |
Participant |
Ministère des Forces Armées, SENEGAL |
| Emmanuel-René moise |
Ministère des Forces Armées Building Administratif 8ème étage- Dakar
SENEGAL |
Participant |
Ministère des Forces Armées, SENEGAL |
| Hon. Mbaye Ndiaye |
Président Commission Défense /Sécurité Assemblée Nationale du Sénégal
|
Participant |
Assemblée Nationale, SENEGAL |
| Dr. J Kayode Fayemi |
CDD |
Handbook Editor & Contributor |
CDD |
| Generall Papa Khalil Fall |
Ministere des Forces Armees, Dakar-SENEGAL |
Chair of deliberations |
Ministere des Forces Armees, SENEGAL |
| Dr Momar Coumba |
Diop Chercheur IFAN-CAD BP 206 Dakar Fann |
Participant |
Université Cheikh Anta Diop, SENEGAL |
| Prof Adebayo Olukoshi |
Executive Secretary, CODESRIA, Dakar-SENEGAL |
Participant |
CODESRIA |
|
Appendix 3: Defence Procurement22
There should be little difference between public expenditure management
in general and public expenditure management in the defence sector. Defence
procurement should accordingly adhere to the same principles that guide
public sector procurement in non-defence areas: fairness, impartiality,
transparency, cost-effectiveness/efficiency, openness to competition. Additionally,
it is essential that there be high-level consultation and evaluation of
all major procurement projects for all forms of public sector procurement.
| The Generic Procurement Process |
A generic procurement process involves:
- A clear definition of the requirement;
- Clear technical quality specifications and standards;
- An open request for proposals and tenders;
- Tender adjudication according to set criteria;
- Selection of preferred bidder;
- Drawing up of a contract;
- Placing the contract/order;
- Monitoring progress;
- Reception of goods;
- Quality assurance checks on goods received;
- Acceptance of goods or rejection of goods not up to specifications;
- Payment
- Distribution of goods.
Source: Len LeRoux, South African defence planning specialist
|
At the same time, with the exception of procurement of works and commodities
(such as construction, clothing, food, fuel, office equipment, general vehicles
and consultancy services), defence procurement does exhibit some distinctive
characteristics. These relate to: 1) the relative importance of cost in
determining which bid is accepted; 2) confidentiality related to national
security considerations; 3) time frame for major weapons procurement; 4)
complexity of defence procurement; and 5) the existence of international
arms control treaty regimes and national legislation governing arms procurement.
These distinctive characteristics are deviations in scale rather than principle.
As explained above, adequate levels of confidentiality can be maintained
without violating basic public expenditure management principles. There
certainly should be skepticism about any claims that procurement of relatively
standard works, services, and commodities for defence should be subject
to different rules.
- Cost considerations in bidding. While standard procurement
practice in non-defence sectors is giving increasing emphasis to value-for-money
considerations, defence analysts argue that cost considerations are
more frequently not the major factor in accepting a bid for weapons
procurement projects than for projects in non-defence sectors. They
point out, however, that national legislation can play an important
role in regulating the role that cost plays in procurement processes
in the defence sector. In South Africa, for example, the Defence Review
(www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/Frame/Frame.htm, click on ?Defence Review
?98?) and the White Paper on Defence Related Industries (education.pwv.gov.za/
Legislation/White_Papers/Defence.htm) spell out which technologies are
considered ?strategically essential capabilities? and thus exempt from
lowest-cost considerations. The South African Parliament has approved
both policy documents.
- Confidentiality. Transparency in defence procurement
must be limited by national security interests. Confidentiality clauses
will be required in the defence procurement process. This too can be
regulated by national legislation. The South African Defence Review
lists a number of reasons for confidentiality in defence procurement.
These include: the protection of third party commercial information,
the national security of South Africa, harm to South Africa?s ability
to conduct international relations, and the protection of South Africa?s
economic interests and commercial activities of government bodies.
- Time frame for major weapons procurement. From inception
to final acceptance of product, procurement of major weapon systems
may take as much as 15 years. Some flexibility needs to be built into
the procurement process to take account of contingencies such as fluctuations
in currency exchange rates. This long time frame also makes quality
control throughout the procurement process essential, rather than when
the product is ready for delivery. Defence procurement projects should
also take into account full life-cycle support to and cost of the acquired
systems. The long time frame also makes it essential to attempt to forecast
spending farther into the future than in non-defence sectors. The UK,
for example, has a 10-year ?Long Term Costing? system for defence.
- Complexity of defence procurement. Due to the complexity
of defence procurement, sound management of the defence procurement
process requires interdisciplinary project teams. Such teams should
contain expertise on engineering, resource management, contracting,
quality assurance and design assurance. Additionally, because of the
complexity of the procurement process for major weapon systems, which
involves a substantial number of subcontractors, opportunities for corruption
are particularly great. These projects therefore require the highest
level of management and scrutiny by governmental accountability mechanisms.
South Africa has three levels of approval for major arms acquisition
projects within the South African Department of Defence. For major projects,
parliamentary approval may also be required.
- Existence of international arms control treaty regimes and
national legislation governing arms procurement. General government
procurement is not subject to this sort of international and national
legislation. Some defence budgeting specialists suggest that such national
and international regulation increases transparency due to associated
oversight mechanisms.
22
This discussion draws on information provided by defence planning specialist
Len LeRoux and defence management specialist Tony.
|
Appendix 4: Summary of Issues, Indicators, Benchmarks for Democratic Governance in the Security Sector
| SUMMARY OF ISSUES, INDICATORS AND
BENCHMARKS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE SECURITY SECTOR |
| Item |
Goals |
Indicative Targets |
Indicators or Benchmarks |
| 1 |
Rule of Law & Constitutionalism |
- Presence of a democratically agreed
Constitution.
- Bill of Rights guaranteeing equality
of citizens before the law and the liberty of the individuals;
individual and collective freedoms and equality of opportunity
for all
- Independent Institutions of State
- Improvement of law enforcement
mechanisms and criminal justice system
- Independence of the Judicial branch
- Presence of Court of superior jurisdiction
to arbitrate in constitutional matters
|
Imposed or ?People ?owned? constitution
Right to justiciable freedom of expression, information, political
association and fundamental freedoms, economic, social and political
rights
Ombudsperson, Human Rights Comm., Gender Equality Commission; Anti-Corruption
Comm.
National judicial reform, Police reform, Prison improvement
Ensure transparency in process of selection of judicial officers;
improve incentives and remuneration.
Independent Constitutional or Supreme Court The Constitution |
2
|
Political Representation |
- Mode of appointment to legislative
and governmental positions;
- The composition of the political
system
- The competitiveness of the political
system
- Nature of appointment to the executive
branch.
- Independent candidature
- The composition of the national
parliament along party lines
- The composition of local and regional
councils
- The autonomy and independence of
the electoral system
- Independence & Impartiality
of the electoral authority.
|
Is appointment determined by elections
and do the elections give room for alternation of political power
Does it consist of a multiparty democracy comprising of two or more
parties.
Extent of effective competitiveness in the political process;
Role of Legitimacy, competence, national character |
3
|
Personal security and access to justice |
- Strengthening Police Accountability
and Responsiveness;
- Developing Community Awareness
- Improve access to and reduce cost
of ?justice?
- Improving Police-Community Relations
- Improving the prosecution service
and decentralise workload
- Investigate non-traditional forms
of justice reform.
|
? Community Policing Principles
? Demilitarising public order and defining security in broader terms
? Legal Aid and scope of legal clinics for pro-bono cases
? Establishment of Independent Police Services Commission with adequate
powers
? Examine scope for mediation and arbitration in the community |
4
|
National security and conflict prevention |
- Clearly defined and well articulated
vision and mission of security sector organisations24
- Accountability of -organizations,
particularly in the security forces
- Security-sector organizations operate
in accordance with the international law and domestic constitutional
law;
- Information about security-sector
planning and budgeting are widely available, both within government
and to the public, and a comprehensive and disciplined approach
to the management of defence resources is adopted;
- Civil-military relations are based
on a well-articulated hierarchy of authority between civil authorities
and the defence forces, and on a relationship with civil society
that is based on the respect for human rights;
- Civil authorities have the capacity
to exercise political control over the operations and expenditure
of the security forces and civil society has the capacity to monitor
the security forces and provide constructive input to the political
debate;
- An environment exists in which
civil society can be consulted on a regular basis on security
policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues;
- Security-force personnel are adequately
trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner consistent
with the requirements of democratic societies;
- Fostering an environment supportive
of regional and sub-regional peace and security has a high priority
for policy-makers
|
Defence and Security-sector Review &
White Papers
Accountability both to elected civil authorities and to civil society
Constitutionally defined role of the security structures
Availability of alternative sources of verifiable knowledge information
on the security sector
Extent of dialogue and interaction between the security sector and
civil society
Clearly defined constitutional powers for the Parliament and Executive
Branch ? powers of the purse, powers of deployment and powers of scrutiny
Extent of the professional autonomy granted to security forces
Regional Norms and values |
| 5 |
Open and Accountable Institutions |
- The nature and composition of the
civil service
- Transparency and accountability
in government
- Decentralisation of decision making
structures and the nature of inter-governmental relations
- Media awareness
- Presence and Effectiveness of independent
monitoring agencies
|
Independence of Civil Service
Accountability of Civil Service to elected authorities
Quality Control mechanisms for civil service at all levels
Civil Service Commission?s effectiveness |
| 6 |
Broader Understanding of Security through
Effective and equitable provision
|
- Meeting the 2015 International
Development and Millennium Targets
- Country?s social and economic rights
regime
|
Extent of fulfillment of human security
and human development goals in health, food, environmental security
and poverty reduction |
| 7
|
Facilitative mechanisms for policy formulation
and management |
- Management of national budgetary
process
- Effective Policies for linking
security-sector governance and pro-poor poverty reduction policies.
- The nature and development of policy
process
- Role of civil society
- Private/public partnership arrangements.
|
Extent of inputs into the budgetary process
by all stakeholders, including civil society
Extent of Involvement of a wide array of stakeholders in policy formulation
& management.
Effectiveness of Policy making mechanisms |
8
|
Enhanced International Regime for Democratic
Governance in the Security Sector |
- Regulatory Frameworks for behaviour
of IFIs and Bilateral institutions consistently applied
- Availability of regional frameworks
to which member states? subscribe
- Regulatory Frameworks for non-state
actors ? TNCs etc
|
Level of mutual accountability
Extent of context determined inputs.
Level of corporate responsibility among trans-national entities |
23 This
is adapted from a presentation made by Kayode Fayemi to the NEPAD-African
Peer Review Mechanism Experts Workshop held in Cape Town, South Africa,
October 7-8 2002.
24
This section is derived from the DFID work on the principles of good governance
in the security sector.
|
Appendix 5: Code of Conduct for African Armed Forces
| As part of its efforts to promote civil-military relations in Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (Regional Centre) in collaboration with the Government of Togo, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) organised a seminar in Lome (Togo) from 29 to 31 October 2001. The theme of the seminar was "the promotion of civil-military relations in Africa: a factor of peace and security in Africa." The embassies of France, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany in Togo also provided financial assistance for the seminar.
| |
|
